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Insufficient water for irrigation is a common problem in New Zealand, particularly in the 
Canterbury region, where the use and demand have been steadily increasing over the past 20 years 
(PCE, 2004; The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2004). As a limited resource, there 
are restrictions around its use. While farmers who need water for irrigation can apply for consent 
through Environment Canterbury, the process takes a long time and is expensive. As a result, only 
those with large farms or those who will be able to realise greater financial benefits and higher levels 
of productivity tend to apply. Instead, most farmers apply to a community irrigation scheme such as 
Central Plain Water Limited (CPWL) who sells water to individual farmers. As a farmer must pay for 
each unit of water that s/he uses, s/he needs to have a good irrigation plan in place to ensure they 
obtain the maximum profit from their investment.  
In New Zealand, most farmers use computer programmes to estimate their irrigation 
requirements. The two most common programmes in New Zealand are IrriCalc and OVERSEER. 
However, both have some limitations: they can only be used to calculate the water needs of an 
individual farm and neither can prioritise crop water needs during periods of water scarcity. To deal 
with this problem, we designed an agent-based irrigation management system that can be used to 
optimise water allocation around the farm which is particularly useful during periods of water scarcity 
by taking into account the crop types and prioritising them based on the crop utility value.  As it 
calculates the water savings based on each crop’s growth stage and prioritises it in terms of its 
potential sales price, this agent-based system provides a way to increase farmers’ profitability and to 
enables them to thrive during periods of water scarcity. 
During the water reduction exercise, most farms suffer from water shortages. However, there 
are farmers (who may have overestimated their water needs) who will have excess water. Recognising 
this situation, we developed a multi-agent system to improve water allocation within a community of 
water users (where each individual agent represents a farm) and investigated the efficiency of water 
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distribution mechanisms among farms.  Farmers can use the proposed multi-agent water management 
system to negotiate with each other to buy and sell water among themselves. One of the most well-
known and simplest methods to achieve this is by using an auction. The choice of an auction was 
deliberate as it allows agents to buy water at a price, they are comfortable with. An agent must 
consider how much they are willing to pay for a specific volume of water to ensure their farm remains 
profitable. This study considered three-auction types and compared the results of each auction in 
terms of fair water distribution, profit for the sellers and reductions in losses for bidders. We found 
that the pay-per-bid auctions (discriminatory and uniform) are the best strategies for water 
distribution that balance between water distribution and gaining profit in water community. In 
addition, we also investigated how varying behaviours of sellers and buyer affect the outcome of the 
auction. 
 
Keywords: water allocation, crop water need, agent and multi-agent system, auction mechanism 
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1.1 Background of research 
Due to population growth, demand for agricultural production has been increasing constantly since 
the second half of the 20th century. A Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report shows an increase 
of 30% in per capita food consumption in developed countries (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2010). 
To feed the projected population of 2050, current food production will have to double. This will require 
two times the amount of water (Birendra, Schultz, & Prasad, 2011). As an activity, agriculture uses the 
most water on the globe: Seventy percent of all water used by humans is used in agriculture (Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 2010).  However, as urbanisation increases, so too does the domestic and 
industrial need for water thus meaning there is less water for agriculture. This means that farmers today 
must produce more food using less water.  
 Birendra. et al. (2019) have shown that it is possible to feed a growing (global) population using 
less water through improved water management practices. Improvements in irrigation efficiency not only 
help improve food production, but also reduce the environmental deterioration caused by overland flow 
and deep percolation (Anthony & Birendra, 2018).  
Environmental problems associated with inefficient irrigation are common around the world. This 
is the case in New Zealand, where ground and surface water resources have been degraded due to nitrate 
leaching through drainage (Birendra, 2016). Computer programmes such as IrricalC, OVERSEER, and 
APSIM seek to improve farm irrigation management practices. These tools enable farmers to calculate 
their irrigation requirements (Keating et al., 2003; Mateos, López-Cortijo, & Sagardoy, 2002; Wheeler & 
Bright, 2015). However, these programmes have their limitations: they can only calculate irrigation 
requirements for a single crop on a single farm: in other words, they cannot be used on a farm which has 
multiple crops. In addition, they do not support water sharing between users.    
This research applies computer techniques to estimate irrigation needs for farms which have 
multiple crops, each with varying watering requirements. Moreover, the proposed computer programme 
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supports water sharing mechanisms between users which optimises the use of water without 
compromising on yields and having a negative impact on the environment. 
1.2 Agriculture and irrigation in Canterbury  
The Canterbury region which is located in the South Island of New Zealand, has the largest area of 
irrigated land and thus uses the largest proportion of water (58% of country’s total water allocation): it 
represents 70% of the country’s total irrigated land (Birendra, 2016; Housen, 2015). In this region, areas 
under irrigation have been progressively increasing over the past 13 years: from 240,778 ha in 2002 to 
478,143 ha in 2017 (refer to Figure 1.1). Numerous dryland farms has been converted to irrigated land 
(Jenkins, 2015). Consequently, water use and water demand have steadily increased over the past 20 
years, resulting in insufficient water availability.  Insufficient water availability may become a problem in 
the future. New Zealand water usage data shows that in the agriculture sector, water usage has been on 
the rise: 55% per decade since 1965 (The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2004).  This 
increasing demand for water has directly affected the water allocation scheme in Canterbury. This means 
that there is not enough surface water for agriculture. 
  
Figure 1.1 Total irrigated land area (Hectare per km2) (2002 - 2017) 
Source: https://www.stats.govt.nz/indicators/irrigated-land 
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1.3 Canterbury climate 
The New Zealand climate varies across regions. It has been broadly categorised into three types: 
subtropical; warm-temperate; and cold-temperate (Chappell, 2013; Macara, 2014). The North Island is 
considered a subtropical region. This area is the warmest part of the country and tends to be humid. 
During the planting season (from November to April) temperatures range between 15˚C and 30˚C. The 
main crops grown in the North Island are wheat and potatoes (Macara, 2014). The warm-temperate region 
(the middle)  is cool in winter and warm in summer.  Temperatures range from 10 ˚C in spring to 25˚C in 
summer.  The main growing season is from September to May/June. The main crops are onions, broccoli, 
broad beans, and eggplants (Macara, 2014).The cold-temperate region (the South)  has no humidity. This 
region is cold in the winter and warm in the summer. Cold winters are ideal for crops that need winter 
chilling. The main growing season is from October/November to April/ May, with the main crops being 
pasture, peas, wheat and radishes. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Canterbury regional map 
Source: http://www.localcouncils.govt.nz/lgip.nsf 
Figure 1.2 shows that Canterbury falls into the cold-temperature category. This region lies on the 
Southern Alps where the annual rainfall is low and long dry spells can occur, especially during summer 
(see Figure 1.2). The rainfall and Reference Evapotranspiration (ET0) data show that from September to 
April the ET0 is greater than rainfall (refer to Figure 1.3). Evapotranspiration (ET) is the rate of water 
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extraction from the bare soil is known as evaporation (E). The sum of evaporation and plant transpiration 
is called evapotranspiration (ET) (Brouwer, Goffeau, & Heibloem, 1985; Brouwer, Prins, Kay, & Heibloem, 
2013). This means that there is the potential for water shortages over September to April. Thus, farmers 
may need to apply supplementary irrigation during this period. Crop water needs vary each month 
depending on the rainfall. Due to high water usage, there are often water shortages and/or restrictions 
during the summer season (Macara, 2014).  
 
Figure 1.3 Average monthly reference evapotranspiration (ET0) and rainfall data based on 16 years (2000 
– 2015) of values, recorded at Broadfield weather station (Birendra, 2016) 
1.4 Irrigation in Canterbury 
In terms of surface water, Canterbury has three types of rivers.  The first of these, the alpine rivers 
with their upper reaches in Ka Tiritiri o te Moana (the Southern Alps) , are snow-and alpine-rain fed.  The 
second, the foothill rivers, are rain-fed catchments where water flow peaks during winter. The third type, 
the lowland streams, are spring-fed from the groundwater (Environment Canterbury, 2012; Jenkins, 2018). 
Currently, many catchments such as the Hawke's Bay, Wairarapa, Marlborough, the Tasman, 
Canterbury, and Otago are heavily allocated and are expected to face further pressure due to increasing 
land use intensification, particularly from irrigated dairy farming (Environment Canterbury, 2012). In order 
to support this growing need for water, farmers must use the available water more efficiently.  
In Canterbury, the irrigation season generally starts in September and ends in April (Birendra, 2016). 
In Canterbury, there are many different irrigation systems, including centre pivot systems, rotorainer, k-
 15 
line and long lateral. The centre pivot is the most popular irrigation system in New Zealand and in 
particular, in Canterbury where 44% of the total irrigated area is under centre pivot (as shown in Figure 
1.4) (Canterbury, 2016). The centre pivot has a high level of automation and farmer can programme it to 
apply a certain amount of water per second or to a particular depth.  The water application rate varies 
along the length of pivot: At the centre, it will be a low application rate (a light drizzle) while at the end 
span, it has a higher application rate (a heavy downpour). The long lateral and k-lines are used in areas 
which are not covered by centre pivot systems, such as the corners of a paddock (McIndoe, 2002).  
 
Figure 1.4 Type of irrigation (Canterbury) 
Source: Guide to good irrigation: Part 1 (DairyNZ, 2015) 
Farmers determine irrigation needs based on their crop, soil moisture, and soil type. Any irrigation 
system needs to programme the water flow based on irrigation need estimation before applying water 
rate to soil surface to ensure the efficient use of water. Farmers need to schedule maintenance for their 
irrigation systems (Dairy NZ, 2011). 
Agricultural crops require irrigation to meet their water requirements and ensure the production 
of high-quality crops. To maximise irrigation efforts, farmers should have control over the actual 
application of water  (Agriculture Victoria, 2018). A good farm irrigation management system is useful for 
irrigation planning to determine when a good time is to irrigate and how much water is needed. Too much 
water can drown the plants and kill them. Equally, a lack of water can severely stress the plants and may 
lead to reduced growth (Armstrong, 2020). 
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1.5 The main agriculture crops in Canterbury 
The main crops that are grown in Canterbury include pasture, wheat, barley, oats, field peas, and 
potatoes. Most of the farmland under the water consent is related to pasture (76%). New Zealand farm 
systems can be classified into two categories: stock farming and mixed farming. Stock farming is 
predominantly grass-fed and includes sheep, cows, and pigs. Mixed farming can be further divided into 
two groups: 1) sheep and crop and 2) intensive cropping. Mixed crop farms produce both pastures to feed 
sheep and other crops on the same farm. Intensive cropping includes wheat, barley, oats, and peas (Evans, 
2004).  
All farms need to have good nutrient, waterway, and irrigation management. Nutrient control 
involves managing the fertiliser inputs and taking into account all nutrient sources. Waterway 
management involves identifying the risk of overland flow of sediment into water resources. Crop water 
irrigation management includes controlling the timing of irrigation inputs and plant water demand 
management to minimise the risk of leaching and water runoff. 
1.6 Water use consent mechanisms in Canterbury 
Currently, in Canterbury water management policy is governed by the Resource Management Act 
1991 (RMA 1991) and the Local Government Act 2005 (LGA 2005). The RMA is a primary piece of legislation 
that outlines how natural resources, water included, should be managed. This is a sustainable 
management policy that affects environmental activities now and in the future when making resource 
management decisions. While the RMA is focused on the sustainable management of natural resources 
the LGA enables the local government to make decisions for their community’s benefit. The RMA requires 
local governments which included regional, district and city council to create plans that help them manage 
natural resources within their boundaries. These plans outline the rules and conditions associated with 
resources use. After the local government approves a plan, they release the RMA that contains guidelines 
for freshwater management to regional, city and district councils. Generally, resource consent includes 
information on how much water a consent holder can use on daily, weekly and monthly basis and under 
what minimum river flow conditions. 
The local government monitors the utilisation of resources within its area. For example, 
Environment Canterbury (ECAN) monitors river flow and water levels for 155 rivers and lake sites in 
Canterbury. It updates this information on its website daily at 3 pm. Farmers need to check the water level 
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data before applying water on their farms. Farmers are responsible for understanding the minimum flow 
conditions imposed under their water consent (ECAN, 2010).  
In terms of water consents, ECAN’s records show that there were 150,000 ha of land consented for 
irrigation in Canterbury in 1985. By 2006 it had reached 560,000 ha (Jenkins, 2018). This massive increase 
in the number of consents means that there is a great need to reduce water usage on farms. At the 
moment, the maximum amount of water that a farmer who does not have a consent can use is less than 
5 litres per second; this figure represents a significant reduction from the 20 litres per second allowed in 
2011 (“Measuring and reporting water takes: An introduction to the Resource Management,” 2010). This 
shows that insufficient water to meet irrigation demands may become a problem in the future. 
Canterbury currently has an oversubscribed water consent problem. It has been reported that 
potentially millions of litres of water are used illegally.  The data shows that approximately 400 large-
consent holders are still not measuring water usage. It is difficult to obtain a consent for water usage and 
the irrigation water is inadequate for all users. Farmers can obtain water use consents from ECAN or they 
can purchase water from community irrigation schemes such as the Central Plain Water Limited (CPWL). 
This kind of community irrigation scheme can offer large irrigation consents to individual farmers (Is et al., 
2014). 
1.6.1 Individual water consents 
The RMA requires councils permitting for a controlled water permit based on ECAN plan. To use 
water, farmers must prepare and submit an application to ECAN to obtain approval. They must provide 
farm information such as land size, water needs, and their farming plan. In addition, the application should 
include a brief description about the site, location and impact on the environment. Farmers can consult 
with ECAN, but must pay extra for these consultations. (Kaye-Blake, Schilling, Nixon, & Destremau, 2014). 
The consent process takes a long time and is expensive. Applying for consent is only really suitable for 
farmers who own large pieces of land (Environment, 2004) and as a result of irrigation will be able to 
realise greater financial benefits and productivity. 
1.6.2 Water use consent through the Central Plains Water Limited (CPWL) 
The CPWL is the owner and operator of the Central Plains Water Enhancement Scheme which is 
located in the Central Plains of Canterbury (Figure 1.5). The CPWL has obtained approval for water 
diversion, damming, reticulation, and irrigation to 60,000 hectares. The scheme takes water from the 
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Rakaia and Waimakariri rivers which are linked by a 56 kilometres headrace canal running around the 
foothills. The CPWL Scheme was established over three stages, based on the geographical location 
(Thorpe & Global, n.d.). Stage 1 covers 23,000 hectares of irrigation land which lies between the Rakaia 
and Selwyn rivers. Stage 2 covers 20,000 hectares between the Selwyn and Waimakariri rivers. The 
Sheffield scheme covers 4,100 hectares lying at the western margin of the CPWL irrigation area. It utilises 
water from the Waimakariri and Kowhai rivers (Thorpe & Global, n.d.).    
The CPWL provides services to its shareholders. The water price is a fixed price per hectares based 
on location and the CPWL construction stages. Farmers can ask for a quote directly from CPWL. It is a good 
option for farmers to buy water from CPWL rather than applying for ECAN consent because it can reduce 
the water consent application process and cost in case of small/medium farming sector. However, if a 
farmer chooses to change their cropping strategies this may lead to changes in their water requirements. 
Situations like these mean that there is a need to manage irrigation more wisely and/or allow users to 
share their water. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 CPWL enhancement scheme area 
Source: https://www.cpwl.co.nz 
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1.7 Main irrigation issues in Canterbury 
1.7.1 Water sharing 
Drought is a major problem for farmers. Reduced water leads to a loss of productivity and 
stock/crops. In 2014, it was reported that there was a 20% decrease in production when farmers were 
asked to reduce their usual water usage in December by 50% (Sharpe, 2015). During the drought season, 
ECAN issues water restrictions. Farmers must adhere to these water restrictions which makes water 
distribution worse. Restrictions essentially mean depriving crops of water, which in turn, leads to a loss in 
productivity. To maintain productivity, there must be a reliable method to determine the actual water 
requirements for each individual crop based on their type, growth stage and the soil moisture level. If a 
farmer knows how much water his crop/s require, it is possible to ensure that they only get what they 
need and thus avoid wastage. In addition, during drought conditions, it is crucial to prioritise by irrigating 
high yield crops first to minimise financial losses. 
Although farmers are knowledgeable enough to determine their water requirements, there is the 
need for a flexible mechanism which can deal with day-to-day fluctuations in plant water requirements 
due to changing weather conditions (van Iersel, Burnett, & Kim, 2010). Farmers need to have a plan in 
place which outlines which crop they will irrigate in times of drought (Anthony & Birendra, 2018). 
Once consent has been granted (it is valid for 10 to 12 years), it is difficult to reduce one farmer’s 
water take rate so that another’s take rate can be increased (Mitchell, 2016). However, ECAN provides a 
water sharing portal between consent holders by joining water user groups. The Land and Water Regional 
committee defines a water user group as one designed to manage the water allocation. It is a voluntary 
group that is authorised to take and manage water resources among members of a particular group. The 
member of a water user group can allocate water between themselves during periods of water restrictions 
as long as they follow the water user group’s rules. Members who need to buy water can contact other 
members directly. They can negotiate between themselves to determine how much water they need and 
what price they are willing to pay. They then provide this information to ECAN (Thorpe & Global, n.d.). 
The CPWL allows shareholders to take and use water for irrigation depending on how much water 
they are allowed to use.  The CPWL also provides a water sharing portal on their website. All CPWL 
member can access this portal and share their requirements (offers to buy or sell). They can then negotiate 
the price and sharing volume directly. Like with the ECAN scheme, they must report to the CPWL on any 
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deals made. However, there is no mechanism which enables users to share and distribute excess water to 
others particularly in the case where most of the shareholders have a deficit. Moreover, if such a 
mechanism was available, how would it best distribute excess water so that everyone would benefit from 
it? This situation has received very little scholarly attention and requires greater understanding. Based on 
this setting, this thesis aims to describe how to distribute the excess water and optimise the total 
additional profit in water user community.  
1.7.2 Limitations with current irrigation management tools 
Using a computer programme to estimate irrigation requirements is a popular option. The two most 
common computer programmes used in New Zealand are IrriCalc and OVERSEER.  IrriCalc is a water 
balance model designed to estimate irrigation water requirements. It can determine seasonal irrigation 
water needs. OVERSEER, owned and supported by the Ministry for Primary Industries, uses daily soil water 
content data to calculate daily water drainage. Irricalc and OVERSEER require users to enter factors such 
as the selected month, farm location, and irrigation system, to calculate daily water needs. However, 
these programmes can only be used on a single farm with a single crop. Chapter 2 discusses these 
programmes in greater detail. 
1.8 Agent-based solution 
The current irrigation management programmes do not support irrigation estimates for multiple 
crops on a single farm (Anthony & Birendra, 2018). To deal with this problem, this research has developed 
an irrigation system which can be used to manage irrigation both on single/multiple crops on individual 
farms and within a community, using an agent-based approach to optimally allocate water, in particular 
under conditions of water scarcity or restrictions. Agent-based Programming (AP)  is a software paradigm 
that uses concepts from Artificial Intelligence (AI).  The agent-based system has an advantage over other 
approaches because it can work with uncertain factors. It also supports non-linear data. Moreover, it is 
flexible and autonomous in complex situations. It can make decisions in an unexpected situation and is 
suitable for software development, which requires dynamic behaviour.  
Agent-based software is applied to solve complex problems. Researchers can build a single or multi-
agent depending on their problem. Our irrigation management system can manage irrigation both on 
individual farms and within a community of farmers during periods of water scarcity. This programme 
helps allocate water more efficiently. With the proposed system it is possible to apply a single agent to 
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estimate crop water needs and crop water allocation in periods of water scarcity. It makes decisions about 
water allocation based on farm factors which include potential crop yields, crop drought sensitivity, crop 
growth stage, soil type, soil moisture levels and irrigation systems. The agent can harness the maximum 
potential of agent on water allocation in community when we apply them to work together as multi-agent 
system to optimize the water distribution between water users in community. However, the single agent 
cannot handle complexity of water distribution in water user community which has different farming 
behaviours. Therefore, multi-agent system is more effective to deal with this problem. 
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) is a computation system composed of multiple interacting agents. It 
solves problems that are difficult to solve using the single agent scheme. It can model complex systems 
and introduce the possibility of conflicting goals in complex problem statements (Bellifemine, Caire, & 
Greenwood, 2007; Garro et al., 2018). The multi-agent system can be applied to many types of modelling 
with varying agent behaviours. It can learn and adapt itself to meet its objective (Bellifemine et al., 2007; 
Le Bars, Attonaty, & Pinson, 2004). In MAS, an agent can negotiate/collaborate/coordinate with another 
agent/s to achieve common goals. Moreover, an agent can operate independently and intelligently, while 
at the same time working with other agents to achieve a larger goal without compromising their own goal.  
MAS has been applied to solve resource and water allocation problems. For example, the agent 
based model was applied to capture collective problems in water infrastructure provisions (Berger, Birner, 
Díaz, McCarthy, & Wittmer, 2006). The problems are collected by learning and understanding the 
complexity of water use by MAS simulation.  MAS has been used to understand the behaviour of different 
water users (representing them as agents). The results from the interactions of these agents have been 
used to develop water management policies (Berger et al., 2006). Giuliani et al. (2015) applied the MAS 
simulation model to demonstrate a hypothetical water allocation problem. The simulation model created 
several active and passive agents to investigate the tradeoff between efficiency-acceptability. The results 
were used to support the design of a distributed solution. 
 Gregg and Walczak (2006) proposed an auction mechanism which has the ability to ensure 
maximum profit on both seller and bidder. Several research have proposed that the auction mechanism 
is useful for water and resource allocation (Gregg & Walczak, 2006). Yamamoto & Tezuka (2007) 
compared three types of auctions in an electric supply auction to analyse how these large generator bids 
can maximise their profits and how auction impacts the closing price and the winning bids. Hailu and 
Thoyer (2005) proposed a multi-unit auction mechanism for water reallocation between users.  
 22 
Accordingly, this thesis extended the single agent water management to multi-agent system to 
improve water allocation and investigate the efficiency of water distribution mechanism among farms. 
Farmers can use the proposed multi-agent water management system to negotiate with each other 
(where each farmer is represented as an agent) on how excess water should be distributed among 
themselves. One of the most well-known and simplest methods to achieve this is using an auction. The 
choice of an auction was deliberate as it allows agents to buy water at a price they are comfortable with. 
An agent must be clever as to how much they are willing to pay for a particular volume of water because 
they need to consider their own goals. This research considered three-auction types and compared the 
results of each auction in terms of fair water distribution and additional profit for sellers as well as 
reductions in losses for bidders. We found that the auction mechanism is useful for allocating excess 
water. Chapter 3 explains the auction techniques and mechanisms used in this research. 
1.9 Research objectives 
This research has following main and sub-objectives: 
Main objective 
To develop a multi-agent-based irrigation management system to manage irrigation on individual farms 
and within a community during periods of water scarcity.  
Sub-objective 
a) To design and develop a water allocation algorithm to allocate water more efficiently on an 
individual farm. 
b) To implement a multi-agent system to facilitate water sharing within a community of 
farmers. 
c) To investigate varying strategies that can be used to optimise water sharing within a 
community of farmers. 
d) To assess how agents’ behaviour may affect water sharing within the community. 
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1.10 Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured in the following way: 
• Chapter 1 describes the research background. It provides an overview of irrigation in Canterbury 
and explains key issues farmers face with respect to irrigation and water management. The 
chapter also discussed aims and objectives of the research.  
• Chapter 2 broadly describes irrigation management and planning. It includes calculations for crop 
water needs (which are based on factors such as soil moisture and weather data), farm costs and 
profit estimates. It also describes related works on water management using various computing 
techniques and current irrigation management programmes. 
• Chapter 3 describes our irrigation management system which can be used to manage water on a 
single farm and within a community of farmers. It also explains water sharing mechanism related 
to various auction mechanisms for finding the best water allocation strategies.  
• Chapter 4 presents the experimental results for the performance of the irrigation management 
for a single farm. 
• Chapter 5 investigates how excess water can be distributed within a community irrigation using 
different water sharing mechanisms. 




This chapter describes factors related to irrigation planning and management. As such, it explains 
crop water needs and water estimation procedures in detail. It also discusses existing irrigation tools used 
to estimate farm water requirements. In addition, this chapter reviews related work on agent-based water 
allocation and other resources associated with agent-based technologies. It summarises various 
computing techniques used for resource and water allocation. The chapter concludes by identifying 
research gaps. 
2.1 Irrigation planning and management 
Irrigation planning involves scheduling irrigation to achieve a desired goal. Irrigation management 
is the day-to-day work which needs to be completed in order to achieve that goal. The goal of irrigation 
planning and management is to ensure more efficient use of water. Some factors that need to be taken 
into consideration in irrigation scheduling and management include soil temperature, soil moisture status, 
the weather forecast and water restrictions. These are summarised in Table 2.1 (DairyNZ, 2011). 
Table 2.1 Some key factors affecting irrigation planning and management 
Factor Issues 
Soil temperature The soil temperature varies with crop type, climate and planning season. 
The crop growing rate will slow down when it is too hot (above 35ºC) or 
when it is too cold (below 6ºC) (DairyNZ, 2011). 
Soil moisture status The soil moisture level must be between refill point and field capacity in 
order to ensure optimal crop growth (Birendra, 2016).  
Weather forecast The weather forecast provides information on rainfall that can be used 
when making irrigation plans. 
Water restrictions Checking water supply restrictions include annual volume allocation limits 
or water delivery rosters. 
 
Some of the key factors to be considered in irrigation planning and management are described in further 
detail in the next section. 
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Soil type 
Soil is a natural storage tank. It holds water for plants. Soil can be categorised into different types 
based on its water holding capacity (WHC), which is the amount of water that a soil can hold expressed in 
millimetres of water per metre depth of soil (mm/m) (DairyNZ, 2011). Crop water needs can be estimated 
using the WHC of the soil within the crop root zone. For example, the structure of clay soil means that it 
sits closely together. It has a high WHC value (190 – 195 mm/m), meaning that it holds water well. While 
this soil type is wet and contains a lot of water, it is not desirable for growing crops. Sandy soil is soil with 
small pieces of eroded rock. It has a gritty texture. It is usually dry and has a low WHC value (45 – 55 
mm/m). Sandy soil is usually dry and fast draining. On farms, soils change even within a single metre. 
Therefore, it is essential to consider spatial variations in the application of irrigation (K.C. et al., 2019) 
Crop growth is related to soil water levels.  Soil can be categorised based on its water content; it 
can be saturated, have reached field capacity, the refill point or permanently wilting (shown in Table 2.2). 
Saturation level refers to when the soil is totally saturated and is unable to hold any more water. This will 
also result in a loss of excess water to deep drainage and surface ponding may occur. Field capacity refers 
to the saturation level of moisture content that a soil can hold. If there is no rainfall and irrigation, soil 
moisture goes down from the field capacity and reaches a point below which plants need to use a certain 
amount of energy to absorb water. This is called the refill point. If there is still no rainfall and irrigation, 
soil moisture keeps decreasing. It reaches a point where plants cannot absorb water at all: this is called a 
permanent wilting point. Farmers need to apply irrigation before soil moisture drops to a refill point and 
fills up to the field capacity, leaving some room for potential rainfall (Birendra, 2016).  
Table 2.2 Effective soil moisture for plant growth 
Soil moisture status Soil moisture levels Plant growth 
Saturation The soil is totally saturated and 
unable to hold any more water. 
Excess water is lost to deep 
drainage. Surface ponding may 
occur. 
Plant growth is restricted through 
a lack of oxygen and nutrient loss. 
Field capacity The optimum level of soil moisture. 
All water is available to plant. 
Ideal for plant growth. 
Refill point Soil becoming drier. Plant under stress, growth might 
be impaired (survival mode). 
Permanent wilting point Soil is very dry Plant dies. 
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Plant type and its development stages  
Crops receive water via the root zone.  Different crops and pasture types have different root 
depths. The plant root zone is the surrounding root area which contains soil and oxygen near the plant. 
The depth of the plant root affects the water available for the plant. Deep rooting crops can absorb more 
water than those with a shallow root (DairyNZ, 2011; Pierret et al., 2016; Savva & Frenken, 2002). The 
plant root depth is used for crop water estimations in irrigation schedules. We explain root depth data 
associated with crop water estimations and daily irrigation schedules in Chapter 3.  
To obtain maximum crop productivity, a farmer must apply irrigation, or the right amount of water 
at the right time to suit the plant’s growth stage; different crop growing stages require different amounts 
of water. Farmers need to estimate water usage for each stage of the plant’s growth. According to 
Brouwer et al. (1985) the crop growing period can be divided into four stages (refer to Table 2.3). While 
crops use a lot of water in the initial stage, in the last stage, they need less water. Therefore, farmers need 
to align the irrigation with the crop growth stage. Every crop has different growing stages, and every stage 
has different water needs. 
Table 2.3 Crop growth stages 
Crop stage Description 
1) Initial stage This is the period from sowing or transplanting until the crop 
covers approximately 10% of the ground cover. 
2) Crop development stage This period starts at the end of the initial stage and lasts until the 
ground is nearly fully covered (ground cover 70 - 80%): it does 
not necessarily mean that the crop is at its maximum height. 
3) Mid-season stage This period starts at the end of the crop development stage and 
lasts until maturity; it includes flowering and grain-setting. 
4) Late-season stage This period starts at the end of the mid-season stage and lasts 





The plant growing process is affected by the climate. The major climate factors that are related 
to crop growth are rainfall and evapotranspiration (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2012). Figure 2.1 
shows the inputs and outputs for the crop. The input water sources are rainfall, irrigation and capillary 
rise. Water is reduced through transpiration (loss from the leaves), evaporation (lost from the soil), surface 
run-off and deep percolation. The rate of water extraction from the bare soil is known as evaporation (E). 
The sum of evaporation and plant transpiration is called evapotranspiration (ET) (Brouwer et al., 1985, 
2013). Transpiration is the movement of water within a plant and the subsequent loss of water as vapour 
by leaf. The ET rate depends on the season. For example, the ET rate is higher in the summer as the plant 
needs more water to grow and maintain a consistent temperature. The ET rate is lower during winter; 
irrigation is not required as rainfall alone is enough to meet crop water needs. Irrigation scheduling in 
autumn and spring depends on the rainfall which varies with location. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Water input and outputs in the plant root zone  
Source: (Allen & Pereira, 2009) 
 
Irrigation system capabilities 
Different irrigation systems have different application capabilities which affect irrigation planning 
and management. There are four key factors which need to be considered in irrigation planning (Table 
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2.4). These irrigation processes are based on the application depth, application rate, distribution 
uniformity and soil infiltration rate. The different irrigation systems provide different levels of irrigation 
efficiency (DairyNZ, 2011).  
Table 2.4 Description of the irrigation process 
Irrigation process Description 
Application depth How deep must the water penetrate? For example, farmers generally 
apply 5 mm of water for pasture.  
Application rate  
(or application intensity) 
How fast the water is applied to the irrigated field.  This is measured 
using water depth in fixed time ( mm/ ha) .  The standard rate is 1 
litre/m2 or 10m3/ha. 
Distribution uniformity  The evenness of irrigation application. For a centre pivot, this is 
generally 70 – 90%. 
Infiltration The rate of water movement from the surface into the soil:  water 
must soak into the soil without causing run-off or ponding. Infiltration 
rates vary according to the soil type and slope. 
 
2.2 Estimating crop water needs  
Water requirement for crops are estimated using the water requirement for a reference crop. The 
daily water need indicates the daily water requirement for a particular crop. This value varies with 
different factors, such as temperature. For example, in locations that have a high temperature or dry 
climate the recommended water requirement is 10 mm per day. This means that the crop needs a water 
layer (rain or irrigation) around 10 mm over the whole area every day. The crop water need estimates are 
shown in Table 2.5 (Brouwer et al., 1985). Using Table 2.5, if a standard grass crop in each area needs 
around 5.5 mm of water per day, then, maize will need 10% more water and nuts will need 20% more 
water. In the case of maize, 10% of 5.5 mm. =  10
100
× 5.5 = 0.55 mm. This means that maize needs: 5.55 
+ 0.55 = 6.05 mm per day. A crop’s water needs for a growing period can be calculated by multiplying 




Table 2.5 Crop water needs compared to a standard grass 
Crops needing the 
same amount of 
water as grass 
Crops which need 10% 
more water than 
standard grass 
Crops which need 20% more water 




peanuts, grass, clean 
cultivated nuts & fruit 
trees 
Barley, beans, maize, 
small grains, tomatoes, 
eggplant, lentils, oats, 
peas, potatoes, soybeans, 
sunflowers, wheat 
Nuts and fruit trees with cover crops 
 
Since crop water needs vary according to development stages, we need to know the different crop 
growth stages. Data on crop growing periods, provided by the FAO, is shown in Table 2.6. Crop water 
needs are defined by their evapotranspiration (ETcrop) and can be calculated using the following formula 
(2.1): 
𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 =  𝐸𝑇0  × 𝐾𝐶   (2.1) 
 
where:  𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝  =  Crop evapotranspiration 
   𝐸𝑇0  = Reference evapotranspiration 
𝐾𝐶   = Crop coefficient  
Reference evapotranspiration (ET0) 
𝐸𝑇0 is the amount of water a crop needs to ensure optimal growth. It can be affected by major climatic 
factors which are sunshine, temperature, humidity, and wind speed. Table 2.7 shows the effect of major 
climatic factors on crop water needs (Brouwer et al., 1985). The highest water need for crops is found in 




Table 2.6 Crop growing periods (days) 
Crop name Min/max Total Initial Crop development Mid-season Late season 
Barley/oats/wheat 
Min 120 15 25 50 30 
Max 150 15 30 65 40 
Beans/green 
Min 75 15 25 25 10 
Max 90 20 30 30 10 
Beans/dry 
Min 95 15 25 35 20 
Max 110 20 30 40 20 
Cabbages 
Min 120 20 25 60 15 
Max 140 25 30 65 20 
Carrots 
Min 100 20 30 30 20 
Max 150 25 35 70 20 
Tomatoes 
Min 135 30 40 40 25 
Max 180 35 45 70 30 
Grains/small 
Min 150 20 30 60 40 
Max 165 25 35 65 40 
Lentils 
Min 150 20 30 60 40 
Max 170 25 35 70 40 
Maize, sweet 
Min 80 20 25 25 10 
Max 110 20 30 50 10 
Maize, grain 
Min 125 20 35 40 30 
Max 180 30 50 60 40 
Onions/green 
Min 70 25 30 10 5 
Max 95 25 40 20 10 
Onions/dry 
Min 150 15 25 70 40 
Max 210 20 35 110 45 
Peanuts/groundnut 
Min 130 25 35 45 25 
Max 140 30 40 45 25 
Peas 
Min 90 15 25 35 15 
Max 100 20 30 35 15 
Potatoes 
Min 105 25 30 30 20 
Max 145 30 35 50 30 
Sorghum 
Min 120 20 30 40 30 
Max 130 20 35 45 30 
Soybeans 
Min 135 20 30 60 25 
Max 150 20 30 70 30 
Spinach 
Min 60 20 20 15 5 
Max 100 20 30 40 10 
Squash 
Min 95 20 30 30 15 
Max 120 25 35 35 25 
Sunflower 
Min 125 20 35 45 25 
Max 130 25 35 45 25 
 
 
Table 2.7 Effect of major climatic factors on crop water needs 
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Climate factors 
Crop water needs 
High Low 
Temperature Hot Cool 
Humidity Low (dry) High (humid) 
Wind speed Windy Little wind 
Sunshine Sunny (no clouds) Cloudy (no sun) 
𝐸𝑇0  can be estimated using several methods including the pan evaporation method and the 
Blaney- Criddle method.  Pan evaporation is a measurement that combines the effects of several climate 
elements (humidity, temperature, rainfall, solar radiation, and wind). However, this method requires 
many processes for measuring data (Allen & Luis S., 1998).  The Blaney-Criddle method is more popular 
because it is calculated using a theoretical method that does not require measured data (Allen & Luis S., 
1998). The Blaney-Cridle method is simple, especially because it only requires temperature data. 
The Blaney-Criddle formula 
𝐸𝑇0 = 𝑝 (0.46 𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 + 8)  (2.2) 
where:  𝐸𝑇0 = Reference crop evapotranspiration (mm/day) as an average for  
a one-month period 
  𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 = mean daily temperature (°C) 
  𝑝 = mean daily percentage of annual daytime hours 
 To determine the value of  𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 , requires the monthly temperature values from the local 
metrological station.  𝑝 is determined by taking the mean daily temperature and the latitude of the area 
(as shown in Table 2.8). For example, 𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 for latitude of -25° in April is 25.5°C. As Table 2.8 shows, 𝑝 is 
0.26. To work out the 𝐸𝑇0: 
𝐸𝑇0 = 0.26[(0.46 × 25.5) + 8] = 0.26(11.73 + 8) = 0.26 × 19.73 = 5.12 𝑚𝑚/𝑑𝑎𝑦 
 
 
Table 2.8 Mean daily percentage (𝑝) of annual daytime hours for different latitudes 
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Latitude 
North Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
South July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June 
60°  0.15 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.13 
55°  0.17 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.16 
50  0.19 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.2 0.18 
45°  0.2 0.23 0.27 0.3 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.21 0.2 
40°  0.22 0.24 0.27 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.21 
35°  0.23 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.3 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.22 
30°  0.24 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.3 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.23 
25°  0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.3 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 
20°  0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.3 0.3 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25 
15°  0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25 
10°  0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 
5°  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 
0°  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
 
 The ET calculation can be calculated using several methods such as Penman−Monteith, 
Shuttleworth−Wallace, Makkink methods etc. which depend on the different weather information. Based 
on the correlations between the model results, Pereira and FAO-56 models agreed the most to the pan 
evaporation measurements included Bleney-Cradle method (Rácz, Nagy, & Dobos, 2013). 
Crop coefficient (𝑲𝒄) 
The crop coefficient (Kc) is the ratio of 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 to 𝐸𝑇0 (Jensen, 1968). It indicates the propensity of 
a crop to loose water through transpiration. Higher the Kc the greater the water loss. It varies with 
different crops and their development stages. Table 2.9 shows 𝐾𝑐  values for some crops at different 
growth stages. It shows that Kc increases gradually up to mid-season and then drops in the late season, 







Table 2.9 Kc value for each crop stage  
Crop Initial Crop development Mid-season Late season 
Barley/oats/wheat 0.35 0.75 1.15 0.45 
Beans, green 0.35 0.7 1.1 0.9 
Beans, dry 0.35 0.7 1.1 0.3 
Cabbages/carrots 0.45 0.75 1.05 0.9 
Eggplants/tomatoes 0.45 0.75 1.15 0.8 
Grain/small 0.35 0.75 1.1 0.65 
Lentils/pulses 0.45 0.75 1.1 0.5 
Maize, sweet 0.4 0.8 1.15 1 
Maize, grain 0.4 0.8 1.15 0.7 
Onions, green 0.5 0.7 1 1 
Onions, dry 0.5 0.75 1.05 0.85 
Peanuts/groundnut 0.45 0.75 1.05 0.7 
Peas, fresh 0.45 0.8 1.15 1.05 
Potatoes 0.45 0.75 1.15 0.85 
Soybeans 0.35 0.75 1.1 0.6 
 
 
Many researchers use a 𝐾𝑐 = 1 value for pasture. However, Birendra et al. (2018) have found that 
it varies significantly with different growth stages due to changing canopies represented by pasture height 
(as shown in Table 2.10). 
 
Table 2.10 Crop coefficients of pasture estimated for different growth stages for a grazing rotation. 
Pasture Crop coefficient (Kc) at the following pasture height 
(cm). 
5 10 15 20 25 30 
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
Source: (Birendra et al., 2018) 
Example of crop water needs for tomatoes: 
Let us assume an average daily 𝐸𝑇0 during different months as shown in the following table (Table 2.11). 
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Table 2.11 The ET0 reference data with difference month 
Month Jan Feb Mar April May  June July 
ET0 4.0 5.0 5.8 6.3 6.8 7.1 6.5 
 
Using tomato data from Tables 2.6, 2.9 and 2.10 (shown in Table 2.12). 
Table 2.12 Period of tomato growth stage base on planting date 
Data/stage Date KC 
Planting date  1 Feb  
Initial stage (35 days) 1 Feb – 5 Mar 0.45 
Crop development stage (40 days) 6 Mar – 15 April 0.75 
Mid-season stage (50 days) 16 Apr – 5 Jun 1.15 
Late season stage (25 days) 6 Jun – 30 Jun 0.8 
Last day of the harvest  30 Jun 0.80 
 
Table 2.13 shows a detailed calculation of the crop water need for tomatoes. 
 
Table 2.13 Total crop water needs for the whole growing season: Tomatoes 
Month Crop stage 𝑲𝒄 𝑬𝑻𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒑 (mm/day) Total monthly 
water need 
February Initial (30 days) 0.45 5 × 0.45 = 2.25 67.5 
March 




× 0.45) + (
25
30
× 0.75) = 0.69 5.8 × 0.69 = 4 
120 
 Crop development 25 days)    
April 




× 0.75) + (
15
30
× 1.15) = 0.96 6.3 × 0.96 = 6.1 
183 
 Mid-season (15 days)    
May Mid-season (30 days) 1.15 6.8 × 1.15 = 7.82 234.6 
June 




× 1.15) + (
25
30
× 0.8) = 0.85 7.1 × 0.85 = 6.04 
181.1 
 Late season (25 days)    
   Total 787.70 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.13, the crop water needs for the whole tomato growing season is 788 
mm/ha. We can estimate water requirements for any crop using this process. In the case of a farm with 
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multiple crops, we can estimate water requirements for each crop and add them together to obtain the 
farm’s total water requirements. In summary, crop water needs are influenced by Kc, ET0, the crop growth 
stage and the duration of crop growth. 
Using a crop water need estimate, a farmer can determine their total crop water need for the year 
when buying water from providers like ECAN or CPWL. A farmer must consider the cost of water in terms 
of the farm’s total expenditure to ensure maximum profit. To estimate total expenditure, a farmer must 
consider several factors, including water costs, seeds, fertilisers, and cultivation costs. The following 
section discusses farming cost estimation in detail, including the reference of farm budget in New Zealand 
context. 
2.3 Farming cost estimates 
The previous section discussed water usage estimation and the related factors that need to be 
considered in farm irrigation estimates. A farmer’s main objective is to achieve the highest total profit 
by maximising farm productivity. The total farm profit is calculated using Equation 2.3 (Faris, 2010). 





Total revenue refers to the summation of each crop’s sale price (dollars per ton). The total cost varies 
and may include the cost of fertilisers, pesticides, irrigation, and labour charges. Figure 2.2 shows the total 
cost and profit per hectare for wheat. This estimated figure is based on data obtained from a financial 
budget manual (Askin & Askin, 2012). The irrigation cost is approximately $303.33 out of $1,684 of total 
direct costs or approximately 18% of the total direct costs. Data used in this manual was collected from 
hundreds of sources in New Zealand and is updated every year. 
𝑃(𝑥) = Total farm profit 
𝑅(𝑥) = Total revenue 
𝐶(𝑥) = Total cost 
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Figure 2.2 The cost of wheat in a single season 
Source: (Askin, Askin, Askin, David, & Virginia, 2013) 
2.4 Existing tools for irrigation planning and management 
In New Zealand, farmers often use computing tools such as IrriCalc and OVERSEER to assist with 
irrigation planning. 
IrriCalc is a soil water balance model that estimates irrigation requirements using effective rainfall 
and actual crop requirements. It was developed by Aqualinc Research Limited, New Zealand (Wheeler & 
Bright, 2015). Effective rainfall refers to total stored water in the crop’s root zone. IrriCalc applies the 
rainfall, spatial information and climate data from the National Institute of Water & Atmospheric Research 
(NIWA). The actual crop water need is calculated using the multiple reference evapotranspiration (𝐸𝑇𝑟) 
and crop coefficient (𝐾𝑟). The 𝐸𝑇𝑟 value is estimated using the Peaman-Monteith method (Birendra, 2016) 
and is based on daily weather data. Using this information, IrriCalc estimates daily, monthly and seasonal 
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crop water needs. IrriCalc only works for a single crop. It also does not support water reductions during 
periods of water scarcity. 
OVERSEER is a farming strategic management software that supports farmers to improve farming 
performance. It was originally developed as a farm management programme to calculate nutrient loss 
using a rule-based setting. It uses daily soil water content data to calculate daily water drainage and 
nutrient losses (Dunbier et al., 2013; Murray, Read, Park, & Fietje, 2016). OVERSEER applies an irrigation 
water demand model which is similar to IrriCalc. The core of the OVERSEER model is a nutrient budget 
table or a table of inputs and outputs for nutrient that depicts the relationship between crop and other 
factors (fertilisers and supplements) by basic derivation. The OVERSEER sub-model was extended to 
estimate crop water need with a modified input-output table. The data required to calculate the crop 
water need includes soil type, soil moisture level, climate data, and rainfall data. The output calculation 
contains the nutrient budget and the monthly crop water need (Wheeler, 2016; Wheeler & Bright, 2015). 
IrricalC and OVERSEER are similar in that they are both single-layer soil water balance models and 
require the same input data for crop water need estimates which are farm size, farm location, soil 
moisture level, the irrigation system and crop types. However, the climate data that is applied for these 
models are different. While Irricalc uses NZ seasonal climate data, OVERSEER uses annual average climate 
data (yearly) and devolves this down to monthly data. Furthermore, OVERSEER and IrriCalc use different 
canopy cover values in the model. The canopy cover value refers to the percentage of soil surface shaded 
by plant cover at midday (Allen & Pereira, 2009). IrriCalc applies the seasonal adjustable value on the 
canopy cover which is 0.8 on average. OVERSEER assumes the ‘full canopy’ cover (a value of 1) (Wheeler 
& Bright, 2015). 
There are other computing programmes such as the Agricultural Production Systems Simulator 
(APSIM) and AquaTRAC. APSIM is a comprehensive model that was developed to simulate biophysical 
processes for the agricultural sector. It allows users to specify the management rules and provides a set 
of modules (physical process in the farm, farm management rules and the simulation engine) to support 
the higher order goal of farming simulation. The set of modules includes climate, genotype, soil, crop 
characteristic and management factors. APSIM requires various data to be input, such as crop type and 
crop stage, farm location, and soil moisture. A simulation engine simulates the result by following specific 
management rules. The APSIM model calculates crop water needs based on the FAO reference and was 
developed using a set of biophysical modules on each crop based on a C# programming framework. Each 
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module allows the user to specify the intended management rules (schedule plan, soil type, and weather 
data), and simulate the farming process (Adam et al., 2012; Brown, Huth, & Holzworth, 2018).  
AquaTRAC is a software that was developed by the New Zealand Foundation for Arable Research 
(FAR), to assist cropping farmers with their irrigation scheduling. It calculates when and how much 
irrigation to apply to optimise yield for each crop. It includes factors that influence crop water needs such 
as crop type, soil moisture, weather, irrigation levels, and irrigation system. The irrigation water need is 
calculated using the FAO’s equation which is based on rainfall data, evapotranspiration and drainage (FAR, 
2010). AquaTRAC estimates crop water needs (mm/Ha/day) and generates a farm irrigation schedule. To 
prioritise the crop water need list, the software compares the stress levels of each plant, the potential 
yield value, and soil moisture data. It calculates the yield loss rate value to compile a prioritised list based 
on the potential yield. 
APSIM and AquaTRAC require different input data than IrriCalc and OVERSEER. APSIM and 
AquaTRAC require weather data, specific farm location, soil type and rainfall data as input. They work with 
multiple paddock sizes and can provide multiple farm crop water estimation. However, they cannot 
support the distribution of water between farms in a water sharing scheme. 
In summary, these irrigation programmes can help farmers with proper irrigation planning based 
on soil moisture monitoring for a fixed period of time followed by the crop water need estimation model. 
IrriCalC and OVERSEER do not support multiple crops on a single farm. While APSIM and AquaTRAC have 
features which support multiple crops in irrigation scheduling they do not take into account differences 
in crops’ water requirements at different growth stages (Anthony & Birendra, 2018; Brown et al., 2018; 
Keating et al., 2003). 
2.5 Related work 
This section discusses work related to water allocation using agent and multi-agent systems. It 
also explains other computer techniques used to solve resource and water allocation problems. 
2.5.1 Agent-based water allocation 
Agent-based Programming (AP) is a software that uses concepts from Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
An agent’s behaviour is dependent on what it is tasked to do.  AP is a microscale model that simulates 
operations and interacts with other agents to predict the emergence of complex phenomena (Bellifemine 
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et al., 2007; Kravari & Bassiliades, 2015). Moreover, the agents are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour 
by taking initiative while ensuring that it achieves its goal.  It can learn and adapt itself to fit its 
environment and to fulfil the users’ desires. An agent is essentially a special software component that can 
operate without the direct intervention of humans. Researchers can build a single or multi-agent system 
depending on the nature of the problem. A single agent is often limited in what it can do, but these agents 
can work together collaboratively to solve more complex problems by way of a multi-agent system. In a 
multi-agent system environment, each agent is autonomous and is able to make their own decisions. They 
are able to communicate with each other using Agent Communication Language (ACL). This allows them 
to negotiate and collaborate in order to achieve a common goal (Caire, 2009; Soklabi, Bahaj, & Bakkas, 
2013). 
MAS has been used to solve resource allocation problems. It has the potential to manifest self-
organisation as well as self-direction and other control paradigms and related complex behaviours to find 
the optimal solution (Bellifemine, Poggi, & Rimassa, 2001; Soklabi et al., 2013).  
Chu et al. (2009) proposed an agent- based social simulation model to calibrate and capture 
residential water usage behaviour. They disaggregated total water demand to the end-users. They 
considered several factors, including market penetration of water saving technology, regulatory policies, 
economic development and social consciousness and preferences in their investigation of consumer 
responses to water. They evaluated different water usage policies and tried to find potential water saving 
for infrastructure development planning using a multi-agent model. In this model, they defined three 
types of agents: a regulator (responsible for establishing the structure and the water prices), the water 
appliance market (which collects and synthesises information for households) and the household/s (social 
water user). Using this model, a user can quantify dynamic patterns of residential water use. This 
information can be used to design effective demand management policies and infrastructure planning 
strategies. J. Cai & Xiong, 2017 proposed an agent-based simulation of the water sharing formation of 
cooperation in using irrigation. The simulation model is developed based on the understanding of the 
farmers’ behaviour who are participating in water resource cooperation. This research applied the 
cooperation rule on irrigation as agents’ behaviour and government water management mechanism to 
optimize the water usage between users in community. 
Berger, Birner, Díaz, McCarthy, and Wittmer (2006) proposed a multi-agent programming model 
to capture social and spatial interactions between individual farms in Chile. They used MAS to better 
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understand water users and water use complexity within sub-basins. The MAS implemented several sub-
models such as crop growth, economic decisions and water runoff. The outcome of the research showed 
that multi-agent simulation can provide support for policymakers and stakeholders, particularly in water 
resource trading and small/large scale infrastructure provisions. An agent-based model is developed to 
find a solution for irrigation and drainage network to reduce the water usage from the water demand 
request by considering the social conditions of farmer in Iran. This research proposed two main group of 
agents that are policy maker and farmer to optimize the balancing of water resource policy and water 
requirement from farmer (Ghazali, Honar, & Nikoo, 2018).  
Nouri, Saghafian, Delavar, Mohammad, & Bazargan-Lari (2019) proposed the crop pattern 
optimization using agent -based approach. This research applied the agent behavior based on farming 
behaviour and self-learning their own behaviour to optimize their crop pattern for the next season. The 
farmer agent interacted with government agent which imposes its policies in the form of scenarios. The 
result shows that agent-based optimisation is useful to help farmer with crop pattern optimization based 
on the water policy. The assessment of irrigation schemes and production scenarios can be optimised by 
an agent-based model agricultural system. Lopez-Jimenez, Quijano, & Vande Wouwer (2021) proposed 
the dynamic crop model underlying each agent to consider the negative effect of water excess in soil and 
making simple optimization strategy based on soil characteristics. 
Ding, Erfani, Mokhtar, and  Erfani (2016) investigated how to tackle the unfair distribution of water 
resources among the northern African countries within the Nile basin. They implemented agent-based 
modelling to simulate the interactions between water users located in the Nile riparian states. They 
investigated three solutions: a centralised solution, a decentralised solution and a re-allocation solution. 
With a centralised solution, the aim is to maximise the total benefits for all water users. This can be 
obtained from the fitness function (the aggregated benefit) of all the countries (agents). In the 
decentralised solution, each agent is separate from the rest of the agents and they maximise their own 
economic function. Each agent uses a parallel evolutionary algorithm to solve their local optimisation 
problem while communicating with other agents. The re-allocation solution reallocates the system 
revenue from the perspective of fairness by combining information obtained from the centralised and the 
decentralised solutions. Using this framework, it was found that the re-allocation of revenue guarantees 
fair and efficient water allocation for all users.  
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Becu, Perez, Walker, Barreteau, and Le Page (2003) used a multi-agent model (CATCHSCAPE) to 
simulate the Mae Uam catchment in Northern Thailand in order to understand the impact of upstream 
water management on the viability of downstream farming systems. The simulation comprised of farmer 
agents and canal manager agents. Each farmer owned paddy plots. Each plot belonged to a canal which 
is managed by a canal manager. The model also included information related to the environment including 
crops, rivers, canals and villages. The model was used to simulate the hydrological system based on 
distributed water balance, irrigation scheme management and crop and vegetation dynamics and capture 
individual farmer’s decision. Using this model, a variety of scenarios can be explored over a period of time 
from different perspectives: an economic perspective, an environmental perspective, a landscape 
perspective, a water management perspective and an individual farmer’s perspective.  
Le Bars et al. (2004) proposed Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) as a negotiation tool to address 
water sharing conflicts in France. The model consists of farmers and water suppliers as cognitive agents 
and information suppliers, crops and climate as reactive agents. Each farmer is expected tand 
communicates with other agento establish their cropping plan and water needs for the year and privately 
sends this request to the water supplier agent. These water requests are compiled by the water supplier 
agent who decides how much water to allocate to each farmer based on the water allocation rules. They 
conducted a preliminary experiment to analyse the outcome of the water distribution using three types 
of water allocation rules, with two types of farmers/agents (greedy and selfish). Other rules are also 
possible. In this work, the actual negotiation between agents were not implemented. The water allocation 
process was dictated by the agents and the water allocation rules.  
Barreteau, Garin, Dumontier, Abrami, and Cernesson (2003) applied an ABM to simulate water 
allocation for the Drome River in France. This model was compared against a more classical approach, 
programmed using Excel macros. The ABM model consists of several classes of agents: A farmer’s 
association, individual farmers, and the Local Water Commission (CLE), as well as Crop and Plot. This 
model was used to support negotiations and to determine limitations around water use based on 
behavioural factors (resource capacity, a set of individual water use rules, and a set of collective rules). 
They also evaluated the complexity of water and land use via the agent-based system. They found three 
major benefits associated with the use of ABM as negotiation support tools. Firstly, the negotiation tools 
were relevant to the negotiation stakes. Secondly, the field of information was extended through multi-
level viewpoints on the system dynamics. Finally, it uncovered hidden interconnected topics in the 
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discussion. These results strongly indicate that ABMs are efficient in supporting the negotiation process 
in irrigation management. 
Management of water resources often results in conflicts among water users as they have to 
compete for a limited water supply. One potential solution involves using an agent-based model to 
simulate the behaviour and interactions of parties in a conflict scenario. Akhbari and Grigg (2013) 
developed an agent-based model to simulate the process of encouraging conflicting parties to cooperate. 
This method was also useful in determining the effectiveness of various social and institutional 
enhancements designed to reduce conflict levels. The model included three types of agents; the water 
diversions/farmers, regulators and the environmental sector. Each of these agents varies in their 
behaviour based on the problem and their perception of the system. Diversion agents can be cooperative 
or non-cooperative. The conflicting agents often waited as long as possible. This forced other agents to 
cooperate because they realised it was more beneficial for them. This research confirms that ABM is a 
powerful tool that can be used to establish rules and scenarios associated with the timing of flows, water 
demands and environmental concerns.  
Cai et al. (2011) studied water rights trading within an integrated economic-hydrologic modelling 
framework for the Yellow River Basin (YRB) in China. They used Yang et al.'s (2010) MAS. The MAS consists 
of 52 general agents, 5 reservoir agents and 3 ecosystem agents. The authors evaluated three water 
management scenarios for the YRB: the de facto water allocation (baseline), unmanaged water allocation 
and market-based water allocation. In terms of unmanaged water allocation, it was found that the basin 
water consumption was higher than the basin gross domestic product (GDP) which was lower than in the 
baseline scenario. The basin gross domestic allocation, however, was lower than the baseline. In the 
market-based water allocation scenario, the MAS recorded lower water consumption and higher basin 
GDP. The water trading scenario was able to improve the agent’s net benefit and the efficiency of the 
overall basin water use. 
Anthony and Birendra (2018) proposed a preliminary design of an agent-based irrigation 
management tool that manages water allocation in mixed crop farms. The agent-based tool can reason 
and make intelligent decisions based on several farming factors such as crop type, crop value, and soil 
type. The proposed system generates an irrigation plan which considers the drought sensitivity of the 
crop, the crop’s growth stage, the soil type and the crop’s efficiency during periods of water scarcity. The 
programme achieved farm water savings without compromising farm productivity. The proposed solution 
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also shows that it is possible to maximise water usage by prioritising each crop’s water needs during 
periods of water scarcity so that the high yield crops do not suffer from a lack of water which may result 
in a lower yield. This tool can be used during periods of water scarcity (such as during the drought season). 
However, the calculation method for the crop water need is not accurate, as it did not include irrigation 
system data. Moreover, it does not address the need to reduce water when there is adequate water, nor 
does not it support sharing water between different community users. This ABM system can be extended 
to a MAS that allows agents to interact for the purpose of sharing water in drought conditions. As each 
agent represents a single farm, the programme should be able to determine the water need for a given 
farm and identify whether a farm has an excess of water or a shortage of water. The agent can then engage 
in negotiations (agents have the ability to communicate and collaborate with other agents to achieve a 
common goal), with other agents in the water community scheme to buy or sell based on the most 
efficient auction mechanism within the multi-agent framework. This will ensure that excess water in the 
community is consumed by other farmers who are facing a shortage of water. The research in this thesis 
aims to follow in this direction to produce a MAS for optimal water sharing.   
Barbalios et al. (2012) applied MAS to simulate realistic water-sharing scenarios for assessing an 
ecosystem’s viability. They considered environmental and socio-economical parameters. The proposed 
model was implemented in a real ecosystem (Koronia Lake in Greece), for a community of farmers using 
the lake. This research made several assumptions. First, each farmer had no knowledge of the exact 
number of farmers in the community and how much water each farmer used. Second, farmers did not 
interact with each other. Third, all farmers planted the same crops. The farmers were represented as 
agents and every day they decided how much water to take from the lake. These farmers interact with 
the environment which is a self-contained reservoir of water that contains a certain amount of water. This 
reservoir provides the farmers with water as requested until a certain threshold is reached. Once the 
threshold is reached, the reservoir will supply the same predefined amount to the farmers. To examine 
the farmers’ behaviour, the researchers developed five level of greediness: from low to high. The farmer’s 
objective is to take as much water as possible. This decision is based on a self-adaptive learning algorithm. 
The model’s performance was investigated using three different policies: a non-rational policy 
(resembling the current behaviour of the farmers living near the lake), a profit driven policy (profit is the 
most important factor), and an environmental friendly policy (water preservation is the most important 
factor). The profit driven policy fared badly in terms of economic survival and resource preservation. While 
the environmentally friendly policy ensured the preservation of resources it prevented farmers from 
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taking enough water to make a profit. With the introduction of a self-adaptive algorithm, farmers 
cooperated to achieve a common goal and were able to preserve their resources and achieve a higher 
profit.  
Kanta and Berglund (2015) developed a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) to evaluate the 
performance of demand side strategies in an urban water supply system in Arlington, Texas. The model 
was used to simulate changes in consumers’ water consumption which in turn affect the operational 
policies and long-term resource planning. In this model, consumers were represented as agents. They 
used an evolutionary computation-based multi-objective methodology to explore tradeoffs in cost, 
inconvenience to customers and environmental impact. In addition to consumer agents, the researchers 
included two additional components in the model: a policymaker agent and a mechanistic water resources 
model. The authors explored two optimisation scenarios in order to generate optimal management 
policies for the Arlington Water System. 
2.5.2 Use of auctions to distribute and share goods 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the thesis’ research objectives is to implement a MAS to 
facilitate fair water distribution in the community. This involves striking a balance between maximising 
profits and ensuring efficient and fair water allocation. Auctions have been used widely for resource 
allocation problems. Izakian et al., (2010) developed a continuous double auction (CDA) method for 
resource allocation in a computational grid. A computational grid consists of resource consumers and 
resource providers. Consumers look for resource providers who can deliver resources to run their 
computational-intensive jobs and are willing to pay for them. Resource providers are willing to rent their 
computational resources for profit. In a CDA setting, the resource consumers publish the amount they are 
willing to pay for the service (based on the remaining time and remaining resources), and the resource 
providers publish the amount they are willing to sell their service for (based on their workload). Their 
results suggest that the proposed auction mechanism is efficient for both the resource providers and the 
resource consumers. 
Huang, Han, Chiang, & Poor (2008) have studied the use of an auction in a spectrum allocation 
problem which was subject to an interference temperature constraint. In this research, users wanted to 
purchase a local, short term data service from private companies or government agencies. This research 
used two auction mechanisms: The first one was an auction in which users are charged for receiving Signal 
to Interference Noise Ratio (SINR) and the second one involved charging users for power. Their research 
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showed that both auction mechanisms are optimal for a large system (with limitations) with co-located 
receivers.  
Lin, Lin, and Wei (2010) proposed a dynamic auction mechanism to allocate computation capacity 
in a cloud computing environment. A second-price auction was applied to determine the price of 
computation capacity allocation from cloud service provider (CPS). CPS will increase the fixed cost amount 
if the total input into background tasks goes over the threshold. A cloud server provider will also sell its 
residual resources to cloud users after deciding how much resources will be distributed to the background 
task. The experiment results showed that the proposed auction mechanism can optimise profits and 
allocate computational resources efficiently. 
Rassenti, Smith, and  Bulfin, (1982) applied a sealed-bid combinatorial auction for the allocation 
of airport time slots that the airports offer take-off and landing price packages – so airlines can pay money 
to get prime take-off and landing times. The proposed algorithm was used to price packages for the winner 
at levels guaranteed to be no greater than the bid amount. These packages were based on three criteria: 
resource (slot for airline), package (set of valuable slots for the airline), and logical constraints. Moreover, 
they proposed a secondary market, which consisted of an oral auction where airlines were able to buy 
additional units or sell units from excess slots after an auction was finished. 
Zaman and Grosu (2013) improved the virtual machine resource allocation for a cloud computing 
provider using combinatorial auction-based allocation mechanisms. They argued that fixed-price 
allocation mechanisms (which favour allocation and pricing for virtual machine resource allocation on 
cloud computing) have some disadvantages: they are economically unproductive and do not reflect the 
equilibrium between supply and demand. They applied two combinatorial auction mechanisms: the first 
one considered a combinatorial auction problem where a user can include, at most, one item of a 
particular type in their request bundle. The second one extended the greedy mechanism which 
determines the allocation of user valuations and requested item in total from bidder. The simulation result 
showed that the proposed auction techniques were better for virtual machine allocation in the cloud. 
One study used an auction-based algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading 
channel (Sun, Modiano, & Zheng, 2006). They used a second-price auction which adopts the Nash 
equilibrium strategies for general channel state distribution to allocate bandwidth for users based on user 
payment. The Nash equilibrium strategy of this auction was used to analyse the average money 
constraints on each user’s strategy. The user submits a bid according to the channel condition revealed to 
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it. The transmitter chooses the one with the highest bid and the winning user pays the second highest 
bidder’s bid. They found that the proposed auction leads to an allocation at which total data throughput 
is increased. 
Budde and Minner (2014) investigated a news vendor-type retailer problem where there is a 
dominant retailer and several competing and identical suppliers. The main objective was to find the least 
costly supplier where there was asymmetric information. They used combinations of different simple 
auction formats and risk sharing supply contracts (push and pull). The retailer and suppliers were either 
risk averse or risk neutral. The authors found that the first price push auction for a risk neutral retailer 
was superior.  
2.5.3 Other work on water allocations 
Scholars have used other approaches to water allocation including dynamic programming, linear 
programming and genetic algorithms. For example, Gu, Guo, and Huang (2013) explored uncertainty in 
water resource allocation in China using dynamic programming.  The main purpose of the study was to 
deal with flood control and water conservation problems. They implemented interval multistage joint-
probability programming (IMJP) to deal with water resource allocation under uncertainty and to handle 
economic expenditure resulting from regional water shortages and flood control. This method was applied 
to water resources allocation in Shandong, China, and was used to assist the water resource manager to 
identify desired system designs under various conditions. Ayvaz & Elçi (2013) implemented a simulation 
model to minimize the cost of groundwater pumping. They integrated a heuristic search algorithm to solve 
pumping cost minimisation problems. They included the pumping rates and the locations of additional 
new wells as the decision variables. The proposed simulation-optimisation model obtained acceptable 
responses for the different parameters which led the authors to conclude that the model was an effective 
way of solving the pumping cost-minimisation problem.  
Khare, Jat, and  Sunder (2007) explored the potential of the conjunctive use of ground and surface 
water for irrigation during the drought season for one of the proposed link canals in India.  They used 
linear programming to optimise crop patterns and identify water resource availability (both surface and 
groundwater) in situations of water scarcity.  They found that conjunctive use planning is beneficial as a 
large quantity of surface water can be saved. This water can be redistributed to other areas that have a 
limited supply. Freire-González, Decker, & Hall (2018) applied a multi-objective linear programming input-
output method to generate plans for water supply allocations during the drought season in the UK. They 
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aimed to assess how water allocation decisions interact with other policy goals to determine the economic 
impacts of a drought. They proposed water supply allocations to determine the minimum profit impact 
during periods of water scarcity with different water allocation policies to illustrate how choices made 
about water allocation can minimise economic production losses.  
 Barlow et al. (2003) applied linear programming to evaluate trade-offs between depleted 
streamflow and groundwater for sustained yields of alluvial- valley stream- aquifer systems in the United 
States. This model evaluated the trade-offs between groundwater withdrawal and streamflow depletion 
for assessing hydrologic variability on minimum streamflow requirements. The proposed model reduced 
the water depletion rate by approximately 10% during the summer season. Yamout and El-Fadel (2005) 
used linear programming to manage water supply rates from various water sources. They applied a linear 
model in the Greater Beirut area to optimise water allocation patterns to provide the highest net return 
above water use while fulfilling the main constraints such as water availability and water requirements. 
The results obtained from the various scenarios indicated that the optimal net return from water used 
and the corresponding optimal allocation in different sectors differ from one objective to the other. Guo, 
Chen, Li, and Li, (2014) applied a fuzzy chance-constrained linear programming to support multiple 
uncertainties around water resource allocation on different farms. The proposed approach was 
implemented in an agricultural water resources management system for farms with multiple crops. The 
result of the simulation showed that crop water reduction affects the total benefit on the farm because 
crop cannot get maximum productivity if do not have enough water.  This analysis can help farmers to 
decide on plants with less water demand to keep the maximum productivity during water scarcity.  
 Li, Fu, Singh, Ma, and Liu (2017) implemented a multi-objective non-linear programming model 
to examine water allocation for irrigation in Qing‘an, China. They wanted to determine how to allocate 
limited water resources to rice based on its growth stage. Using multi-objective programming, the model 
was able to quantitatively solve multiple problems, including crop yield increases, blue water savings and 
water supply cost reductions. The model also considered the combination of dry and wet conditions for 
water availability and precipitation. The results obtained can be used to generate a range of water 
allocation schemes that can assist decision makers to determine the irrigation water resources allocation 
policy under uncertainty. This model can be applied to a single farm irrigation during periods of water 
shortage. 
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Interval multistage joint-probabilistic left-hand-side chance-constrained programming (IMJLCP) 
was developed to address the complexity and uncertainty of agricultural water management (Zhang, Li, 
& Guo, 2017). The proposed model applied probability distribution to address uncertain factors to 
optimise water allocation for different crop growth stages in the Heihe River Basin, China. It also took into 
account groundwater and surface water in its decision making. The programme was used to investigate 
six scenarios. Managers’ attitudes to economic benefit are represented in the different levels of constraint 
violation. This model also assists managers to determine the best water allocation plan (whether to utilise 
ground water or surface water), based on the crop type and the farming location.  
Similarly, Benli and Kodal (2003) applied a non-linear optimisation model to determine the 
optimum cropping pattern, including water supply conditions and farm income. They compared water 
allocation models using both linear programming (LP) and non-linear programming (NLP) techniques 
based on a crop water-benefit function. The result showed that the NLP technique generated higher farm 
income values compared to LP on different water reduction schemes. Dursun and Özden (2017) applied 
a genetic algorithm (GA) and an artificial neural network (ANN) to reduce the number of soil moisture 
sensors and to determine the best location for these sensors in the farms. While ANN was used to estimate 
soil moisture, GA was used to find the optimum energy and water consumption in the system. At the end 
of the irrigation period, it was found that the application rate was more homogeneous than the traditional 
irrigation systems. There was a 32% decrease in daily energy and water consumption. The moisture rate 
was kept at a desired range. Ramakrishnan et al., (2010) wanted to see what effect it would have if a 
farmer replaced a peanut crop with rice or changed the crop growing season in Sathanur, India. Water for 
irrigation is collected in the reservoir during the monsoon period and used in the cultivation of crops 
during the rainy season. They proposed a GA based crop calendar adjustment model to determine a 
suitable crop period to maximise crop water needs during a period of water scarcity while reserving 
drinking water as a priority. GA was used as an optimisation tool to drive near-optimal operating strategies 
for water allocation in the UK (Rao, Debski, Webb, & Harpin, 2010). The initial population consists of the 
discharged water flow from each reservoir. Each chromosome was evaluated based on the value of its 
fitness function in finding the optimal solution. These studies demonstrate that the fitness function and 
the selection method must be accurate in order to obtain the optimal solution.  
In summary, dynamic programming is useful when the same subproblem occurs in the calculation 
process. It can reduce calculation time and memory resource capacity because the system stores the 
previous result and reuses it (this process is called “memorisation”) (Skiena, 2008). DP is very powerful 
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when the same subproblem is formulated. DP divides the problem into multiple subproblems and saves 
the results for each subproblem in local memory. If the same subproblem occurs, DP will use the old 
reference from the previously calculated subproblem. However, it takes a lot of memory to store the 
calculated result and there is no guarantee that the stored value will be utilised.  
The LP technique has the same advantages as dynamic programming. It is applied to optimal 
decision analysis in a linear inequalities form.  It is applied to those problems that require maximisation 
because of its easy formulation and application (Kuo & Liu, 2003). For example, IrriCalc uses the LP model 
to estimate water needs based on farming location and daily data (Wheeler & Bright, 2015). The LP 
technique is easy to formulate and apply. In linear programming, an objective function needs to be 
defined. However, it needs to define a specific objective function for complex problems such as water 
resource allocation. It is hard to develop mathematical formulas because there are many factors that must 
be considered. In addition, the LP specific objective is based on assumption that inputs and outputs have 
linear relations. Unfortunately, input and output data are not linear in real-life situations (Skiena, 2008). 
Moreover, crop factors are not well-defined as these are non-linear factors: thus, these issues cannot be 
solved using LP techniques. The NLP model does not perform better than the LP model. It is applied in 
cases where some of the constraints or the objective functions are non-linear (Chambers & Fletcher, 
2001). However, the extreme points which is the Intersection graph of multivariate equations that 
represent the balance of the equation.  may not determine an optimal solution (Bradley, Stephen ; Hax, 
Arnoldo ; Magnanti, 1977).  
A genetic algorithm (GA) is a computer algorithm which applies metaheuristic to provide a good 
solution for an optimisation problem. The GA is inspired by the principle of genetics and natural selection 
where the best generations live and the bad ones die (Goldberg & Holland, 1988; Haupt & Haupt, 2004). 
However, the GA has some limitations in terms of finding an optimal solution because the method 
selection must be appropriate and the fitness function must be accurate.  
In summary, every technique has advantages, depending on the nature of the problems that it is 
trying to solve. The agent-based system has advantages over other approaches because it can work with 
uncertain factors. It can also support non-linear relationships which is a common data for crop water 
estimation model. Moreover, it is flexible and autonomous in complex situations. It can make decisions in 
unexpected situations and is suitable for solving complex problems (Singh, 2014).   
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2.6 Gaps in the literature 
The literature review has shown that there is a lot of work on resource allocation and in particular, 
various computing techniques. Many studies contend that MAS modelling has the potential to solve water 
allocation problems as it is flexible and can be modified to reflect varying user behaviours. It is able to 
negotiate with other agents and the environment. Moreover, MAS can be implemented to simulate a 
variety of scenarios in order to determine the best decision. MAS can be used to determine the best 
irrigation plan based on the current environment (weather, crop types, soil moisture, and economic 
factors). Based on the reviews discussed in this chapter, the literature has identified the following gaps: 
• Existing tools that are commonly used in agriculture such as IrriCalc and OVERSEER cannot 
prioritise crop water needs during periods of water scarcity. 
• There is limited research on the development of negotiation tools for water resource 
allocation (for examples, see Barreteau et al., 2003; Le Bars et al., 2004). In these studies, 
agents were not able to communicate with each other and hence negotiate with each other.  
• While auctions have the potential to be used as a mechanism for fair water distribution and 
would help meet different objectives (such as profit, community benefit or a balance of both), 
there has been no research on using them in community irrigation schemes. 
• Most of the pre-existing literature focuses on capturing water requirements and responding 
using optimisation methods based on current water resource capacity. They do not consider 
how to manage excess water once the allocation process is complete. 
In response to these gaps, this research develops an agent-based irrigation management system 
that can be used by individual farmers to generate irrigation plans on a daily basis. This system generates 
optimised irrigation plans based on specific information such as crop type, crop growth stage, soil 
moisture and the weather conditions. During periods of water scarcity, these agents can negotiate with 
other agents in the community to buy or sell water as needed, with the objectives of maximising profit, 
minimising loss and the fair distribution of water. The outcomes of these negotiations are dependent on 




This chapter discusses the architecture of our multi-agent-based irrigation management system 
that is designed to manage water on a single farm and within a community of farmers. Firstly, we briefly 
describe agent and multi-agent systems, the architecture of these systems and their applications. 
Secondly, we describe the Java Agent Development Environment (JADE) which is the platform used to 
develop our multi-agent-based irrigation management system. Thirdly, we discuss the algorithm used by 
the single agent to calculate an individual farm’s water needs. Fourthly, we explain the various auction 
mechanisms that a farmer can use to buy and sell water. We then describe the architecture of the multi-
agent system which facilitates the interaction between agents in the farming community. Finally, we 
explain strategies that can be used to distribute excess water in a farming community.  
3.1 Agent and multi-agent systems 
An agent or a software agent is a special software component that provides an interoperable 
interface to an autonomous system like a human agent that works with a client to achieve a particular 
goal. An agent can work as a solitary agent within a particular environment or interact with other agents 
if necessary (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995). Agents have been widely used in several technologies such 
as artificial intelligence (AI), database, and computer networks (Niazi & Hussain, 2011). An agent is 
autonomous, social, proactive, and reactive. Autonomous means that agents can interoperate without 
human intervention. An agent has control over its actions and internal state. Social means that an agent 
can work with other agents or humans to achieve their tasks. An agent is reactive because it can perceive 
and automatically respond to changes in its environment. An agent is proactive not only because it acts 
in response to its environment, but also it can exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking initiative 
(Bellifemine et al., 2007).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, agent-based software can be used to solve complex problems. 
Researchers can build a software agent or multi-agent system depending on the nature of the problem. 
When the problem is complex, the software agent may require the cooperation of several agents, each 
with different capabilities. In this research, we develop an irrigation management system which can 
determine water needs irrigation in individual farm and interact and work together with other farmers 
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within a community of farmers during water scarcity. The water distribution within the farming 
community is a complex problem because each individual agent (who works on behalf of a farmer) needs 
to determine the water needs for the farm (based on many factors) and negotiate with other agents in 
the farming community to secure more water (within their purchasing capability) in order to ensure that 
it obtains the maximum profit for the farm. Moreover, factors that affect a farm’s water needs are 
dynamic: they change from time to time. These factors include crop growth stages (crops require different 
amounts of water depending on their growth stage), temperature (which changes on a daily basis), and 
the season (during periods of drought there are often water restrictions). Moreover, each farm has 
different water requirements due to varying crop types, soil types, farm location, and farm size.   
3.1.1 Agent-based architecture 
Agent architecture can be divided into one of four categories based on the agent’s behaviour: 1) 
logic- based ( symbolic) ; 2)  reactive; 3)  belief, desire, intention ( BDI) ; and 4)  layered architecture 
(Bellifemine et al., 2007; Soto, 2007) 
Logic-based architecture   
Logic-based architecture uses reasoning mechanisms based on human knowledge.  Logic is used 
for encoding and to find the optimal solution. In other words, a human can easily understand the agent’s 
logic.  However, it is difficult to produce an accurate symbolic representation and it takes more time to 
execute. 
Reactive architecture  
Reactive architecture maps the situation to set of actions. This architecture is based on responsive 
data that is triggered by sensors.  It is not like logic-based architecture because it does not have a central 
symbolic model.  The key idea of this architecture is that it makes a decision through goal- directed 
behaviour. Reactive architecture uses a simple design: on or off stage allows an agent/s to respond faster 
in a dynamic environment.  One limitation with this type of architecture is that it is very hard to develop 
reactive agents with specific behaviour because the agent’s action is simple. 
Belief, Desire, Intention (BDI)  
BDI is probably the most popular form of agent architecture.  It uses logic theory which defines 
the mental attitudes of belief, desire, and intention using a logic model.  Beliefs represent information 
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about the agent’ s environment.  Desires represent an agent’ s allocation tasks and corresponding 
objectives or goals. Intention represents the result or decision that an agent has committed to achieving. 
Layered architecture  
Layered architecture allows agents to engage in both types of behaviour: reactive and deliberate. 
This architecture subsystems, arranged as layers of hierarchy, are utilised to accommodate agent 
behaviours. The layers enable flexibility in the agent communication process (Ferguson, 1992; Müller, 
Pischel, & Thiel, 1995).  
This research uses hybrid agent architecture to develop a water sharing scheme. We use a logic-
based form of architecture for the open auction process which depends on the agent’s goals. We use 
reactive architecture to facilitate the auction, process bids and determine the winner/s. Each agent is 
motivated by his/her individual goal (efficient water allocation) and multiple agents work together to 
achieve fair distribution of water and ensure the community, as a whole, profits.  
3.1.2 The multi-agent system  
The multi-agent platform has been developed on the availability of appropriate technology 
(Bellifemine et al., 2007). We chose object-oriented language because the agent concept is similar with 
object oriented model such as encapsulation, inheritance and message passing (Bordini et al., 2006). 
Agents communicate with each other using standard agent communication language (ACL). One of the 
most popular forms of ACLs is FIPA-ACL which was developed by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical 
Agents (FIPA). FIPA is an industry body which develops and establishes computer software standards for 
heterogeneous and interacting agents and multi-agent communication. There are several software 
frameworks that support FIPA standards which can be used to develop agents and multi-agent-based 
system such as Agent Services Layer (ASL), Java-based Intelligent Agent Componentware (JIAC), Bee-get 
and Java Agent Development Environment (JADE). 
Agent Services Layer (ASL) is a multi-agent platform developed by Broadcom. This platform has 
independent language support systems that allow an agent to be implemented in several languages such 
as JAVA and C++. The key concept of ASL is authority. There is a controlling agent who creates and deletes 
agents of various types in the system. It works with other agents as local name servers that resolve any 
active agent request and which allows it to discover agents based on role and name (Ferguson, 1992; 
Hayzelden & Bigham, 1999; Kerr, O’Sullivan, Evans, Richardson, & Somers, 1998). 
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JIAC is an agent framework that supports the design implementation and development of a 
software agent system. In JIAC, an agent platform consists of one or more nodes that represent an agent’s 
runtime environment. The agent node runs in the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and communicates with 
other agents with the encapsulation in the agent bean. The agent bean, which works as an authority 
device, defines the possible service of the agents (Kuster, Küster, Lützenberger, & Albayrak, 2014; 
Lützenberger, Küster, Konnerth, & Masuch, 2014). 
Bee-gent, an agent software framework developed by Toshiba, provides two type of agents: a 
wrapper agent and a mediator agent. The wrapper agent works as a coordinator. It communicates with 
others by handling messages through an XML/ACL message which follows FIPA standards. The mediator 
agent is a mobile agent. It identifies other agents in the environment by name and service (Bellifemine et 
al., 2001; Tanaka, Funabiki, & Nabae, 2002). 
JADE is a software platform that provides middleware- layer functionalities (Bellifemine et al., 
2007; Caire, 2009).  It is implemented using a well- known Java programming language which provides a 
simple and friendly Application Programing Interface (API). JADE offers a middleware agent: it provides a 
set of services which fulfil FIPA standards. It supports interoperability. Moreover, JADE provides several 
graphic tools for debugging and testing. It can be adapted for use on mobile devices and communicate 
between agent environments (Bordini et al., 2006). JADE provides two agents: the Agent Management 
System (AMS) and a Directory Facilitator (DF). AMS performs platform management actions which include 
starting and killing agents (Caire, 2009). DF works as yellow pages service that can be used to publish the 
services provided by agents and to find agents who provide specific services (Bellifemine et al., 2007, 
2001; Caire, 2009). 
ASL and Bee-gent were both developed by private companies. They work only with specific 
devices. Neither are open-source software. In contrast, both JIAC and JADE are open source frameworks. 
However, JADE is a full FIPA-compliant agent framework. This means that JADE’s architecture and 
performance have been well-tested to ensure agent interoperability (Soklabi et al., 2013). JADE is a more 
popular platform than others because it is developed fully in Java and supports different operating 
systems on the web (Hayzelden & Bigham, 1999; Kravari & Bassiliades, 2015). It is for these reasons that 
we chose to develop our system using the JADE platform. 
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3.1.3 Java Agent Development Environment (JADE) 
The main components of JADE are:  1) a container and platforms and 2) an agent management 
system and a directory facilitator (see Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1 JADE’s container and platforms 
Source: (Bellifemine et al., 2007) 
Containers and platforms 
The container runs instances of the JADE runtime environment. It can contain several agents and 
a set of active containers called a platform.  The main container is a single special container and must 
always be active in the JADE environment platform.  Every container needs to register with the main 
container.  If another main container is started somewhere in the network, it constitutes a different 
platform (new normal containers can register to this platform).  Figure 3.1 shows how agents can 
communicate with other agents in the same container (A2 and A3) , different containers in the same 
platform (A1 and A2) or in different platforms (A4 and A5).  
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Agent Management System (AMS) and Directory Facilitator (DF) 
AMS and DF are special agents that are launched after the main container is established.  AMS 
provides a naming service and represents a platform authority designed to manage agents on remote 
containers.  DF acts like a yellow page.  If agents want to find another agent service, they will use the DF. 
Overall, JADE technology is flexible and able to solve complex problems. The JADE framework is a dynamic 
environment. It has features to support a changing agent behaviour scheme and add external factors to 
the processing scheme.  Changing an agent/s’ behaviour allows a user to determine its effect on the 
current situation. Agents in a multi-agent environment may need to negotiate with each other in order to 
achieve a certain goal. This research focuses on negotiations between agents who are buying or selling 
water using a variety of auction rules. 
3.2 The irrigation management agent (a single agent) 
In our system, each farm is represented by a single agent whose main role is to calculate the farm’s 
water needs based on crop type/s, moisture on the ground and farm type (whether it is a grazing pasture 
or mixed crop farm). The agent generates an irrigation plan to determine how much water each crop 
needs. During periods of water restriction, the agent must consider several factors, including the crop’s 
potential yield, its sensitivity to drought and the farm’s soil type, to generate an effective irrigation plan. 
As discussed, the proposed irrigation management agent is an extension of Anthony & Birendra (2018) 
original work. 
3.2.1 Conceptual design 
 
Figure 3.2 Conceptual framework 
Figure 3.2 shows the conceptual design of the single agent. The main purpose of the single agent 
is to optimise water allocation around the farm which is particularly useful during periods of water scarcity 
(water restriction).  As described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1), crop water need is calculated based on crop 
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evapotranspiration and the crop coefficient (crop type and the growth stage). Most crops have four 
growing stages (initial, development, mid-season, late-season). Pasture has three stages (after grazing, 
development, and late-season). Our software agent assumes that each type of crop is planted in a certain 
sized plot. This means that the water need for a particular crop is calculated using a particular plot size.   
An agent represents a single farm. Each farm may grow a single crop or many different crops. The 
agent must determine the irrigation plan for the farm for a given planting season. During a period of water 
scarcity (such as during a drought), the agent will develop an irrigation plan that will prioritise crop 
irrigation needs based on the prevailing conditions. The crop information database contains up-to-date 
information about the state of the farm, including information about each crop, its growth stage, its 
location, plot size, and soil type. During periods of water scarcity, a user needs to enter the percentage of 
water reduction as required by the local authority. The agent will then calculate the water need for each 
crop on the farm, calculate the expected utility for each crop, decide which crops have higher water needs 
by prioritising them and determine how much water should be reduced for each crop on the farm. This 
prioritisation is based on the crop's expected utility, which takes into account the potential yield of the 
crop, its sensitivity to drought (low, medium, and high where crops with high sensitivity to drought are 
given priority), the crop’s growth stage, and the farm’s soil type (light, medium, heavy where heavy soil 
can absorb more water and so it has low irrigation priority). For example, if the farm contains high yield 
crops, more importance will be placed on the crop's yield to ensure that the farm’s revenue is not 
compromised. If the farm does not have a high yield crop, then the other two factors can be considered.  
3.2.2 Water reduction plan 
In a normal situation, the proposed algorithm calculates the farm’s total water requirement based 
on the FAO’s crop water need calculations (as discussed in Chapter 2). During periods of water scarcity, 
the water reduction plan is generated once the water requirement calculation process is complete. The 
algorithm to generate the water reduction plan is shown in Figure 3.3. First, the user keys in the required 
water reduction percentage. It is assumed that the water reduction is set by the water authority. If there 
is no water reduction in place, the proposed algorithm calculates the total water requirement of each 
crop using a zero water reduction percentage. Second, the agent retrieves the crop information from the 




   get water reduction percentage 
   retrieve crop information from crop database 
   calculate the water requirement for each crop 
   calculate total water requirement on farm 
   calculate expected utility for each crop  
   prioritise crops based on expected utility 
   calculate water reduction for each crop 
   generate water reduction plan for a farm 
End 
Figure 3.3 The pseudocode of the irrigation management agent 
The 𝐾𝑐  and 𝐸𝑇0  are used to calculate the actual crop’s water requirements. The 𝐸𝑇0  value is 
retrieved from the New Zealand weather data, and the Kc value is based on the FAO data reference. All 
data references are stored in the crop database which are collected from multiple sources: for example, 
weather data from the National Institute of Water & Atmospheric Research (NIWA) and total income 
(from a New Zealand Financial Budget manual book). 
While the main idea for the proposed algorithm is the same as the original work of Anthony & 
Birendra (2018), we have made several improvements to the existing algorithm. This includes improving 
the accuracy of the crop water needs calculation by adding soil moisture level and irrigation system as 
factors that can be used to determine crop water needs. These factors are useful for optimising the total 
water requirements on farm as different crops need different amounts of water depending upon their 
growth stage. Another improvement is the extension of this single agent to a multi-agent systems to allow 
for water sharing negotiations among the farmers in the community irrigation. 
An agent calculates the individual crop water needs and the total water requirement for the whole 
farm (this is the sum of all the water needs for all the crops in the farm). The algorithm then calculates 
how much water a farmer can save. The agent will attempt to save water by checking the growth stage of 
each crop, paying particular attention to those crops in the late season stage (or close to harvest). At this 
stage, crops do not need as much water so the agent can reduce the amount by a certain percentage 
(Anthony & Birendra, 2018). This process results in a detailed estimate of potential water reduction efforts 
to make more efficient use of water in total. Next, the agent calculates the farm’s water reduction 
requirements based on the percentage of required reductions entered by the user. It calculates the 
expected utility for each crop based on its properties. Once the crops are prioritised, the agent will 
determine the percentage of water reduction that should be applied to each crop. The proposed system 
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will prioritise those crops that need water the most. The proposed system does not prioritise water needs 
if there is sufficient water. However, the algorithm will still try to reduce the farm’s water needs based on 
each crop’s growth stage. Finally, the agent generates an individual irrigation reduction plan for the 
farmer. These processes are detailed in the following sections. 
Crop information database 
The crop information database is designed to calculate irrigation water needs. It contains 
information about each crop and other relevant information from multiple data sources (see Figure 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.4 ER diagram for crop information database 
The database contains multiple tables that contain crop information, weather data, irrigation 
system, and soil type. The crop information includes the crop growth stage and also crop 
evapotranspiration (𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝). As shown in Chapter 2 (see Tables 2.6, 2.9 and 2.10), each crop has a name, 
growth stage (referenced from the FAO and (Birendra et al., 2016)). The weather data table contains 
weather information from multiple weather stations in Canterbury. It also captures the ET0 value, where 
ET0 is calculated using weather data and New Zealand geographical data, including geographical location 
(latitude and longitude), and the average monthly temperature value (°C), crop period (indicating the 
duration of each stage, as shown in Table 2.6), and the irrigation system. The revenue and cost table 
contains information about the crop value, including the price per kilogram, productivity per hectare, and 
the total revenue per hectare which is taken from a New Zealand farm budget manual (Askin et al., 2013). 
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The soil type table contains various types of soil as identified by their water holding capacities (Birendra 
et al., 2019). 
  The irrigation system contains reference data from the FAO’s water management method 
(Brouwer et al., 2013). As shown in Table 3.1, the typical values for soil surface wetted (𝑓𝑤) are from a 
mixture of irrigation and precipitation in the same area on the same day. This value is based on a weighted 
average of the 𝑓𝑤  for precipitation (𝑓𝑤 = 1) and the 𝑓𝑤  for the irrigation system. It is approximately 
proportionate to the infiltration depths from each water source. These values are used to calculate crop 
water needs. 
Table 3.1 Common values of fraction 𝑓𝑤  of soil surface wet by irrigation or precipitation 
Wetting event 𝒇𝒘 
(mm/day) 
Precipitation 1.0 
Sprinkler irrigation 1.0 
Basin irrigation 1.0 
Border irrigation 1.0 
Furrow irrigation (every furrow), narrow bed 0.75 
Furrow irrigation (every furrow), wide bed 0.5 
Furrow irrigation (alternated furrows) 0.4 
 
Calculating crop water needs 
The proposed model modified the standard calculation for crop water needs from Equation (2.1 
in Chapter 2) which was based on crop water needs on a daily basis. This new equation takes into account 
the soil moisture and the farm’s irrigation system. We applied the FAO’s dual crop coefficient model to 
calculate crop water needs, which include the wetting system and soil moisture level. This procedure is 
conducted on a daily basis and improved the accuracy of 𝐾𝐶  by estimation  (Allen & Luis S., 1998; Allen & 
Pereira, 2009). As shown in Equation 3.1, this calculation requires 𝐸𝑇0 and 𝐾𝐶. 
  𝐸𝑇𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 = (𝐾𝑐𝑏 + 𝐾𝑒) × 𝐸𝑇0   (3.1) 
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Where  𝐸𝑇𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 = Crop evapotranspiration (mm/day) 
  𝐾𝑐𝑏 = Base crop coefficient value 
  𝐾𝑒 = Soil evapotranspiration coefficient 
  𝐸𝑇0 = Reference evapotranspiration value 
This represents  a slight variation from Equation 2.1 in that the original 𝐾𝑐 value is added with 
𝐾𝑒 to accommodate the soil evapotranspiration (Allen & Luis S., 1998). The modified formula is more 
accurate than the previous model for irrigation water needs. In this case, the 𝐾𝑐𝑏 is the crop coefficient 
value from the standard 𝐾𝑐  based on crop stage. 𝐾𝑒  describes the soil evaporation coefficient. The 
𝐾𝑒value is maximal when the topsoil is wet and zero when the soil surface is dry. The 𝐾𝑒 is calculated as 
follows (Testa, Gresta, & Cosentino, 2011): 
  𝐾𝑒 = 𝐾𝑟(𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐾𝑐𝑏) ≤ 𝑓𝑒𝑤 ∙ 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥     (3.2) 
where  𝐾𝑟 = Soil evapotranspiration reduction coefficient 
𝐾𝑐 = Soil evapotranspiration coefficient 
  𝐾𝑐𝑏  = Base value of crop coefficient 
  𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥  = Maximum value of 𝐾𝑐 (following the remain irrigation) 
  𝑓𝑒𝑤 = Exposed and wetted soil fraction 
 𝐾𝑒 calculation includes the soil evapotranspiration reduction coefficient (𝐾𝑟) and the exposed and 
wetted soil fraction (𝑓𝑒𝑤). The 𝐾𝑟 is the evapotranspiration from the exposed soil, which can be replaced 
with the soil moisture level. The maximum value is 1 if the soil surface is wet. The 𝐾𝑟 value is zero when 
the total amount of water that can be evaporated from the topsoil is depleted (Testa et al., 2011). 𝐾𝑒 is 
used to compare the 𝑓𝑒𝑤 × 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 . The maximum 𝐾𝑒 is less than or equal to 𝑓𝑒𝑤 × 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 . The 𝑓𝑒𝑤  value is 
essentially defined as (1 − 𝑓𝑐), where 𝑓𝑐 is the average fraction of soil surface covered by vegetation and 







    (3.3) 
where  𝐾𝑐𝑏 = Based crop coefficient value 
𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛 = Minimum crop coefficient  
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𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 = Maximum crop coefficient 
ℎ = Crop height 
In irrigation systems where only a fraction of the ground surface is wet by irrigation, 𝑓𝑒𝑤 is limited 
to 𝑓𝑤, the fraction of the soil surface wetted by the irrigation system. As shown in Table 3.1. 𝑓𝑒𝑤 can be 
calculated using Equation 3.4.  
𝑓𝑒𝑤 = min (1 − 𝑓𝑐 , 𝑓𝑤)   (3.4) 
where 1 − 𝑓𝑐 is the average of exposed soil fraction not covered (or shared) by vegetation [0.01 – 1]. The 
𝑓𝑤 value is the average fraction of soil surface wetted by irrigation or Precipitation [0.01 – 1]. The 𝑓𝑒𝑤 
function selects the lowest value of 1 − 𝑓𝑐 and 𝑓𝑤 values. 
Example of crop water needs calculation 
The steps to calculate the crop water needs for potatoes to be planted in February with a soil 
moisture rate of 0.3, using a sprinkle irrigation system, are shown below. Table 3.2 shows the 𝐸𝑇0  for 
potatoes for January – July.  
Table 3.2 𝐸𝑇0 reference data for crop water needs (potato) 
Month Jan Feb Mar April May  June July 
ET0 4.0 5.0 5.8 6.3 6.8 7.1 6.5 
 
The potato data obtained from Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 is shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 The potato Kc and period 
Data/ Stage KC Period 
Initial stage 0.45 25 
Crop development 0.75 30 
Mid-season stage 1.15 30 
Late season stage 0.85 20 
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 1. The values of 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛  are determined. 
The 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥  = 1.15 and 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛  = 0.45 











=  0.35 
3. Determine 𝑓𝑤 . 
𝑓𝑤 value with sprinkle system is 1.0, as shown in Table 3.1. 
4. Calculate 𝑓𝑒𝑤 . 
 𝑓𝑒𝑤 = min(1 − 𝑓𝑐 , 𝑓𝑤) = min (0.65, 1)   ➔ 0.65 
5. Calculate 𝐾𝑒 . 
𝐾𝑒 is then calculated using 𝐾𝑒 = 𝐾𝑟(𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐾𝑐𝑏) ≤ 𝑓𝑒𝑤 ∙ 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥  
𝐾𝑒 = 0.3(1.15 − 0.45) ≤ (0.65 ∙ 1.15) ➔ 0.21. This value is lower than 𝑓𝑒𝑤 ∙ 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥  which follows the 
irrigation system calculation. 
6. Calculate 𝐾𝑐 for each crop stage. 
Finally, 𝐾𝑐 that includes soil moisture calculation is 𝐾𝑒 = 𝐾𝑐𝑏 + 𝐾𝑒 = 0.75 + 0.21 = 0.96. Then, 
 calculating the potato new 𝐾𝐶  value on every crop stage as shown in Table 3.4 and the total crop water 
need with new  𝐾𝐶  can be calculated as shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.4 Comparison between 𝐾𝑐 reference and new 𝐾𝑐 calculation   
Crop stage 𝑲𝒄 reference 𝑲𝑪 includes soil moisture 
Initial 0.45 0.96 
Crop development 0.75 0.87 
Mid-season 1.15 1.15 
Late-season 0.85 0.94 
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7. Then, using the new 𝐾𝑐 value, the crop water need for potatoes in each stage can be calculated using 
Equation 2.1.  
Table 3.5 Total crop water needs for the whole growing season with new 𝐾𝐶  




February Initial (30 days) 0.96 5 × 0.96 = 2.3 
 
144.00 
March Crop development 
(30 days) 
0.87 5.8 × 0.87 = 4 151.38 




























 Late season  
(5 days) 
June Late season  
(25 days) 
0.94 7.1 × 0.94
= 6.67 
166.85 
   Total 690.10 
Crop water needs can be calculated daily, monthly or for the whole season. This water need value 
can be multiplied by the plot size to determine the total water requirements for a given crop. For example, 
the crop water needs for the entire potato growing season is 690.1 mm/Ha. So, assuming that the potato 
plot size is 10 hectares, the total crop water requirement (𝐶𝑤𝑟𝑞) is 6,901 mm. This is calculated as: 
𝐶𝑤𝑟𝑞 = 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 × 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡       (3.5) 
where 𝐶𝑤𝑟𝑞 is the total crop water requirement for the whole growing season, 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝  is the water 
requirement for potatoes for the whole growing season and 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡 is the size of the plot used for planting 
potatoes. If the farm grows a variety of crops, the farm’s total water requirement can be calculated by 
adding up the water requirements for each crop. 
3.2.3 Prioritising irrigation water needs for multiple crops 
To prioritise irrigation water needs for multiple crops, the agent uses three determinants: drought 
sensitivity and the growth stage, the potential crop yield, and the soil type (Anthony & Birendra, 2018). 
Each determinant is associated with a utility function that indicates the importance of that crop (the 
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higher the value, the higher the irrigation priority). These utility functions (based on a crop’s potential 
yield, drought sensitivity and growth stage and soil type) are defined as follows: 
𝑓𝑃𝑌 = (𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡 × 𝐶𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑) × 𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒      (3.6) 
𝑓𝐷𝑆 = 𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 × 𝐷𝑣𝑎𝑙       (3.7) 
𝑓𝑆𝑇 = 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡       (3.8) 
where: 
𝑓𝑃𝑌 = Crop’s potential yield function 
𝐶𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = Yield amount of crop area 
𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = Price per kilogram 
𝑓𝐷𝑆 = Crop’s drought sensitivity function 
𝑓𝑆𝑇 = Soil type function 
𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = Crop stage 
𝐷𝑣𝑎𝑙 = Drought sensitivity value 
𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡 = Plot size of crop 
𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 = Soil type 
 
To prioritise crop water need, the water reduction process considers three factors (drought 
sensitivity, crop potential yield for different crop stages, drought sensitivity and soil type). We divide crops 
into two categories: pasture and crops. Crops have four growth stages (see Table 2.3). Pasture only has 
three stages: after grazing, development, and late season (Anthony & Birendra, 2018). Drought sensitivity 
is divided into three levels: low, medium and high. Drought sensitivity is related to irrigation priorities. A 
high sensitivity to drought requires a higher irrigation priority (Cavin & Jump, 2017). The soil types are 
divided into three levels: light, medium and heavy. As described in Chapter 2, the WHC value is high for 
clay soil which that has a heavy texture. Sandy soil, which has the lowest WHC, has a light texture (Bodner, 
Nakhforoosh, & Kaul, 2015; DairyNZ, 2011). This work considers high-value crops; crop yield can be 
estimated based on the total planting area and price per kilogram. High yield crops have a higher irrigation 
priority as they generate more money. 
To determine the expected utility (EU) for each crop, the agent combines the three utility 
functions by allocating weights to denote their relative importance. Thus, the expected utility of each 
crop is calculated as follows: 
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 𝐸𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑓𝑗𝑗𝜖𝑐                   ;  0 ≤ 𝑤𝑗 ≤ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗𝜖𝑐 = 1   (3.9) 
where C is the set of determinants which the agent uses to calculate the crop priority value, 𝑓 is 
the utility function for each determinant, and 𝑗 is the individual parameter. At any time, the agent can 
consider the three utility functions to determine irrigation priority, depending on what it sees as being 
important at that moment. 
For example, in an all pasture farm, the crop's drought sensitivity and growth stage determinants 
are the most important because the potential yield of the crop is the same (pasture only). If the farm is a 
mixed crop which has high yield crops, then the crop's potential yield is more important because it affects 
the farm’s productivity and income. Thus, a higher weight will be applied to the crop's potential yield 
function. 
Determining water reductions for each crop during periods of water scarcity 
The percentage of water reduction is the key determinant for water reduction. In New Zealand, 
the average water reduction is around 95% of water supply reliability (Anthony & Birendra, 2018). 
However, the agent needs to consider the worst dcase scenario as well. The maximum water reduction 
should not be over 20% for crops because it will lead to low productivity and a decline in their value 
(Brouwer et al., 2013). We also consider different crop growth stages as at each stage, crops have different 
water requirements. Anthony and Birendra (2018) note that it is possible to reduce water by 50% during 
the late season stage for crops and late season stage for grazing pasture. 
All reductions are performed in two stages. First, the software calculates the percentage of water 
reduction for each individual crop based on the crop growth stage. The software divides the crops into 
two types: crops and pasture. As described in Section 3.2.2, crop water is reduced from 30 to 50% for the 
late season stage, 15% for the mid-season stage, 20% for the development stage and 10% for the initial 
stage. In terms of pasture, water reductions in the late season stage are reduced from 30 to 50%, 20% for 
the development stage and 10% for the after grazing stage. These reductions are performed from the 
bottom of the prioritised crop list. This process continues up the list until the required water reduction 
level is reached. Using this strategy, we can ensure that the top priority crop is least affected. In the second 
stage, if the total required water reduction for all the crops is still less than the required amount, then 
each crop’s water requirement is reduced by the percentage of water reduction.  
The outcome of the water reduction exercise is, in most farms, obviously a shortage of water. 
However, there are farmers (who may have overestimated their water needs or farmers who originally 
 67 
planned to plant more crops but decided not to), who will have excess water. In short, farmers may want 
to buy water or sell water within the water community scheme. It would be beneficial for those farmers 
with excess water to distribute it to those who need it in an optimal manner. This would mean that farmers 
with excess water are able to make more profit and those who do not have enough water are able to 
purchase water to reduce their losses. To maximise/minimise their profits/losses, we need an optimal 
marketplace to ensure that everyone obtains the maximum benefits from the exchange of water. In this 
research, we explore how auction-based negotiations can be used to optimise water sharing within a 
community of farmers during periods of water scarcity. 
3.3 The negotiation process and auction mechanisms  
The negotiation process involves dialogue between two or more people with the aim of reaching 
an agreement. The outcome of the negotiation is an important factor in determining whether the 
negotiations are successful (De Dreu, 2014; Hopmann, 1995). Negotiations are commonly used to solve 
labour issues, to resolve conflict and in market bargaining. Figure 3.5 shows a simple negotiation process 
between a seller and a buyer. A buyer can join a group and find products or services offered by a seller. A 
buyer may contact and negotiate with a seller who can provide compatible value and/or specialist 
services. Sellers and buyers can negotiate an agreed price for a services/items. A successful negotiation 
will result in a sale/trade (De Dreu, 2014; Gates, 2012). 
 
Figure 3.5 Simple negotiation process 
Negotiation between a seller and a buyer is very important. Both sellers and buyers are keen to 
maximise their benefits. In general, negotiations can be divided into two categories: 1) distributive 
negotiations and 2) integrative negotiations. Distributive negotiations operate under zero-sum conditions 
that one person is going to win and other bidders will lose. Integrative negotiation attempts to create 
total value from the course of the negotiation using “win-win negotiation.” A seller is interested in 
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obtaining a good price for the item/service that he is trying to sell; equally, the buyer/bidder is keen to 
receive a bargain. This form of negotiation is called an auction (Krishna, 2010).  
An auction is a process of buying and selling goods/services that involves several steps. Multiple 
buyers want the same item; however, they are aware that they may not win the negotiation process. 
Buyers need to make sure that they do not bid more than their private valuation (the maximum price they 
are willing to pay for the item being negotiated), and estimate the best bidding price so that they can win 
the auction (Gates, 2012). Sellers want to sell their item at a price equal to or above their reserve price. 
There are four standard auction types: an ascending-bid auction, a descending-bid auction, a first-price 
sealed-bid auction, and a second-price sealed-bid auction (Klemperer, 1999). 
An ascending-bid auction is often called an English auction. It is the most prevalent form of auction. 
At the beginning of the English auction, the seller sets a starting price for the item to be auctioned. Bidders 
compete to buy the item, with each bid being higher than the last. This process goes on until there is a 
single bidder left who is holding the highest bid. In the online variation, there is a fixed time: when the 
time is up, the winner is the one who has offered the highest bid. A bidder cannot re-join an auction once 
s/he decides to quit the auction. Sometimes, in online auctions, bidders wait until the last minute before 
making a bid. If this happen, the time is often extended. When an auction closes, if the winning bid is 
lower than the reserve price, then the seller can choose not to sell the item (Anthony, 2003; Pinker, 
Seidmann, & Vakrat, 2003).  
A descending-bid auction works in the opposite way. The auctioneer starts the auction with highest 
price. The price lowers in steps until a bidder accepts the current price. The winner pays that price for the 
item. This auction is called a “Dutch auction” because it is used to sell flowers in the Netherlands. 
Sometimes, if there are a lot of the same product from the same seller, bidders call out to buy some of 
the available lots and the rest are re-auctioned (Klemperer, 1999). 
 In the first-price sealed-bid auction, a bidder cannot see anyone else’s bids. They can only submit 
one bid price. When the auction period closes, the seller opens all bids and sells their goods/services to 
the person who has offered the most money. The winner pays for their bid. This type of auction is used 
widely in the sale of artworks, real estate and government mineral rights (Jank & Shmueli, 2010; Krishna, 
2010). The second-price sealed-bid auction has the same rules and process as the first-bid auction. 
However, the winner pays the second-highest bid price. This auction is called a Vickrey auction after 
William Vickrey who wrote a paper on auctions (Anthony, 2003; Klemperer, 1999). Sellers can use these 
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different types of auctions to sell a single item or trade multiple units of a product (see Table 5.3). The 
multiunit auction is used for selling multiple units of the same item (Krishna, 2010).  
Table 3.6 Comparison table for standard auction types  
Type Bidding rule Clearing rule Unit of goods 
Ascending-bid auction Seller announces the 
starting price and 
bidders are free to 
raise the price 
successively 
Expiration of bidding 
period or when no 
new bids are received. 
Winner is the bidder 





Bidders submit bids 
without any 
knowledge of what 
other potential buyers 
bid 
Expiration of bidding 
period. Winner is the 
highest bidder. They 
pay a price equal to 




Bidder submit bids 
privately (price) 
 Seller proposes to sell 
a single unit/volume. 
Expiration of bidding 
period. Winner is the 
highest bidder. They 
pay the price equal to 




Bidders submit bids 
without any 
knowledge of what 
other potential buyers 
bid. 
Expiration of bidding 
period. Winner is the 
highest bidder. They 
pay a price equal to 
the second highest 
bid. 
Single/multiple 
Source: (Anthony, 2003) 
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The multiunit auction is designed for people who want to sell multiple units of a particular 
good/service at the same time. The multiunit uniform auction is an auction where multiple units can be 
sold at the same price. In contrast, the multiunit discriminatory auction is an auction where multiple units 
can be sold with varying prices depending on the bid price. 
 In a multiunit uniform auction, bidders may submit single/multiple bids which specify the number 
of units and price per unit. These bids are sealed and are not revealed to the other bidders until the 
auction closes. The auctioneer serves the highest bidder as the first priority and gives them the requested 
number of units. The auctioneer then serves the second highest bidder using the same process until all 
the items are sold. All bidders pay the same price per unit, which is the lowest winning bid. In this auction, 
the winners pay the price equal to the lowest winning bid (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Kahn, 1998). 
The multiunit discriminatory auction differs slightly from the multiunit uniform auction. This kind 
of auction is used to sell multiple homogeneous items at difference prices (Binmore & Swierzbinski, 2000). 
The bidding process is the same (bidders submit the number of units and how much s/he is willing to buy). 
After the auction closes, the auctioneer serves the highest bidder as the first priority. Each bidder pays 
the price they offered.  
In summary, the multiunit uniform and multiunit discriminatory auctions have the same sequential 
bidding process. In water distribution, the bidder specifies the volume of water s/he needs. However, the 
sale price depends on the type of auction used. In a multiunit uniform price auction, the winners pay the 
lowest winning bid price, whereas in a multiunit discriminatory auction, the bidders pay the price they 
offered. These auctions are described in greater detail in Section 3.5.3.  
There is a wide range of applications for auctions. According to Yamamoto & Tezuka (2007), in 
England and Wales, the discriminatory auction has been used to balance the market in electricity trading 
arrangements. The uniform auction is used to balance benefit on the difference size of electric company 
that has difference electric volume to sell because the big company can dominate the price in the 
market. Sheikholeslami and Navimipour (2018) showed that auctions are useful for solving resource 
allocation and pricing problems. Izakian, Abraham, and  Ladani (2010) applied agent-based and multiunit 
discriminatory auctions for computational grid resource sharing. This enables resource owners and 
resource consumers to make autonomous scheduling decisions. The auction technique is applied to 
regulate the supply and demand of resources. This method motivates participants to consider multiple 
factors such as budget and the service quality requirements.  
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3.4 The multi-agent mechanism 
As mentioned, each agent calculates their farm’s total water requirements, prioritises the crops to 
be irrigated, and calculates water reductions for each crop. An agent is able to decide whether to buy or 
sell water and negotiate with other agents. During periods of water scarcity, it is anticipated that there 
will be farms who do not have enough water and there will be farms that have excess water. It would be 
useful for those farms with excess water to share water with other farms in the community. This practice 
would enable those facing water shortages to reduce their potential losses. One of the objectives of this 
research is to investigate efficient water sharing mechanisms that can be used by a community of farmers. 
To simulate this community of water users, we have developed a multi-agent system which consists of 
multiple agents that represent farmers in the community. These agents are able to communicate with 
each other and negotiate to buy or sell water. We propose a range of water sharing mechanisms: a first-
price sealed-bid auction format, a multiunit discriminatory auction format, and a multiunit uniform 
auction format. We use an auction format because they are an efficient allocation mechanism (Budde & 
Minner, 2014; Izakian et al., 2010; Mailler, Lesser, & Horling, 2003; McAfee & Mcmillan, 1987; 
Sheikholeslami & Jafari Navimipour, 2018).  
Figure 3.6 shows the multi-agent environment and the algorithm for the multi-agent water 
management system. The system can be explained in two parts; 1) A single farm’s total crop water needs 
and 2) the negotiation process among the agents using auction mechanisms. We discussed crop water 
needs calculations in Section 3.2. Each individual agent is able to estimate their crop water needs on a 
daily basis. Based on this calculation, agents who have excess water will be categorised as seller agents. 
Agents who have a shortage of water are categorised as buyer (bidder) agents. The seller agents will 
auction their excess water and bidder agents will participate in these auctions. As shown in Figure 3.6, the 
algorithm from Figure 3.3 is extended to include the agent’s decision to participate in the marketplace as 
a buyer or seller. The agent decides on the reserve price/private valuation for the water to be sold/bought 
based on the farm’s total marginal profit. In any given farm, the total marginal profit can be calculated as 
follows equation 3.10. 
 𝑃 = ∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖 − ∑ 𝐹𝐶𝑗      (3.10) 
Here, 𝑃 represents the total marginal profit in the farm, 𝐶𝑉 is the total crop value, and 𝐹𝐶 is the total 




Figure 3.6 Pseudo-code for multi-agent irrigation management system 
Before excess water is auctioned, the seller agent needs to determine the reserve price (the 
minimum price it is willing to sell the water), for its water (the price per cubic metre). A buyer agent sets 
a private valuation (the maximum price it is willing to pay for water), which is dependent on the farm’s 
expected profit. The water pricing equations are shown in Equations 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13. The water price 
for various agents differs depending on the farm’s expected profit. While it is assumed that the profit will 
decrease during periods of water scarcity, the total farm cost will remain the same. As shown in Equation 
(3.11), in this situation, the farming profit value will decrease if a farmer does not have enough water for 
the farm. If the farmer has more water than s/he require, he can gain additional profit by selling water to 
others (see Equation (3.12)). The expected profit function is shown in Equation (3.13) where 𝑥 is the profit 
changed value (in dollars), 𝑓(𝑦) is the total farm cost function, and 𝑓(𝑧) is the utility function for water 
pricing. 𝑓(𝑧) is used as a maximum price (reserve price) for the bidder agent and a minimum price (reserve 
price) for the seller agent. The auctions begin once the reserve prices for seller agents and private 
valuation for the bidder agents have been decided. The auctions have an expiry date/time (this is 
dependent upon the seller’s requirement). The auction can be started in parallel, but a bidder agent can 
only participate in a single auction and only a single bid is required. The auction duration is fixed. Bidders 
must submit their bids within this time. When the time is up, the winner is determined according to the 
type of auction. During the auction period, agents can contact each other using FIPA–ACL message 
protocol. The agent standard protocol includes different message types and standard descriptions to show 
the sequence of the auction process. The MAS is implemented on JADE platform: sellers and agents can 
communicate using standard agent communication language. At the conclusion of the auction, the winner 
leaves after receiving the product. The other agents standby for new auctions to open. 
𝑃 − 𝑥 =  𝑓(𝑥)𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑓(𝑦)𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡   (3.11) 
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𝑃 + 𝑥 =  𝑓(𝑥)𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑓(𝑦)𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡     (3.12) 
𝑓(𝑧) = {
∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖 − ∑ 𝐹𝐶𝑗 − 𝑥                ; 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒
∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖 − ∑ 𝐹𝐶𝑗 + 𝑥                ; 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒
  (3.13) 
3.4.1 Negotiation messages and specifications 
JADE architecture 
A JADE platform is composed of agent containers that are distributed over the network. Agents 
live in containers that provide all services for hosting and executing agents. Agents communicate with 
other agents using FIPA-ACL message standards. There is a message stack that provides a transport 
envelope that comprises the set of parameters that details the agent communication. The communication 
protocol can be separated into four sub-layers: transport information, encoded messages, message 
parameters, and message content (see Figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3.7 FIPA message structure 
The transport information is used on the internet protocol standard. There is Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP), which is the foundation of data communication on the internet (Fielding, Irvine, & Gettys, 
1999). Encoded messages use a simple byte-encoded message. This layer is intended for communication 
between agents over low bandwidth connections. The message parameter is specified independently. 
This level contains the necessary parameters for agent communication based on FIPA ACL message 
standards, as shown in Table 3.6 (Bellifemine et al., 2007; Caire, 2009). The message content can be in any 
text form which follows general logical formulas in FIPA-SL content language specification (Bagherzadeh 
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& Arun-Kumar, 2006; Juneja, Jagga, & Singh, 2015). Once the JADE environment is opened, the main 
container is launched, and all the agents are registered following a standard FIPA message structure. 
Table 3.7 FIPA communicative acts 
FIPA communicative act Description 
Call for Proposal (CFP) Service and behaviour advertising message. 
Accept proposal The action of accepting a previously submitted proposal to perform 
an action. 
Inform The sender informs the receiver that a given proposition is true. 
Failure The action of telling another agent that an action was attempted, 
but the attempt failed. 
Propose The action of submitting a proposal to perform a certain action, 
given certain preconditions. 
Refuse The action of refusing to perform a given action and explaining the 
reason for the refusal. 
Accept proposal The action of accepting proposals to perform the action during the 
negotiation process. 
Reject proposal The action of rejecting a proposal to perform some action during a 
negotiation. 
Request The sender requests the receiver to perform some action. 
 
Message interaction and protocol specification 
In FIPA message standard, there is the FIPA Contract Net Interaction Protocol (IP) which describes 
the negotiation between the initiator agent and participant agents (see Figure 3.8). The sequence diagram 
describes the agent message. There are two types of agents: initiators and participants. The initiator sends 
the Call for Proposal (CFP) to all participants. Participants will decide whether to reply, propose, or refuse 
the message. The participant will propose its service if the CFP description is matched, otherwise it will 
send a refuse message. The initiator evaluates the received proposals and selects the best agent to 
perform the accept-proposal. The initiator will send an accept-proposal to the selected participant and 
reject-proposals to the others. The initiator sends an inform message to the selected participant/s. Upon 
receiving an accept-proposal message, the participant will send an inform message.  
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Negotiation between agents can take many forms, including auctions. The action mechanism is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
Figure 3.8 Request interaction between agents 
3.5 Auction mechanisms and process 
Before an auction can take place, each agent must calculate their individual farm’s crop water 
requirement. Once it has done so, it decides whether to act as a seller or bidder agent. Auctions begin 
only if there are bidder agents who can bid in any of the auctions. At the conclusion of the auction, the 
winner is determined and the affected seller and bidder agents will calculate and update their profit 
margin. In this research, we offer four bidding strategies: the single unit first-price sealed-bid, the 
multiunit first-price sealed-bid, the multiunit discriminatory and multiunit uniform auction. The first-price 
sealed-bid is an auction where the bidder submits their bids for a specified volume of water (the seller 
determines the amount of available water). The multiunit first-priced sealed-bid is where a seller splits 
the available water into smaller volumes. For example, if the volume of excess water is 5,000 cubic meters, 
a seller can conduct five independent auctions, each consisting of 1000 cubic metres. A single unit first-
price sealed-bid is where the seller will auction off the 5,000 cubic metre in a single auction. A multiunit 
first price sealed-bid auction increases a seller’s chance of selling and allows bidders to bid for a smaller 
unit of water as it is possible that the volume of water traded as a single unit may be more than what they 
need. Bidders can bid for multiple units to fit their needs. However, this strategy may also be risky as they 
will need to bid in multiple auctions and they may not win all the auctions that they participate in. 
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3.5.1 The single unit first-price sealed-bid auction 
The first-price sealed-bid is a common type of auction. The seller advertises a minimum selling 
price and volume to the agent environment. Once the auction has begun, all bidder agents submit their 
bids. The bids are private and hidden from the other bidders: they are opened at the end of the auction, 
where the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the bid price he submitted (see Figure 3.9(a)) 
(Krishna, 2010; McAfee & Mcmillan, 1987). The first-price sealed-bid is a single round auction and all users 
have a single round to propose a bidding price and volume to the seller. The duration of the auction was 
set to 300 milliseconds: bidders must submit their bids within this period. This duration simulates what 
happens in the real world where auctions last for a specific period of time. If there are no bids received 
during this time, no winner will be declared. If there are multiple bidders with the same highest bid, then 
the first one who submitted the bid is declared the winner. The sequence diagram (based on the JADE and 
FIPA), is shown in Figure 3.9(b). The seller sends a CFP message that contains information about the 
reserve price and the volume of water that is being auctioned to all bidder agents. The interested bidder 
agents send a propose message with their bid. Once the time is up, the seller evaluates all the bids and 
selects a winner. This winner will be notified after the auction is concluded.  
 
 
(a) Conceptual design (b) Sequence diagram 
















In this auction, the bidder’s objective is to purchase water at the lowest possible price. In contrast, 
the seller is seeking a bidder who can offer the highest price. Although the literature (Krishna, 2018; 
Mcafee et al., 2018) suggests that the best strategy for bidders in this type of auction is to bid below the 
private valuation, in our setup, a bidder should bid the true valuation to increase his/her chance of 
winning. This will also indirectly reduce the losses associated with having insufficient water. When the 
auction closes, the winning bidder is the one who submitted the highest bid. If the highest bid is lower 
than the seller’s reserve price, no winner will be declared, and the excess water will be re-auctioned in 
the next round.  
The first price sealed-bid auction has several limitations. Often the volume of excess water being 
traded does not match the bidders’ requirement (it is either too much or too little). Moreover, it is not 
beneficial for bidders to buy more than what they need as they will incur additional costs and wastage. 
To maximise the sellers’ chance of trading their excess water, a bigger volume of water can be divided 
into smaller units and be auctioned off individually to allow more bidders to purchase it. In this way, 
buyers can choose to participate in several auctions based on the volume of water they need. The fixed 
multiunit first-price sealed-bid auction offers a solution to this problem. 
3.5.2 Fixed multiunit first-price sealed bid auction 
This auction is a variation of the single unit first-price sealed-bid auction. Instead of selling excess 
water as a single unit, the seller splits the water into smaller units and sells them using several auctions. 
The seller predetermines the volume of water for each auction. Figure 3.10 shows that excess water can 
be split into two equal parts. In this setting, bidders may bid in multiple auctions if the water needed is 
more that the individual lot being traded. The auction process is the same as before but this time there 
are more auctions in the marketplace. The winner is chosen in the same way as the previous form of 
auction. However, the same bidder can win more than one auction if s/he has bid in multiple auctions. As 
before, there is no auction winner if the highest bid is lower than the reserve price. 
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Figure 3.10 Conceptual design for fixed multiunit first-price sealed bid auction 
By splitting the excess water into many lots, a seller may be able to obtain higher offers from the 
bidder. Likewise, bidders have more opportunities to bid in more than one auction. A bidder will also be 
able to buy the right amount of water (or closer to the volume that they need). Hence, there is less 
wastage and less cost. Even though this mechanism represents an improvement on the previous one, 
there is still no guarantee that all the excess water can be traded, as the water volume per auction is fixed. 
A better solution would be to allow the bidder to specify how much water s/he needs and how much s/he 
is willing to pay for it. The next section describes the multiunit auction.   
3.5.3 The multiunit auction 
In section 3.5.2, we proposed that splitting the water volume into smaller units is useful. However, 
there may be difficulties associated with this approach; for example, knowing how much to split and how 
many units to split it into. The multiunit auction type provides a better solution to deal with this problem. 
This type of auction can be applied to water trading as buyers can specify the exact volume of water 
required and what price they are willing to pay. In terms of the auction process, the multiunit 
discriminatory and multiunit uniform auction has the same sequential task, but the selling prices are 




Figure 3.11 Conceptual design and for a multiunit auction 
At the start of the auction, the seller advertises the volume of excess water to be auctioned off to 
all the bidders. Each interested bidder submits a bid which contains the volume of water needed and the 
price that s/he is willing to pay. At the end of the auction, the seller determines the winning bidders using 
the following algorithm: 
Preprocessing: 
SET array[i] = 0 
GET all offers from bidders (B1, B2, … ,Bn) 
ADD Bi to array[i] 
On the arrival of the Bn: 
SET array[x]=0 
SET v = selling volume: v’=0 
Sort array[i] in ascending order of offering price 
FOR i=0 to array[i] length -1 
 GET value from array[i] 
  IF (v’ < v) then 
   ADD array[i] to array[x] 
   v’ = v’ + value of array[i]  
  ENDIF 
 ENDFOR 
 RETURN array[x], v – v‘ 
Figure 3.12 The multiunit auction algorithm 
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Figure 3.12 shows the seller agent algorithm for the multiunit auction process. First, the seller 
reads each offer and determines the actual price. Then, all offers are sorted in ascending order (lowest to 
highest price). After that, the bidder with the highest price is served, followed by the second highest 
bidder. This process is repeated until all units have been offered. The seller will reply to all winning agents, 
stating the accepted volume and the price. The difference between those two auctions is the price that 
the bidder must pay. In the uniform auction, the bidders all pay the lowest price offered. Once the auction 
is over, all winners pay the same price. In contrast, in the discriminatory auction, those who are successful 
must pay the price they offered. Figure 3.13 shows the reply message that is sent once the auction is 
complete (the multiunit discriminatory auction is shown in (a)) and the multiunit uniform is shown in (b)). 
In the multiunit discriminatory auction, the seller offered the winning bidders (A, B, and C) 50mm, 30mm, 
and 20mm of water at $12.50, $10.00, and $9.50 respectively. All three bidders accepted the offers. Bidder 
D was sent a reject message which s/he acknowledged. In the multiunit uniform auction, the seller offered 
all the winners the same price: the lowest winning bid ($9.50).  
  
Figure 3.13 The interaction messages between agents for multiunit discriminatory and multiunit uniform 
auctions 
These proposed auction techniques are designed to optimise water sharing within a farming 
community. Table 3.8 provides a comparison of the auction techniques. The table includes the bidding 
and clearing rules for each auction. The first price sealed-bid is a simple auction which determines its 
winner based on the highest bid. The highest bidder is awarded the item at a price equal to the bid 
amount. However, in this auction, the buyer must buy all of the water. This form of auction does not 
guarantee the highest profit for all participants because a buyer may end up buying more water than s/he 
needs. The fixed multiple units first price sealed-bid provides bidders with the opportunity to bid in 
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smaller lots closer to the volume of water needed. The multiunit discriminatory and multiunit uniform 
price auctions offer a more efficient way of distributing excess water as bidders are able to buy the 
required volume of water. The bidder can bid on demand and the seller has a better chance of selling all 
their excess water. While both proposed auction techniques use the same bidding process, the sale price 
is determined differently. In the case of a multiunit discriminatory auction, winning bidders will pay based 
on their offer. In contrast, winners in a multiunit uniform auction all pay the same price (the lowest 




Table 3.8 Comparison table for all auction techniques 





Bidder submits bids privately 
(price) 
Seller separates single selling 
volume to multiple groups and 
auctions them simultaneously. 
Each auction is treated as a 
single first price sealed-bid 
auction 
  
Uses the same rule as the  





Bidders place bids for a specific 
volume of water along with the 
offer price. 
 
Seller collects offers and 
chooses the highest bid price 
until all the volumes of water 
are traded. There are multiple 
winners. Each pays a different 
rate depending on their bid 
values. 
 




Bidders place bids for a specific 
volume of water along with the 
offer price 
 
Seller serves the highest 
bidder first, giving them the 
number of units requested, 
then the second highest 
bidder and so forth until all 
the water is sold. . All bidders 
then pay a per unit price equal 
to the lowest winning bid. 
Single/multiple 
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3.6 Agent behaviour 
Sellers and bidders may behave differently when participating in online auctions. Agents can be 
neutral, greedy, or generous (see Table 3.8). As prior research has shown, the agents’ varying 
behaviours may lead to different auction outcomes (Hailu & Thoyer, 2005; Zuo, Brooks, Wheeler, Harris, 
& Bjornlund, 2014) 
Table 3.9 Description of agent behaviour 
Agent behaviour Description 
Greedy  The agent wants to buy the water with the cheapest price. 
Generous  The agent wants to distribute water to others and does not care about 
making a profit. The seller is motivated to share the excess water. 
Neutral  The agents buy water based on how much they can afford. 
 
In this water trading scenario, the bidders display one of two behaviours: (greedy and neutral). 
Similarly, the sellers can be greedy, generous, or neutral). In this research, we analyse varying agent 
behaviours and assess their impact upon the auction results. We assume that different agent behaviours 
will result in different water distribution patterns and reserve prices. In this setting, we are interested in 
studying the effect of water sharing in the community and the economic effect of water trading.  
A neutral bidder agent is an agent who behaves in a neutral manner. S/he will offer bids which 
reflect the true value of the water that they need. A greedy bidder agent is an agent who is willing to take 
a risk by bidding less than the water’s true value, with the objective of reducing their potential losses.  
In terms of selling, a neutral seller is one who sets the actual reserve price at the same price as the 
water consent cost. They are not looking to make a profit but want to share unused water with community 
members and simply get some of their money back. A generous seller is one who wants to share all of 
his/her excess water and does not care about the income s/he receives from selling it. This means that 
the seller’s main concern is to distribute all of his/her excess water. Thus, the seller does not impose any 
reserve price which means that excess water will be auctioned off to the bidder/s with the best offer. A 
greedy seller will set a slightly higher reserve price to try and gain higher profit. 
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Having outlined the methods used in this research, the next two chapters discuss the experimental 
evaluations used to assess the performance of single agents and to determine which auction mechanisms 
are best suited for trading and distributing water in a community of users. The effect of varying bidder 




Irrigation management agents: Experimental evaluations and 
discussions 
This chapter presents and examines in detail all the experimental results for the irrigation 
management agent. The objective of the experimental evaluation is to analyse the performance of the 
irrigation management agent. As explained in the previous chapter, a farmer can use this software to 
calculate their farm’s water requirement and water reductions during periods of water scarcity. The 
experiment is divided into two stages. First, we validate the crop water needs estimation model and utility 
function for the priority list. Second, we evaluate the performance of the proposed irrigation management 
algorithm using two scenarios: during normal conditions when the farm has sufficient water and during 
periods of water scarcity. We compare the performance of our software to a control agent from an 
existing irrigation calculation tool. 
4.1 Validating the model 
4.1.1 The crop water reduction model  
A farm’s total water needs depend on several factors, including the farm’s location, the planting 
schedule, the weather conditions, and the type of crops grown. During periods of water scarcity, it is 
important to consider each crop’s growth stage, as their water needs vary from one stage to another. The 
proposed irrigation management agent takes all of these factors into account when determining an 
irrigation plan for periods of water scarcity. The agent’s water need calculation is based on a 95% supply 
reliability for the average target in New Zealand irrigation scheme as well as the wilting point. The wilting 
point refers to the situation where the soil’s water content has been exhausted by the crop and, as a 
result, the crop wilts and cannot be revived. At this point, the crop will die (FAR, 2010; Savva & Frenken, 
2002). The soil is considered to be at wilting point when the potential of soil moisture level is at or below 
-1.5  Mean soil moisture potential (Mpa) (Rai, Singh, & Upadhyay, 2017). Anthony and Birendra (2018) 
have shown that the lowest point for crop water usage (the plant will die if the applied water is lower 
than this point) is approximately 80% of the maximum need. In the late season stage, water usage can be 
reduced to around 50%. In this experiment, it is assumed that the maximum water reduction is 20% based 
on the wilting point. 
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The model’s accuracy needs to be validated. We do this by comparing the agent-based water 
calculations and the author’s desk calculations based on crop water need equations from the FAO. We 
collected the water usage estimates (mm/sec/Ha) from three farming categories: pasture only, crops only, 
and mixed crops farms. The farm was located in Lincoln in Canterbury, New Zealand. The farm has a fixed 
soil moisture level, soil type and drought sensitivity value. 
Crop water need: Pasture 
The steps to calculate water need for pasture planted in summer is shown below. Before 
calculating, we must note the following factors. The pasture is now in the late-season stage and has 30 
cm of pasture height. It has a moisture rate of 0.3 using sprinkle irrigation system. 
1. The 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛 values are determined. The data from Table 2.10 shows 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥  = 1.0 and 
𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0.5. 











=  1 
3. Determine 𝑓𝑤 . 
𝑓𝑤 value with sprinkle system is 1.0 as shown in Table 3.1. 
4. Calculate 𝑓𝑒𝑤 . 
 𝑓𝑒𝑤 = min(1 − 𝑓𝑐 , 𝑓𝑤) = min (0, 1)   ➔ 0 
5. Calculate 𝐾𝑒 . 
𝐾𝑒 is then calculated using 𝐾𝑒 = 𝐾𝑟(𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐾𝑐𝑏) ≤ 𝑓𝑒𝑤 ∙ 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥  
𝐾𝑒 = 0.3(1.0 − 1.0) ≤ (0 ∙ 1) ➔ 0. This value is equal to 𝑓𝑒𝑤 ∙ 𝐾𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥  which follows the irrigation system 
calculation. 
6. Calculate 𝐾𝑐 for the late-season stage. The 𝐾𝑐 that includes soil moisture calculation is 𝐾𝑒 = 𝐾𝑐𝑏 +
𝐾𝑒 = 1 + 0 = 1.  
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7. Calculate the pasture water need (daily). The 𝐸𝑇0 on average in summer is 3.99. Then, the daily water 
need for pasture is 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 =  𝐸𝑇0  ×  (𝐾𝐶 + 𝐾𝑒) ➔ 3.99 × 1 = 3.99 mm. 
 Using these steps, we calculated the water requirement for pasture and other crops and 
compare this value with the agent-based calculation for verification and validation as shown Tables 4.1 – 
4.3.  
Table 4.1 Comparison between author’s calculations and irrigation management agent: Pasture only 
Crop name Crop stage Drought 
sensitivity 
Soil type Water requirement (mm.) 
Author’s calculation Agent-based 
PastureA After grazing High Light 3.97 3.97 
PastureB Development High Light 3.89 3.89 
PastureC Late season High Light 3.99 3.99 
Table 4.1 shows the comparison between the author’s calculations for pasture water requirements 
and agent-based water management. The planting season is summer. The rainfall data is from NIWA. Each 
crop is in a different crop growth stage. The values obtained using the author’s desk calculation is identical 
to the agent’s calculation.  
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the water needs calculation for a mixed crop farm and a mixed crop and 
pasture farm. In both tables, the author’s calculations and the values generated by the irrigation 
management agent are identical. This result indicates that the agent’s calculations are accurate.  
Table 4.2 Comparison between author’s calculation and irrigation management agent: Mixed crop 
Crop name Crop stage Drought 
sensitivity 
Soil Type Water requirement (mm) 
Author’s calculation Agent-based 
Wheat Initial  High Light 4.31 4.31 
Wheat Late-season High Light 4.27 4.27 
Maize Crop development High Light 4.59 4.59 
Maize Mid-season High Light  4.45  4.45 
Peanut Crop development High Light 4.19 4.19 






Table 4.3 Comparison between author’s calculation and irrigation management agent: Mixed crop and 
pasture 
Crop name Crop stage Drought 
sensitivity 
Soil Type Water requirement (mm) 
Author’s calculation Agent-based 
Peanut Crop development High Light 3.95 3.95 
Maize Crop development High Light 4.59 4.59 
Wheat Initial High Light 4.31 4.31 
Oil seed Mid-season High Light 4.25 4.25 
Pasture Development High Light 3.89 3.89 
Pasture After grazing High Light 3.97 3.97 
4.1.2 Calculating the utility function and prioritising crops 
In this section, we show how we have validated the utility function and crop prioritisation 
calculations. Table 4.4 provides descriptions for PastureA, PastureB and PastureC which include 
information about the crop stage, planting season, rainfall, soil type and plot size. In this setup, PastureA 
should be given the highest priority as it is in its initial stage (after grazing). Based on prior literature, a 
crop in the initial stage of growth requires more water than crops in either the development or late-season 
stage. 
Table 4.4 Input model validation: Crop stage and soil type 
Crop type Crop stage Planting season Rainfall (mm) Soil type Plot size 
PastureA After grazing Summer 630 Light soil 100 m2 
PastureB Development Summer 630 Medium 100 m2 
PastureC Late-season Summer 630 Heavy soil 100 m2 
Table 4.5 shows the calculations for drought sensitivity (𝑓𝐷𝑆), soil type (𝑓𝑆𝑇), potential yield (𝑓𝑃𝑌) 
and the final utility value. To calculate the final utility value for each crop, the value of each function is 
multiplied by its weight (this indicates its relative importance). These are then added together. Here, the 
weights for 𝑓𝐷𝑆 and 𝑓𝑆𝑇  are set to 0.5, as both the drought sensitivity and the soil type factors are equally 
important. The potential yield is not considered here as this is an all pasture setting. As shown in Table 
4.5, PastureA has the highest utility followed by PastureB and PastureC. This is as expected, since pasture 
at the initial stage needs the most water. 
Table 4.5 Prioritised list based on the utility function: Pasture only 
Crop type 𝒇𝑫𝑺 𝒇𝑺𝑻 𝒇𝑷𝒀 Utility value Prioritised list 
PastureA: 30 300 928,000            92.95  1 
PastureB: 20 200 928,000            92.90  2 
PastureC: 10 100 928,000            92.85  3 
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This prioritisation list is used to determine how much water should be reduced for each crop 
based on the algorithm defined in Chapter 3. 
Table 4.6 Simulated data validation: Other Crops farm 
Crop type Crop stage Planting season Rainfall (mm) Soil type Plot size 
Oil seed Late-season Summer 630 Light soil 100 m2 
Wheat Mid-season Summer 630 Medium 100 m2 
Maize Initial Summer 630 Heavy soil 100 m2 
Table 4.6 shows an example for other crops farm. The water requirements for oil seed, wheat and 
maize are 4377.18, 3219.12 and 4576.85 m3, respectively. The farm’s total water need is 13,073 m3. Wheat 
is considered a high value crop and more water is required in the mid-season stage than the late season 
and initial stage. 
Table 4.7 Prioritised list based on the utility function: Other Crops  
Crop type 𝒇𝑫𝑺 𝒇𝑺𝑻 𝒇𝑷𝒀 Utility value Prioritised list 
Wheat: 20 200 597,000            59.80  1 
Maize: 40 300 537,000            53.85  2 
Oil seed: 10 100 260,000            26.05  3 
Table 4.7 shows the calculation for the utility function and the prioritisation of each crop. Using 
this example the weights are changed to 0.2, 0.2, 0.6 for 𝑓𝐷𝑆, 𝑓𝑆𝑇 and 𝑓𝑃𝑌 respectively as we considered 
yield as more important in a farm with varying crops. Here, we considered all three factors, but placed 
more importance on the potential yield. As expected, wheat is at the top of the priority list. Then, the 
result of priority list is used for the water reduction plan based on the percentage of water reduction 
requirement as discussed in Section 4.3. Overall, the validation result shows that our model can accurately 
calculate the crop water need based on the FAO reference data. The proposed water reduction behaved 
as expected.  
4.2 The experimental setup 
To evaluate the proposed agent’s performance, we need to prove that the irrigation management 
agent can generate the best possible solution for users, particularly in prioritising water usage on the farm 
with different water reduction schemes. We consider two scenarios: when water is available and when 
water restrictions are in place. In the first scenario, we are interested in investigating how much water 
can be saved using the irrigation management agent as opposed to other software that does not consider 
different crop stages in water requirement calculations (such as IrriCalc and Overseer). In the second 
scenario, we investigate a scenario where there is water scarcity. We consider the potential savings that 
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can be gained by using an irrigation management agent. In both cases, we observe the amount of water 
than can be potentially saved and the change in the farm’s profit by taking into account the crop yields 
and the cost of water. 
To test the performance of our irrigation management agent, we conducted three experiments 
using three farm setups: a grazing pasture only farm, other crops only farm and a mixed crops farm (which 
consists of pasture and other crops). These setups are common in New Zealand. For each experiment, we 
randomly generated 100 farms with varying crop properties. For the pasture only farm, we set the crop 
type to pasture and randomized the growth stage to three different stages. In the other crops farm, we 
randomized the crop type and the growth stage to four different stages. The setup for the mixed crops 
farm is also similar to the other crops farm. However, we included pasture as the additional crop. We fixed 
the farm size to 250 hectares based on the average New Zealand farm size (The Law Foundation, 2018).  
 In the first scenario, it is assumed that there is sufficient water on the farm. We are interested in 
investigating how much water is actually needed and how much water can be saved by using an irrigation 
management agent. We compare this agent’s performance to a control agent, which exhibits similar 
behaviour to an existing irrigation management tool. We also compared the proposed water need 
generated by our agent during a period of water scarcity (based on a 10% water reduction scheme) with 
the control agent. 
The second scenario investigates how much water can be saved when using the water 
management agent. It is based on four water reduction schemes: 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%. This is to align 
with the real-world setting where the water authority defines the water reduction percentage during 
periods of water scarcity. We did not test the agent with a reduction scheme higher than 20% as the water 
reduction scheme is usually capped at 20%. In Chapter 3, we proposed the utility function, which includes 
a crop’s potential yield function (𝑓𝑃𝑌), crop’s drought sensitivity function (𝑓𝐷𝑆) and soil type function (𝑓𝑆𝑇). 
The utility function weights are based on the real life scenario which focuses on the crop yield and 
productivity as first priority to get maximum profit in the farm. In the pasture only farm, we set the weight 
for the three determinants as (𝑓𝑃𝑌=0.2, 𝑓𝑆𝑇 = 0.5, 𝑓𝐷𝑆 = 0.3) to indicate the importance of the growth 
stage and drought sensitivity. On the other crops farm, we set the weight to favour the productivity 
outcome, which is a farmer’s first priority. The soil type and drought sensitivity are the second and third 
priorities, respectively. The weight for the utility function for a mixed crops farm is set as (𝑓𝑃𝑌=0.5, 𝑓𝑆𝑇 =
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0.3, 𝑓𝐷𝑆 = 0.2). The same weight distribution was applied to the mixed crops farms. Other weights can be 
considered as well, depending on what the farmer considers to be important at that point in time.  
4.3 Result 
4.3.1 Comparisons between an existing tool and irrigation management agent when 
there is sufficient water on the farm 
In the next two sections, we compare the water requirements generated by the irrigation 
management agent and the control agent. We use an existing water allocation calculator called Irricalc as 
our control agent. As described in Chapter 2, Irricalc is a soil water balance model that estimates irrigation 
requirement from effective rainfall and actual crop requirements (Wheeler & Bright, 2015). Irricalc’s 
estimations only work for a single crop. So, to estimate multiple crops, a user must calculate water 
requirements for each individual crop. To use Irricalc, the user must enter the address of the farm, the 
crop (the user can select from a drop down list which consists of pasture, apples, avocadoes, grapes, 
kiwifruit, stone-fruit, arable, and others) (see http://mycatchment.info/), plant available water and 
irrigation method. The software estimates the irrigation requirements for each month of the whole year.  
Table 4.8 compares the pasture water requirement from the control agent and the irrigation 
management agent. The planting season is summer, and the rainfall data was obtained from NIWA. The 
crop stages vary. The water requirements recommended for all pastures by the control agent are 40.22 
mm/sec/hectare whereas the values recommended by the agent vary depending on the crop stage. The 
differences in calculations were expected because the agent took into account the growth stage of the 
pasture and incorporated it into the water needs calculations. These values are lower than those 
recommended by the control agent (reducing the total water need by 11.98%).  
Table 4.8 Irrigation management agent vs. the control agent: Pasture only 
Crop name Crop stage Drought 
sensitivity 
Soil type Water requirement 
(mm/sec/hectare) 
IrricalC Agent-based 
PastureA After grazing High Light 40.22 32.67 
PastureB Development High Light 40.22 39.46 
PastureC Late-season High Light 40.22 34.07 
   Total 120.66 106.2 
Table 4.9 shows the water requirement for other crops farm. As before, the water requirement 
calculated by the irrigation management agent is less than that recommended by the control agent. The 
values generated by the irrigation management agent vary from one crop to another based on each crop’s 
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growth stage. The irrigation management agent’s total proposed water requirement is 16.40% lower than 
that of the control agent. As seen in Table 4.10, the total water requirement for a mixed crops farm 
generated by the irrigation management agent is 13.95% lower than the control agent’s value.  
Table 4.9 Water requirement from irrigation management agent vs. control agent: Other crops 
Crop name Crop stage Drought 
sensitivity 
Soil type Water requirement  
(mm per hectare) 
IrricalC Agent-based 
Wheat Initial  Low Heavy 40.22 33.07 
Wheat Late-season Low Heavy 40.22 34.66 
Maize Development Low Heavy 44.24 40.26 
Maize Mid-season Low Heavy 44.24 33.87 
Peanut Development Low Heavy 44.24 37.06 
Peanut Late-season Low Heavy 44.24 36.26 
   Total 257.4 215.18 
 
Table 4.10 Water requirement from irrigation management agent vs. control agent: Mixed crops and 
pasture 
Crop name Crop stage Drought 
sensitivity 
Soil type Water requirement  
(mm per hectare) 
IrricalC Agent-based 
Peanut Development Low Heavy 44.24 32.27 
Maize Development Low Heavy 44.24 33.87 
Wheat Initial Low Heavy 40.22 34.66 
Oil seed Late-season Low Heavy 40.22 38.85 
Pasture Development Low Heavy 40.22 35.87 
Pasture After grazing Low Heavy 40.22 39.06 
   Total 249.36 214.58 
In summary, the irrigation management agent calculated lower water requirements as it used 
the modified formula to calculate 𝐾𝑐 , It also took into account the crop growth stage.  
4.3.2 Comparison between an existing tool and the irrigation management agent 
when there is insufficient water on the farm 
When there is sufficient water on the farm, the irrigation management agent’s water need 
calculations were lower than the control agent’s estimates. This means that the agent can achieve 
additional water savings even when there is sufficient water. Reducing usage becomes more important 
when water is scarce, especially during the drought season. 
Table 4.11 shows the water reduction results from the control agent and the irrigation 
management agent for a pasture only farm using a 10% water reduction scheme. Since the control agent 
does not provide functionality that can be used during water scarcity, we apply a standard 10% reduction 
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to the actual water requirements. This means that for a 40.22 mm/sec/Ha, the proposed reduction for 
the control agent is 36.20 (40.22 – 4.022). The total water requirement for the control agent is 108.60. 
This figure is higher than the irrigation management agent’s water requirement estimate (90.09). The 
water requirement for PastureC is very low as the pasture is in the late season and less water is required 
(the control agent reduced the water usage around 50% of water usage). The agent-based proposed 36.20 
mm/sec as opposed to 18.01 mm sec proposed by the agent. PastureB needs more water than PastureA 
and PastureC because it is in the development stage and needs more water for pasture growing. In total, 
the irrigation management agent’s water requirement estimate is lower than that proposed by the control 
agent. The control agent does not provide an irrigation water need calculation based on the crop growth 
stage. In fact, the crop water needs estimate is calculated based on the average of water needs for the 
entire planting period. In contrast, the irrigation management agent estimates crop water need based on 
the crop growth stage, season and soil moisture data for the farm. 
Table 4.11 Water reduction irrigation management agent vs the control agent: Pasture only  
Crop name Crop stage 10 % of water reduction 
(mm/sec/Ha) 
IrricalC Agent-based 
PastureB After grazing 36.20 (10%) 32.67 (-) 
PastureA Development 36.20 (10%) 39.46(-) 
PastureC Late season 36.20 (10%) 18.01 (-50%) 
 Total 108.60 90.09 
 
Similar results are observed for the other crops farm and the mixed crops farm. Table 4.12 shows 
the water reduction results for other crops for a 10% of water reduction. Since the control agent is not 
able to prioritise crop water needs, it is assumed that a water reduction of 10% is applied to all crops. In 
this setting, the pea (field) is in late season and water usage can be reduced to 50% of the normal water 
need. The maize’s water can also be reduced by 15%. The agent’s total water reduction is approximately 
16.80% which is much higher than the control agent’s proposed reduction of 10%. Similarly, the irrigation 
management agent proposed greater water reductions than the control agent for the mixed crops farm. 
Table 4.13 shows that the water reduction from the irrigation management agent is around 19.58% for 
mixed crops without compromising the crops and pastures as the reductions are based on the crop priority 
list. The oil seed and PastureB water requirements are reduced by 50% because they are in the late season 
stage. In summary, the water reduction algorithm ensures that the reduction is applied from the crop with 
the lowest priority to the crop with the highest priority: notably, the required reduction is fulfilled before 
getting to the top of the crop priority list. This process is discussed further in the next set of experiments. 
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Table 4.12 Water reduction from irrigation management agent vs. the control agent: Other crops 
Crop name Crop stage 10 % of water reduction 
(mm/sec/Ha) 
IrricalC Agent-based 
Barley Initial  39.82 (10%)  34.66 (-) 
Peanut Development  39.82 (10%)  37.06 (-) 
Oil seed Mid-season  36.20 (10%)  38.26 (-) 
Wheat Mid-season  36.20 (10%)  36.66 (-) 
Maize Mid-season  39.82 (10%)  28.79 (-15%) 
Pea (field) Late-season  39.82 (10%)  17.33 (-50%) 
 Total 231.68 192.76 
 
Table 4.13 Water reduction from irrigation management agent vs. control agent: Mixed crops  
Crop name Crop stage 10 % of water reduction 
(mm/sec/Ha) 
IrricalC Agent-based 
    
Maize Initial  39.82 (10%) 33.87 (-) 
PastureA After grazing  36.20 (10%) 39.06 (-) 
Wheat Development  36.20 (10%)   36.66 (-) 
Peanut Mid-season  39.82 (10%) 37.06 (-) 
PastureB Late-season  36.20 (10%)   18.01 (-50%) 
Oil seed Late-season  36.20 (10%)  15.73 (-50%) 
 Total 224.44 180.49 
 
4.3.3 Water scarcity: Varying reduction schemes 
This experiment investigates how much water can be saved when using the irrigation 
management agent based on four water reduction schemes: 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% for a pasture only 
farm, other crops farm and mixed crops farm. For each reduction scheme, we observe the actual reduction 
proposed by the irrigation management agent. All crop types and crop stages are generated randomly, 
based on commonly found crops on a dairy farm in the Canterbury region. 
Grazing pasture only 
In this experiment, it is assumed that the farm has different types of pastures at different growth 
stages planted in varying soil conditions with same plot sizes (see Table 4.14).  
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Table 4.14 Information for pasture only 
Crop name Crop growth stage Drought 
sensitivity level 







PastureA Late-season Low 50 2,000 2.32 Light 
PastureB Development Low 50 2,000 2.32 Medium 
PastureC Development Low 50 2,000 2.32 Heavy 
PastureD After grazing Low 50 2,000 2.32 Heavy 
PastureE Late-season High 50 2,000 2.32 Heavy 
 
Table 4.15 Irrigation priority list and water reduction for different reduction rates  
for pasture only  
  Water reduction (m3) 
Priority 5% 10% 15% 20% 
PastureD 0 0 0 194.12 
PastureC 0 0 0 194.12 
PastureB  0 0 386.25 386.25 
PastureA 0 376.27 376.27 376.27 
PastureE 900.74 900.74 900.74 900.74 
Actual water requirement 9,536.53 9,536.53 9,536.53 9,536.53 
Actual reduction 476.83 953.65 1,430.48 1,907.31 
Proposed reduction 900.74 1,277.01 1,663.26 2,055.51 
Proposed reduction (%) 9.45 13.39 17.44 21.55 
 Table 4.15 shows the irrigation management agent’s proposed water reduction plan. PastureE 
has the lowest priority because it in the late growth stage and soil contains a lot of water with a heavy soil 
type. PastureA is the second lowest priority due to its light soil type which needs more water than 
PastureE. In the 5% water reduction scheme, only PastureE’s water need is reduced. The rest of the 
pastures do not require any water reductions since the proposed water reduction of 5% has already been 
fulfilled. In the 10% water reduction scheme, only Pasture E (50%) and PastureA (50%) are subject to water 
reductions. This is because PastureE and PastureB are both in the late season stage. In the 15% reduction 
scheme, PastureE (50%), PastureA (50%) and PastureB (20%) are subject to reductions. With a 20% 
reduction scheme, all pastures are subject to water reductions, with PastureC and PastureD having the 
lowest reductions as they are the top two in the prioritised list. The actual water requirement is 9,536.53 
m3. Using this model, the proposed reductions are greater than what is required: at 5% the agent is able 
to reduce the water by 9.45%, at 10% by 13.39%, at 15% by 17.44% and at 20% by 21.55%. These results 
show that the actual water reductions for all schemes proposed by the agent are actually higher than the 
proposed reduction schemes.  
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Other crops (without pasture) 
In this scenario, we assume that the farm has multiple crops, which are peas, oil seed, barley, 
wheat and a hybrid carrot seed. As shown in Table 4.16, they are all at different crop growth stages. The 
weight was set with productivity value as the first priority (𝑓𝑃𝑌=0.5). Soil type and drought sensitivity are 
equally weighted (𝑓𝑆𝑇 = 0.25, 𝑓𝐷𝑆 = 0.25).  
Table 4.16 Information for other crops 









Wheat Initial Low 50 15,000 0.4 Light 
Oil seed Mid-season High 50 4,000 0.65 Medium 
Barley Development Medium 50 7,500 0.39 Medium 
Maize Development High 50 12,500 0.43 Light 
Peanut Late-season Low 50 4,500 0.46 Heavy 
Table 4.17 shows the irrigation priority for these scenarios. Wheat is the highest priority as it has 
the highest yield, followed by maize, barley, oil seed and peanuts. Peanuts has the lowest priority because 
it is in the late-season stage and the crop value is low. Hence, the water usage can be reduced to 50% of 
the actual water needed. The proposed reduction recommended is 9.13% for a 5% water reduction 
scheme. At a 5% reduction scheme, no water reduction is required for wheat, maize, barley and oil seed. 
In the 10% reduction scheme, the recommended water reduction is 13.03% and wheat, maize and barley 
are not subject to water reductions. With the 15% water reduction scheme, the proposed water reduction 
is 16.42% and wheat and maize are not subject to water reductions. Likewise, in the 20% water reduction 
scheme, the proposed water reduction is 21.51%, where wheat and maize are subject to a 10% and 20% 
water reduction. Based on this result, the proposed water reductions were more than the actual reduction 




Table 4.17 Irrigation priorities and water reductions for different reduction rates on other crops farm  
  Water reduction (m3) 
Priority 5% 10% 15% 20% 
Wheat 0 0 0 173.68 
Maize 0 0 0 344.38 
Barley 0 0 344.38 344.38 
Oil seed 0 397.28 397.28 397.28 
Peanut 928.30 928.30 928.30 928.30 
Actual water requirement 10,171.52 10,171.52 10,171.52 10,171.52 
Actual reduction 508.58 1,017.15 1,525.73 2,034.3 
Proposed reduction 928.3 1,325.58 1,669.96 2,188.02 
Proposed reduction (%) 9.13 13.03 16.42 21.51 
Mixed crops (pastures and other crops) 
In this experiment, we included a combination of crops (maize, wheat, oil seed) and pastures 
(PastureA and PastureB) as shown in Table 4.18. The agent placed equal weight on drought sensitivity 
and soil type (0.25) but allocated a heavier weight (0.5) to the crop value.  
Table 4.18 Information for the mixed crops farm 









PastureA Late-season Medium 50 2,000 2.32 Light 
PastureB After grazing Medium 50 2,000 2.32 Light 
Maize Mid-season Medium 50 12,500 0.13 Heavy 
Wheat Initial Low 50 15,000 0.176 Light 
Oil seed Mid-season High 50 4,000 0.43 Light 
 Table 4.19 shows the irrigation priority for these crops and the proposed water reductions at 
different water reduction percentages. Wheat is marked as the highest priority as it is a high value crop 
followed by maize, PastureB, PastureA and oil seed. Oil seed is the lowest priority because it has the lowest 
productivity value. In the 5% reduction scheme, only oil seed and PastureA are subject to water 
reductions. In a 10% water reduction scheme, oil seed, PastureA and PastureB are subject to water 
reductions. Outcome is the same when a 15% water reduction scheme is applied. All the crops and 
pastures are subject to water reductions in a 20% water reduction scheme, but wheat and maize are 
subject to the lowest water reductions as they are the top two crops. The agent system’s proposed water 
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reductions are more than the actual reduction requirements: 6.38% at 5%, 15.24% at 10% and 15% and 
21.52% at 20%.  
Table 4.19 Irrigation priorities and water reductions for different reduction rates on a mixed crops farm 
 Water reduction (m3) 
Priority 5% 10% 15% 20% 
Wheat 0 0 0 173.68 
Maize 0 0 0 438.21 
PastureB 0 863.41 863.41 863.41 
PastureA 196.64 196.64 196.64 196.64 
Oil seed 425.23 425.23 425.23 425.23 
Actual water requirement 9,747.23 9,747.23 9,747.23 9,747.23 
Actual reduction 487.36 974.72  1,462.08 1,949.45 
Proposed reduction 621.87 1485.28 1485.28 2,097.17 
Proposed reduction (%) 6.38 15.24 15.24 21.52 
Based on these experiments, it can be concluded that the proposed system was able to 
prioritise the crops’ water needs based on predetermined constraints. The greater reductions can be 
achieved for lower % reduction schemes, and at higher % schemes, the agent still can achieve a marginal 
increase in water saving. For 10% and 15% of water reduction scheme, the agent-based proposed the 
same water reduction which is around 15.24% because the proposed system reduced the water usage 
to its maximum.  
In this chapter, we have discussed the performance of the irrigation management agent on an 
individual farm. We have validated the agent’s water need requirements by comparing the values 
obtained using a manual calculation based on the FAO formula. The water need calculations were also 
compared with the values obtained from a control agent - an existing water calculator - in two settings 
(when the farm has sufficient water and when the farm has insufficient water). In both cases, the irrigation 
management agent proposed a lower water need rate than the control agent. We then applied the 
proposed model to several scenarios, which are grazing pasture only, other crops and mixed crops and 
found that it was able to reduce water more than the required reduction. Moreover, some of 
experimental result shows the satisfying water reduction plan.  These results show that the proposed 
system can be used by a single farm to help with irrigation management on an individual farm during a 
normal season and during periods of water scarcity. The next chapter presents and discusses the results 
of the water sharing experiment. 
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Chapter 5 
Multi-agent irrigation management system: Experimental evaluations 
and discussion 
This chapter describes the experiments used to evaluate various auction mechanisms employed 
to distribute excess water within the community. The main objective of this experimental evaluation is to 
investigate how excess water can be distributed to a community using four different auction techniques. 
The experiment has three parts. The first part of the experiment is designed to establish whether the use 
of auctions is better than direct negotiation. Here, we compare how much excess water is left for bidders, 
sellers and the community at the end of the negotiation process. The second part of the experiment 
compares the performance of different auction techniques in terms of excess water and profits/losses. 
Finally, we report the impact of sellers and bidders’ behaviour on the auction outcomes and the 
distribution of excess water.   
5.1 Experimental setup 
To determine the number of sellers and bidders in the marketplace we compare different situations 
with respect to the number of auction participants: 1) small (two sellers and 20 bidders) 2) medium (five 
sellers and 50 bidders), and 3) large (10 sellers and 100 bidders). We run each distribution 100 times and 
conduct statistical analysis using ANOVA (see Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Statistical significance of closing price for four auction mechanisms and three auctions’ 
scenarios with ANOVA. 
Size of the 
experiment 
2 sellers and 20 
bidders 
5 sellers and 50 
bidders 
10 sellers and 100 
bidders 
Statistical test 
Mean Mean Mean Sum-of-squares F - statistic 
    Between group Within group  
First price sealed 
bid auction 
16.84 18.84 18.90 66.70 237.97 8.409* 
Fixed multi-unit 
first price sealed 
bid auction 




19.21 18.67 19.71 10.40 389.07 0.722 
Multiunit uniform 
auction 
18.78 19.07 18.90 0.95 107.02 0.268 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 5.1 shows the closing prices for auction techniques based on the various distributions of 
sellers and bidders. The mean closing price from the single unit first-price sealed-bid and fixed multiunit 
first-price sealed-bid auction differ significantly across the three distributions. However, the mean closing 
price from the multiunit discriminatory and multiunit uniform auction are not significant across the three 
distributions. We apply a histogram to examine the spread of the closing prices, including the peaks, 
spread, and symmetry as shown in Figure 5.1. 
         
 
Figure 5.1 Closing price histogram on the different of auction size  
 It shows that the frequency of the closing price on small, medium and large bidding experiments 
from the single unit first-price sealed-bid and fixed multiunit first-price sealed bid auction is such that 
approximately 85% of the frequency data is the highest price on every size of experiment. This result 
indicates that the closing prices for all auctions are not significantly different. As the statistical analysis 
shows that different numbers of sellers and bidders do not affect the closing price, we opted to use a 
medium distribution (five sellers and 50 bidders). 
To conduct the experiments, we establish a simulated environment consisting of 55 farmers. Within 
this group there are five sellers and 50 buyers. Each farmer is represented by an irrigation management 
agent (as described in Chapter 4). Each agent must calculate their farm’s water requirements and decide 
whether to bid or sell water. They must also determine a private valuation/reserve price for the water 
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they want to buy or sell. For each experiment, we generate varying crop properties based on a Canterbury 
farm. Crop properties are randomised based on the crop growth stage, and crop type/s. The farm size is 
fixed to 250 hectares which is the average farm size in New Zealand. The agents display varying 
behaviours. They have access to relevant farm information. This information is based on Canterbury crop 
types. The cost and expense values are based on the Financial budget book: Volume 40 (Askin et al., 2013). 
Information about each individual farm is generated individually and depends on whether it is a mixed 
crop and/or pasture farm. This environment can be configured to run multiple types of auctions with 
different numbers of sellers and bidders. 
Table 5.2 Agent characteristics in the water sharing scheme 
 Seller Bidder 
Excess water Yes No 
Productivity loss No Yes 
Reserve price Yes No 
Private valuation No Yes 
In the first and second part of the experiment, all the agents have neutral behaviour. The agents’ 
characteristics are shown in Table 5.2. In the last part of the experiment, the bidders and sellers have 
varying behaviours (generous, greedy and neutral). We use four auction techniques: the single unit first-
price sealed-bid, the fixed multiunit first-price sealed bid, the multiunit discriminatory auction, and the 
multiunit uniform auction. Each experiment is run 100 times. The excess water, the seller’s total income 
($), bidders ($) and community ($) are calculated and averaged at the conclusion of each auction.   
5.2 Comparing direct negotiation and the auction mechanisms  
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate the suitability of auctions in distributing excess 
water to the community. In CPWL, sellers can sell their excess water via direct negotiation with any 
interested buyer. A seller broadcasts the volume to be sold and the reserve price on the marketplace 
(provided by CPWL). The auctions are conducted on a ‘first come first serve’d basis. Any interested buyers 
will contact the seller directly. When there are multiple buyers who are interested, the water will be 
offered to the buyer who makes the first offer. As indicated in the literature, an auction is an efficient 
mechanism for selling goods. In this experiment, we compare two negotiation mechanisms (direct 
negotiation and a single unit first-price sealed-bid auction) for distributing excess water. We compare the 
performance of the two mechanisms, focusing on how much excess water from seller is sold and 
distributed (Chiewchan, Anthony, Birendra, & Samarasinghe, 2020). It is assumed that all agents 
participating in this experiment have neutral behaviours. 
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Table 5.3 shows the total excess water for sellers, bidders and the community at conclusion of the 
auctions. Using direct negotiation, the total excess water is reduced from 100% to 59.29% for sellers. The 
total excess water increases from 0% to 13.82% for the bidders. For the community, the total excess water 
is reduced from 100% to 73.11%. This means that only 27.89% of the excess water is distributed to the 
community. Using a first-price sealed bid auction, the total excess water in the community is reduced from 
100% to 62.25%, a figure higher than what is that traded through direct negotiation. This means that 
37.75% of the excess water is distributed to the community. This figure represents an improvement of 
10.86%. As Table 5.3 shows, a part of the excess water has now been transferred to the bidder. The bidder 
must purchase the water as a single unit which means that the volume might be more than what s/he 
needed. However, purchasing water helps to increase the bidder’s marginal profit (see Table 5.4). Table 
5.4 shows the percentage of total additional marginal profit once the water trading is complete. By trading 
the excess water, sellers, bidders and the community as a whole can gain additional marginal profit. This 
additional gain is higher when the auction is used as the trading mechanism (0.54% using direct 
negotiation and 0.58% using a first price sealed bid auction). In addition, sellers gain more profit from 
using an auction (1.05%) compared with direct negotiation (0.75%).  
Table 5.3 Total excess water after water trading 
 Total excess water (%) 
 Seller Bidder Community 
 Before After Before After Before After 
Direct negotiation 100% 59.29% 0% 13.82% 100 % 73.11% 
Single unit 
first-price sealed-bid 
100% 48.12% 0% 9.07% 100% 62.25% 
 
Table 5.4 Total additional marginal profit ($) after water trading 
 Additional margin profit (%) 
 Seller Bidder Community 
 Before After Before After Before After 
Direct negotiation 0% 0.75% 0% 0.52% 0% 0.54% 
Single unit 
first-price sealed-bid 
0% 1.05% 0% 0.52% 0% 0.58% 
 
As Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show, by using an auction to distribute their excess water, farmers are able 
to gain additional marginal profit. The additional profit is calculated from the crop yield calculation.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the water management agent calculates the total crop water need 
based on reduction scheme. When the total crop yield is reduced, it will affect the total profit for a farm. 
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In this experiment, we use a first price sealed bid auction, where bidders have to bid for the water as a 
single unit; there are no options for the bidders to buy the exact volume of water they need. We explore 
different types of auctions to discover the best water distribution model that both maximises marginal 
profits and minimises excess water.    
5.3 Comparing auction techniques 
5.3.1 Single unit first-price sealed-bid auction 
In this experiment, like the previous one, the marketplace is populated with five sellers and 50 bidders. In 
this auction, each bidder submits their bid privately during the auction. At the end of the auctions, the 
sellers evaluate all the bids and the winning bidders are announced. Here, there are five units of water 
that are for sale and there are potentially five winners (with the highest winning bids). Each winner pays 
for the water based on the winning bid. However, if the winning bid is lower than the seller’s reserve price, 
there will be no winner and the water is re-auctioned. We run the auction 100 times and, at the end of 
the auctions, average the excess water and additional profit for the sellers, bidders and community. 
Table 5.5 Single unit first-price sealed-bid auction: Summary result 
 Excess water  
Before After % 
Seller 3,596.40 1,000.45 27.82 
Bidder - 336.05 9.34 
Community 3,596.40 1,337.49 37.19 
 
 Additional margin profit ($)  
Before After % 
Seller 3,582,701.99 3,631,387.70 +1.36 
Bidder 26,553,969.39 27,073,635.91 +1.96 
Community 30,136,671.38 30,705,023.61 +1.89 
 
 
Table 5.5 shows water distribution once the auctions have concluded. Before the auctions, the 
amount of excess water in the community is 3,596.40m3. At the conclusion of the auctions, the sellers still 
have 1.000.45m3 excess water. The bidders now have 336.05m3 (bidders have apparently bought more 
water than necessary due to the nature of the auction), resulting in the community having excess water 
of 1,337.49 m3. Some sellers are left with excess water: it was not auctioned off as there were no offers 
from the bidders and/or the winning bid was lower than the seller’s reserve price. At the end of the 
auction, over 70% (72.18%) of the total excess water has been distributed, thereby increasing the sellers' 
profits by 1.36%. The bidders now have an excess of 336.05 litres, since they have to buy the total volume 
offered. In short, they are unable to specify how much water they actually need. Overall, 62.81% of the 
excess water has been distributed to the community, representing an additional profit of 1.89%.  
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Details of the auction rounds are shown in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. While Seller 5 was not able to 
sell his excess water, the other four sellers were able to trade their water at a higher price than their 
specified reserve: as shown in Table 5.7 they gained 71.21%, 63.11%, 20.19% and 17.76%. Sellers who 
sold their excess water via an auction obtained a higher price for their water in contrast to those who sold 
it via direct negotiations where sellers received offers based on their reserve price. In short, the first price 
sealed bid auction technique is a good option for the sellers because they can sell most of their water and 
make additional profit. Unfortunately, buyers end up purchasing more water than they need. As shown 
in Table 5.8, all four bidders have excess water. However, they were still able to recover some of their 
losses (10.83% for Bidder 27, 4.63% for Bidder 26, 50.8% for Bidder 17 and 10.27% for Bidder 22).  
Table 5.6 Single unit first-price sealed-bid result: Seller 
Seller name 






% Before After  
Seller1 508,265.55 517,757.66 +1.87 483.81 - 
Seller2 689,198.80  705,845.15  +2.42 955.56  -    
Seller3  987,283.53  1,001,574.88  +1.45 736.38 - 
Seller4 583,978.16  592,234.01  +1.14 419.19  -    
Seller5 813,975.95  813,975.95  - 1,001.45  1,001.45  
Table 5.7 Winner reserve price 
Winner name Reserved price  
 Before bidding After bidding % 
Bidder27 11.46 19.62  71.20  
Bidder26 10.68 17.42  63.11  
Bidder17 16.15 19.41  20.19  
Bidder22 16.72 19.69  17.76  
 
Table 5.8 Single unit first-price sealed-bid results: Winner 
Winner 
name 















Bidder27 483.81 19.62 469.60 786,029.69 871,151.69 +10.83 - 14.22 
Bidder26 955.56  17.42 781.82 630,176.57 659,331.02 +4.63 - 173.74 
Bidder17 736.38 19.41 670.81 563,341.59 849,505.56 +50.80 - 65.57 
Bidder22 419.19  19.69 336.68 584,784.42 644,853.62 +10.27 - 82.52 
 105 
5.3.2 Fixed multiunit first-price sealed bid auction 
As observed in the previous experiment, a single unit first-price sealed-bid helps to distribute excess 
water to those who need it. Unfortunately, the excess water is sold as a single unit (in some cases, the 
water is a large volume), and bidders are not able to specify the volume they require. This is the main 
reason why the sellers were not able to auction off their excess water. To avoid such a problem, a seller 
may choose to sell their water in multiple units or by splitting it into smaller volumes. This provides bidders 
with more options and results in less water wastage. In this experiment, the marketplace is set up to run 
multiunit first-price sealed-bid auctions: this auction is a modified version of the single unit first-price 
sealed-bid auction. However, in this case the seller can now split excess water into several smaller units. 
This means that each seller will run several auctions depending on the number of water units they wish 
to sell. This also means that if bidders need to buy more water than they can get in a single unit, they will 
need to bid in multiple auctions.  
Table 5.9 Fixed multiunit first price sealed bid: Summary results. 
 Excess water  
Before After % 
Seller 3,596.40 1,171.64 32.58 
Bidder -    153.4 4.27 
Community 3,596.40 1,325.04 36.84 
 
 Additional profit  
Before After % 
Seller 3,582,701.99 3,625,744.86 +1.20 
Bidder 26,553,969.39 26,958,604.65 +1.52 
Community 30,136,671.38 30,584,349.51  +1.49 
 
Table 5.9 shows the outcome of water distribution at the conclusion of the auction. Before the 
auction, the amount of excess water in the community is 3,596.40m3. At the conclusion of all the auctions, 
the sellers still have excess water of 1,171.64m3. The bidders now have 153.4m3 meaning that the 
community has excess water of 1,325.04 m3. The fact that the sellers still have excess water indicates that 
this water was not auctioned off: there were no offers from the bidders. Moreover, the cost of the water 
was higher than bidders' private valuations. The possibility of selling this water decreased with multiple 
units. The sellers distributed 67.42% of their excess water which increased their profits by 1.2%. The 
excess water from the bidders was approximately 153.4 litres. This is due to the fact that in this type of 
auction, the bidders have more bidding options. Overall, 63.16% of the excess water has been distributed 
to the community, meaning an additional income of 1.49%. 
The details of the auction rounds are shown in Tables 5.10 and 5.11. Each seller (five in total) has 
two units of water to sell. They offer buyers two different volumes to choose from. For example, Seller 1 
splits his 483.81 litres into two units (200 litres and 283.81 litres). Similarly, Seller 2 splits his water into 
two units (455.56 litres and 500 litres). This means that there is a total of 10 auctions: five sellers each 
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hold two auctions. This also means that bidders now have more auctions to participate in. Seller 1, Seller 
3 and Seller 5 were not able to sell all of their excess water. However, they were able to auction off one 
unit of their water to Bidder14 and Bidder 27 and for this they gained profits of 0.71%, 0.64% and 1.21% 
respectively. Both Seller 2 and Seller 4 were able to trade all their excess water at a higher price than their 
reserve price: they gained a percentage of income around 2.18% and 1.41%, respectively. Bidder 14 and 
Bidder 22 won bids in two separate auctions. Bidder14 purchased 550 litres of water (8.94 litres more 
than what s/he needed). Bidder 22 won both of Seller 4’s auctions. S/he bought a total of 419.19 litres of 
water which was 82.51 litres more than s/he needed.  
In summary, a fixed multiple units first price sealed bid auction is a good option for bidders because they 
have more auctions to choose from. However, they may have to bid in more than one 
auction as the volume sold in each auction might be smaller than what they need. 
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that they will win all the auctions that they participate 
in. The bidders were able to recover some of their losses (3.33% for Bidder32, 45.85% for 
Bidder 16 and 10.27% for Bidder 22, 6% for Bidder14 and 10.79% for Bidder27). Some of 
the sellers were not able to sell all of their excess water which resulted in reduced profits. 
Moreover, sellers need to conduct multiple auctions.Table 5.10 Fixed multiunit first-price 





















Seller1 508,265.55   511,879.55  +0.71 283.81 283.81 11.46 0  
    200 0.00 11.46 18.07 Bidder14 
         
Seller2 689,198.80   704,239.31  +2.18 455.56 0.00 10.68 15.74 Bidder16 
    500 0.00 10.68 15.74 Bidder32 
         
Seller3  987,283.53   993,608.03  +0.64 386.38 386.38 16.15 0  
    350 0.00 16.15 18.07 Bidder14 
         
Seller4 583,978.16   592,232.01  +1.41 219.19 0.00 16.72 19.69 Bidder22 
    200 0.00 16.72 19.69 Bidder22 
         
Seller5 813,975.95   823,785.95  +1.21 501.45 501.45 11.07 0  




Table 5.11 Fixed multiunit first price sealed bid: Winners 
Winner 
name 















Bidder32 500 16.6 482.52 853,608.80 882,037.10 +3.33 - 17.48 
         
Bidder16 455.56 15.74 441.49 418,619.53 610,562.51 +45.85 - 14.07 
         
Bidder22 200 19.69 200 
584,784.42 644,855.62 +10.27 - 82.51 
 219.19 19.69 136.68 
         
Bidder14 200 18.07 200 
656,735.32 696,124.01 +6 - 8.94 
 350 18.07 341.06 
         
Bidder27 500 19.62 469.6 786,029.69 870,833.80 +10.79 - 30.4 
 
5.3.3 Multiunit discriminatory auction 
Using a fixed multiunit first price auction provides bidders with more auctions to choose from. They 
can select the appropriate auction based on the volume of water they need. However, sellers must decide 
how best to split the excess water (what volume and how many units). They must also manage multiple 
auctions. Likewise, bidders may need to bid in multiple auctions to obtain the actual volume of water they 
require. A better approach is to use a multiunit auction. The multiunit auction allows bidders to specify 
how much water they want to buy and how much they are willing to pay for it. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
there are two variations of this auction: the multi-unit discriminatory auction and the multi-unit uniform 
auction. These two auctions differ in terms of how the final price is determined. In a multi-unit 
discriminatory auction the winning bidders pay what they bid. In contrast, in a multi-unit uniform auction, 
the winning bidders pay the same amount as the lowest bid from the pool of winning bidders. 
Table 5.12 Multiunit discriminatory auction: Result 
 Excess water  
Before After % 
Seller 3,596.40 1218.3  33.88  
Bidder - - - 
Community 3,596.40 1,218.30  33.88  
 
 Additional profit  
Before After % 
Seller 3,582,701.99 3,625,046.34 +1.18  
Bidder 26,553,969.39 26,959,688.05 +1.53  
Community 30,136,671.38 30,584,734.39 +1.49  
 
Table 5.12 shows the distribution of water post-auction. Before the auction, the amount of excess 
water in the community is 3,596.40m3. At the conclusion of the auctions, the sellers still have excess water 
of 1,218.30m3. There is no excess water on the bidders’ side because bidders only bought what they need. 
The total excess water is thus whatever volume of water is not sold by the sellers (1,218.30 m3). This 
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remaining excess water was not auctioned off as there were no offers from bidders or the received offers 
were below the sellers' reservation prices. At the conclusion of the auction, 66.12% of total excess water 
has been distributed, increasing the sellers’’ profit by 1.19%. Overall, the community’s total income 
increased by 1.49%. 
The details of the auctions are shown in Tables 5.13 and 5.14. Seller 2 was not able to sell his/her 
excess water. The other four sellers were able to trade their water at a higher price than their reservation 
price: they gained 61.69% (Seller1), 66.76% (Seller3), 17.76% (Seller4) and 60.25% (Seller5) respectively. 
The sellers were able to sell most of their water and made additional income from these sales. In this type 
of auction, a bidder can bid for the volume of water they need at the desired price. They do not need to 
buy more water than they require. Moreover, the number of winners at the end of the auction process is 
more than the previous two auctions as this type of auction promotes bidding on demand. The bidders 
are still able to recover some of their losses: as shown in Tables 5.13 and 5.14 this is approximately 10.98% 
in total. Significantly, there is no excess water on the bidders’ side as they only purchase water as needed, 
resulting in zero wastage. A total of eight bidders were able to buy and use the excess water and reduce 
their losses. The multi-unit discriminatory auction is a good option for sellers and bidders because the 
reserve price is based on the bidding offer.  
Table 5.13 Multiunit discriminatory result: Seller 
Seller 
name 




















Seller2 689,198.80  689,198.80   -    955.56  955.56 10.68 -  -    - 
















Table 5.14 Multiunit discriminatory results: Winners 
Winner 
name 















Bidder4 231.70 18.53 231.70 407,082.22 425,143.45  + 4.44  - - 
Bidder5 315.03 18.15 315.03 635,058.93 700,893.79 + 10.37  - - 
Bidder41 252.12 15.56 288.60 374,226.12 386,038.06 + 3.16  - - 
Bidder35 360.90 17.81 360.90 302,963.60 421,558.33 + 39.14  - - 
Bidder23 405.17 17.74 405.17 794,292.43 876,415.81 + 10.34  - - 
Bidder20 189.5 17.39 267.64 304,266.53 337,724.48 + 11.00  - - 
Bidder40 287.01 16.96 287.01 291,187.52 305,327.75 + 4.86  - - 
Bidder22 336.68 19.69 336.68 584,784.42 646,478.77 + 10.55  - - 
 
5.3.4 Results: Multiunit uniform auction 
 In this experiment, the marketplace was set up to run five multiunit uniform auctions. This auction 
is a variation of the multiunit discriminatory auction in that each bidder bids by specifying the volume of 
water they want to purchase and how much they are willing to pay for it. 
Table 5.15 The multiunit uniform auction: Result 
 Excess water  
Before After % 
Seller 3,596.40 1,159.26  32.23  
Bidder - - - 
Community 3,596.40 1,159.26  32.23  
 
 Additional profit  
Before After % 
Seller 3,582,701.99 3,625,577.73 +1.20  
Bidder 26,553,969.39 26,987,060.37 +1.63  
Community 30,136,671.38 30,612,638.10 +1.58  
 
Table 5.14 shows the distribution of water at the conclusion of the auctions. Before the auctions, 
the amount of excess water in the community is 3,596.40m3, contributed by the sellers. At the conclusion 
of the auctions, the sellers still have excess water of 1,159.26m.3 However, as in the multiunit 
discriminatory auction, there is no excess water on the bidders’ side because the bidders only bid for the 
amount of water that they need. At the end of the auction, the community’s profits increased by 1.58%. 
  The details of the auction rounds are shown in Tables 5.16 and 5.17. Seller 4 was not able to sell 
his/her excess water. The other four sellers were able to trade their water at a higher price than their 
reserve price: Seller1 gained 51.75%, Seller3 gained 45.97%, Seller4 gained 17.76% and Seller5 gained 
60.25%. The multiunit uniform auction achieved similar results to the multiunit discriminatory auction. 
The sellers were able to sell most of their water and made additional income from these sales. Bidders 
are able to propose the exact volume they need and the price they are willing to pay. They were able to 
buy the exact amount of water that they need. The bidders were able to recover some of their losses: 
approximately 11.43% as shown in Table 5.17. 
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Table 5.16 Multiunit uniform result: Seller 
Seller 
name 
































Seller4 583,978.16  592,234.01  +1.41  419.19  - 16.72 19.69  17.76  - 
Seller5 813,975.95  823,679.72  +1.19  1,001.45  501.45 11.07 17.74  60.25  Bidder23 
 
Table 5.17 Multiunit uniform results: Winners 
Winner 
name 















Bidder5 315.03 17.39 315.03 635,058.93 701,134.06  + 10.40  - - 
Bidder20 168.78 17.39 267.64 304,266.53 334,067.13 + 9.79  - - 
Bidder22 336.68 15.59 336.68 584,784.42 647,860.10  +10.79  - - 
Bidder48 417.29 15.59 417.29 324,796.51 353,275.09 + 8.77  - - 
Bidder33 201.60 15.59 374.61 434,449.53 461,165.20 + 6.15  - - 
Bidder4 231.70 17.81 231.70 407,082.22 425,309.43 + 4.48  - - 
Bidder35 360.90 17.81 360.90 302,963.60 421,558.33 + 39.14  - - 
Bidder23 405.17 17.74 405.17 794,292.43 876,415.81 + 10.34  - - 
5.3.5 Comparing auction techniques 
Tables 5.18 and Figure 5.2 shows the performance of the different auction techniques in terms of 
reductions in excess water and profit. The result shows that, first-price seal-bid auction resulted in the 
highest excess water among the bidders. This type of auction also brought in the most profit for the sellers 
and the community. While breaking the volume into smaller units leads to a slight improvement in the 
distribution of excess water it results in a slight reduction in the community’s profit. The multiunit 
discriminatory auctions and the multiunit uniform auctions both perform well: they record the least 
excess water post auctions (1,218.30 liters and 1,159 liters respectively). According to the result, it does 
not have the excess water on bidder side in multiunit discriminatory and uniform auction as show in Figure 
5.2) because the multiunit auction rule selling on the product on demand which suitable for the water 
distribution scheme. 
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Table 5.18 Comparing auction techniques in terms of excess water (excess water after finished auction) 
 Seller Bidder Community 
 Before bidding After bidding Before bidding After bidding Before bidding After bidding 
First price sealed bid 
auction 
3,596.40  1,001.45  -    336.05  3,596.40  1,337.49  
Fixed multi-unit first 
price sealed bid 
auction 
3,596.40  1,171.64  -    153.40 3,596.40  1,325.04  
Multi-unit 
discriminatory 
auction   
3,596.40  1,218.30 -    - 3,596.40 1,218.30 
Multi-unit uniform 
auction 
3,596.40  1,159.26 -    - 3,596.40 1,159.26 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Comparing the percentage of excess water  
Table 5.19 and Figure 5.3 shows the total income obtained by both auctions is also acceptable, 
lower than the first price single unit sealed bid but higher than first-price multiunit sealed-bid auction. 
When taken all auctions result together, the multiunit uniform auction is able to distribute the most excess 
water while generating an acceptable level of income. This result seems to suggest that using a multiunit 
uniform auction is better than using a multiunit discriminatory auction. Winners of the auction pay the 
same amount for their water (the lowest winning bid). As Table 5.19 shows, both sellers and bidders gain 
higher profits using a multiunit uniform auction. This type of auction also proves the best in regard to 
community profits. These findings indicate that the multiunit uniform auction should be used if the 































First price sealed bid auction Fixed multi-unit first price sealed bid auction
Multi-unit discriminatory auction Multi-unit uniform auction
 112 
they need meaning that there is no wastage. A single unit first-price sealed-bid auction only benefits the 
seller: while they may receive a better price for their water, the winning bidders may end up having excess 
water. Our experiment results show that the pay-per-bid auctions (discriminatory and uniform auction 
types) are the best strategies for water distribution. The multiunit uniform auction performs the best in 
terms of distributing the most excess water and gaining the most profit.  
Table 5.19 Comparing profit value change between auction techniques (additional profit after finished 
auction) 
 Seller Bidder Community 
 Before bidding After bidding Before bidding After bidding Before bidding After bidding 
First price seal bid 
auction 
3,582,701.99 3,631,387.70 26,553,969.39 27,073,635.91 30,136,671.38 30,705,023.61 
Fixed price first 
price seal bid 
auction 
3,582,701.99 3,625,744.86 26,553,969.39 26,958,604.65 30,136,671.38 30,584,349.51 
Multi-unit 
discriminatory 
auction   
3,582,701.99 3,625,046.34 26,553,969.39 26,959,688.05 30,136,671.38 30,584,734.39 
Multi-unit uniform 
auction 
3,582,701.99 3,625,577.73 26,553,969.39 26,987,060.37 30,136,671.38 30,612,638.10 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Comparing the percentage of profit value change 
5.4 Agent behaviour 
As the results in Section 5.3 show, auctions provide a good mechanism for trading water. We 
found that the multiunit auctions, the multiunit discriminatory and multiunit uniform auctions, are 
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may behave differently. This experiment investigates the effects of different agents’ (both sellers and 
bidders) behaviours on water distribution and community profit. In this experiment, we limit our 
experiment to multiunit uniform auctions as this auction performed best in the previous experiment. In 
Chapter 3, we outlined three agent behaviours: neutral, generous, and greedy. In this experiment, there 
are four different situations, based on the agents’ behaviours. For a seller, being generous means that an 
agent’s first priority is to distribute the excess water. S/he does not care about making a profit. They will 
not fix a minimum price; they will sell all excess water at any price. A neutral agent will sell the water at 
cost price. The seller will accept any offers equal to, or more than, what they paid for their water. A greedy 
seller will set the reserve price higher than the price they paid for the water in the hopes of obtaining 
additional profit. In this experiment, the greedy agents increase the price by approximately 10 – 15% more 
than the actual price of their water. The bidders’ behaviours are similar to the sellers in that a neutral 
bidder will bid based on their actual private valuation. Greedy bidders will bid at a price below their private 
valuation. It does not make sense to have generous bidder(s), as bidders need to recover their losses. It is 
also not a good idea for an individual to pay more than what s/he can afford. In the water trading 
marketplace, all bidders join the bidding process with the same goal: to purchase additional water. We 
outline the various scenarios in Table 5.20 below. 
Table 5.20 Agent behaviours in the four situations 
Scenario Seller Bidder 
Numbers Behaviour Numbers Behaviour 
   50 Neutral 
Generous seller 5 Generous 50 Greedy 
   50 Neutral / Greedy 
     
   50 Neutral 
Neutral seller 5 Neutral 50 Greedy 
   50 Neutral / Greedy 
     
   50 Neutral 
Greedy seller 5 Greedy 50 Greedy 
   50 Neutral / Greedy 
     
   50 Neutral 
Mixed seller behaviours 5 Generous / Neutral / Greedy 50 Greedy 
   50 Neutral / Greedy 
 
As before, there are five sellers and 50 bidders in the marketplace. As shown in Table 5.20, there 
are four different situations. These are: 1) generous seller 2) neutral seller 3) greedy seller and 4) mixed 
seller behaviours. All scenarios contain three sub-scenarios, with all neutral bidders, all greedy bidders 
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and neutral/greedy bidders. We use a multiunit uniform auction for all the experiments. The results are 
shown in Table 5.21. 
Table 5.21 Varying agent behaviours 
  Excess water (%)  
 Seller Bidder Community 
 Without bidding After bidding Without bidding After bidding Without bidding After bidding 
 Generous seller scenario 
Neutral bidders 100 20.45 - - 100 15.61 
Greedy bidders 100 15.61 - - 100 20. 45 
Greedy and neutral 100 19.32 - - 100 19.32 
 Neutral seller scenario 
Neutral bidders 100 30.60 - - 100 30.60 
Greedy bidders 100 63.79 - - 100 63.79 
Greedy and neutral 100 57.26 - - 100 57.26 
 Greedy seller scenario 
Neutral bidders 100 39.58 - - 100 39.58 
Greedy bidders 100 70.58 - - 100 70.58 
Greedy and neutral 100 70.47 - - 100 70.47 
 Mixed seller scenario 
Neutral bidders 100 31.28 - - 100 31.28 
Greedy bidders 100 54.27 - - 100 54.27 
Greedy and neutral 100 52.89 - - 100 52.89 
  
 The percentage of excess water in the community is at its lowest if all sellers behave generously. 
Significantly, if all greedy bidders are present in this environment, there is more excess water left in the 
community. The best combination is where the marketplace is populated with all generous sellers and all 
neutral bidders (in which case there is 15.61% excess water left in the community). In short, it is not 
beneficial for bidders to be greedy. The percentage of excess water in the community is at its highest if all 
the sellers are greedy. The worst scenario involves a marketplace populated by all greedy sellers and all 
greedy bidders: in this scenario only 30.42% of the excess water is distributed to the community (there 
was 70.58% excess water left in the community). The observations for all neutral sellers and mixed sellers 
are similar and expected. In the case of both all neutral and mixed sellers, the worst distribution is when 
the marketplace is populated by all greedy bidders. Similar results are found when there are greedy and 
neutral bidders (9% lower). This outcome was expected, since a greedy seller will set a higher price. Some 
of the bidders will withdraw because the reserve price is much higher than their private valuations. The 
result suggests that for water to be distributed fairly, sellers should be generous and bidders should be 
neutral. Table 5.22 shows the additional profit obtained, based on the varying agent behaviours. 
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Table 5.22 Additional profit with varying agent behaviours 
  Additional profit (%)  
 Seller Bidder Community 
 Without bidding After bidding Without bidding After bidding Without bidding After bidding 
 Generous seller scenario 
Neutral bidders 100 101.31 100 101.96 100 101.89 
Greedy bidders 100 100.88 100 102.07 100 101.94 
Greedy and neutral 100 100.95 100 101.90 100 101.80 
 Neutral seller scenario 
Neutral bidders 100 101.24 100 101.93 100 101.86 
Greedy bidders 100 100.53 100 101.07 100 101.01 
Greedy and neutral 100 100.65 100 101.25 100 101.18 
 Greedy seller scenario 
Neutral bidders 100 101.09 100 101.86 100 101.77 
Greedy bidders 100 100.47 100 101.94 100 100.89 
Greedy and neutral 100 100.44 100 100.04 100 100.98 
 Mixed seller scenario 
Neutral bidders 100 101.20 100 101.88 100 101.84 
Greedy bidders 100 100.55 100 101.40 100 101.31 
Greedy and neutral 100 100.67 100 101.30 100 101.23 
The sellers make the most profit when the marketplace is populated with all generous sellers and 
neutral bidders. This result indicates that the additional profit gained by the generous sellers is driven by 
bidders’ behaviour: in this case, having a mixture of greedy and neutral bidder is more favourable for 
generous sellers. Similar results can be seen in the marketplace populated with all neutral sellers and 
mixed sellers. However, in the marketplace populated with all greedy sellers, more profit can be gained if 
all the bidders are neutral. This means that for all types of seller(s), neutral bidders provide the most profit 
as shown in Table 5.22. It can be seen that the sellers want more profit, but the bidders want to buy water 
at the lowest possible price. This result was as expected as it is in line with human behaviour.   
Bidders obtain the highest profit (102.07%) when the market is populated with all generous sellers 
and greedy bidders. The lowest profit (100.04%) is obtained when the market is populated with all greedy 
sellers and a mixture of greedy and neutral bidders. When all experiments are taken into account, the 
community’s profit is at its highest when the marketplace is populated with all generous sellers and all 
greedy bidders (101.94%). The lowest (100.89%) is when there are all greedy sellers and greedy bidders. 
This result shows that sellers do not gain much by displaying greedy behaviour. It is more beneficial for 
them to be generous. The reverse is true for bidders; greedy bidders make profits for themselves in only 
2 scenario which are greedy and generous sellers. A greedy bidder tries to obtain water at a price lower 
than his/her private valuation. This is sensible behaviour as the bidders’ ultimate goal is to reduce his/her 
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losses as much as possible. In summary, when additional profit is desired in community, the marketplace 
should be populated with generous sellers and greedy bidders. When water distribution is the primary 
concern, sellers should behave generously, and bidders should be neutral. Also, sellers do not lose much 
profit by being greedy or neutral as shown in the 1st column of Table 5.22.  Only thing is that they have 
more excess water than when they are generous.  In the next auction round they can sell or get rid of it 
by being generous if they wish and make additional profits. In general, the results show that generous 
sellers will result in additional profit for the community while they themselves do not gain as much. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed the results of the experiments designed to fulfil the research 
objectives. This research investigates how excess water can be distributed in a community of farmers 
using different water sharing mechanisms. We have evaluated four types of auctions. The results showed 
that the pay-per-bid (discriminatory and uniform) auctions are the best for distributing excess water. The 
multiunit uniform auction performed the best in terms of distributing the most excess water and gaining 
the most profit. This chapter has also reported the results of varying seller and buyer behaviours. The 
results indicate that if profit is the primary concern then the best combination is generous sellers and 
greedy bidders. When equitable water distribution is the key goal, then the marketplace needs to be 
populated with generous sellers and neutral bidders. Having explained the results, the final chapter 
summarises the work, revisits the research objectives, outlines the research’s key contributions and 
provides suggestions for future work.
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Work 
In this chapter, the summaries of all the chapters are discussed. The research findings are 
described and discussed with respect to the research objectives. In addition, the novel contributions of 
this work are detailed and finally the future directions of this work are described.  
6.1 Summaries of the Chapters 
In Chapter 1, we described the motivation of the work by describing some of the main issues in 
irrigation management in Canterbury which was contributed by the increasing water demand and 
shortage of water particularly during the drought season. The chapter also discussed the objectives of the 
research.  
In Chapter 2 we presented the overview of irrigation planning and management which included the 
crop water need calculation based on FAO. We discussed factors that affect irrigation planning, irrigation 
management tools and their limitations. In addition, related works that employed various computing 
techniques are discussed in some detail. Finally, the research gaps are identified and elaborated.  
Chapter 3 described the design of the irrigation management agent which can be used in a single 
farm. We described the water need calculation, the water reduction algorithm and how crops water needs 
are prioritised. To facilitate the water sharing in the community, the MAS design is discussed along with 
the auction mechanisms used to allocate water within the community of farmers.      
 In Chapter 4 the experimental evaluation for a single agent  is discussed. First the model is 
validated, followed by a comparison in performance in terms of water saved with a control agent. This is 
followed by a discussion on the results obtained when water reductions scheme are in effect.  
Chapter 5 discusses the water allocation within a MAS setting to simulate the water allocation in a 
farming community. Four auction mechanisms were evaluated based on the remaining excess water left 
in the community and the profit gained/reduction of losses by the sellers and buyers. The effect of varying 
the sellers and seller behaviours are also discussed.  
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6.2 Research findings 
The main objective of this research is to develop a multi-agent based irrigation system to manage 
irrigation in an individual farm and within a community of farmers during water scarcity. In order to 
achieve this objective, several sub-objectives were defined. These are: 
RO1:  To design and develop a water allocation algorithm to allocate water efficiently in a farm. 
RO2:  To implement a multi-agent system to facilitate water sharing within a community of 
farmers 
RO3: To investigate varying strategies that can be used to optimize water sharing within a 
community of farmers. 
RO4:  To assess how varying behaviour of the agents may affect water sharing within the 
community. 
In this research, we have developed a multi-agent based irrigation management system than can be 
used by individual farm(s) to calculate the water needs based on the crop types, crop growth stages, soil 
types and climate on a daily basis. Each farm is represented by an irrigation management agent which has 
the ability to negotiate with other irrigation management agents to achieve an optimized water sharing 
mechanism. In Chapter 3, we described the design of the irrigation management agent and we evaluated 
the water allocation efficiency in terms of water saving in Chapter 4. These were the findings: 
• The agent based irrigation management system proposed a lower water need than the control 
agent for all three types of farms (pasture only, other crops and mixed crops). 
• The proposed system reduces water usage in farm both during normal situation and when water 
is insufficient. The water reduction during water scarcity is made based on the crop water need 
priorities as well as the growth stages of the crops and motivated by maintaining the maximum 
profit of the farm.  
Based on these findings, we can confirm that RO1 has been achieved.  
We extended the single irrigation management agent by setting up a multi-agent system to 
represent a community of water users during water scarcity. Each agent represents a farm and is able to 
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make a decision on whether to buy or sell water. These agents are also able to negotiate with each other 
on how the water sharing should proceed through the implementation of auctions. Four auction 
mechanisms were investigated and the performance of these different auctions were investigated in 
terms of how much excess water was left in the community and how much profit/loss was gained/reduced 
at the end of the auction. These were the major findings of this experiment: 
• First-price sealed-bid proposed the highest profit gain for the seller and community. However, it 
has a highest excess water in the community after the auctions are completed. 
• Fixed multiunit first price sealed bid that separates the water volume to smaller units is an 
improvement from the first-price sealed bid auction in that it further reduced the excess water in 
the community and gain the additional profit at the conclusion of the auctions.  
• The multiunit discriminatory auction can distribute the most excess water with acceptable 
income. On the other hand, the multiunit uniform auction recorded the most efficient water 
sharing (least excess water in the community) and also resulted the highest gain in community’s 
profit at the conclusion of the auctions.  
• The pay-per-bid auctions (discriminatory and uniform) are the best strategies for water 
distribution that balance between water distribution and gaining profit in water community. 
Based on these findings, we can confirm that RO2 and RO3 have been achieved. 
We recognized that sellers and buyers may possess varying behaviours in the auctions which will 
directly affect the outcome of the auction in terms of how much excess water is left in the community 
and how much profit can be gained by the sellers and how much loss can be reduced by the bidders. 
Hence, we designed the seller agents to possess three types of behaviours; generous, neutral and greedy 
and the bidder agents to possess two types of behaviours; neutral and greedy. We populated the 
marketplace with varying seller and bidder behaviours and we observed the outcome of the auctions. 
These were the major findings of this experiment: 
• The excess water in community is the lowest if all sellers behaviour is generous. On the other 
hand, excess water is the highest if sellers and bidders are greedy. 
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• The suggestion for fair water distribution is that seller should be generous and bidder should be 
neutral. 
• The highest profit recorded by the sellers is when the marketplace is populated with generous 
sellers and neutral bidders. 
• The highest profit for bidders is when the market is populated with all generous sellers and greedy 
bidders. 
• The community’s profit is at its highest if the marketplace is populated with all generous sellers 
and all greedy bidders. On the other hand, the community’s profit is lowest when there are all 
greedy sellers and greedy bidders. 
• Sellers gain more profit when they are generous (no reserve price on the price of the water to be 
traded) and bidders gain more profit when they are greedy (they bid below their private 
valuation).     
These findings support RO4. 
6.3 Novel Contributions 
In this research, we proposed a multi-agent based irrigation management framework that can work 
out the water requirement in the farms based on certain factors. The proposed agent can work as a single 
agent which works out the water requirement in the individual farm. Moreover, it can make the decision 
whether to sell or buy water and participate in an auction in a multi agent framework to deal with the 
water distribution in community.  
The proposed agent estimated the water requirement with the goal of reducing water even when 
there is sufficient water in the farm. In terms of water scarcity, it is able to prioritise crop water needs 
based on its yield and participates in auctions to buy water (when there is water shortage) or sell water 
(when there is excess water). 
The proposed framework provides an environment that can facilitate fair and equitable water 
distribution in the community during water scarcity through online auctions depending on the motivation 
(to gain extra profit, to help other farmers, or a combination of both). Moreover, we investigated the 
effect of water distribution with varying seller and bidder behaviours and analysed the outcome of having 
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such behaviours in terms of community profit, sellers profit, bidders profit and how much excess water is 
left in the community.   
 The framework is also flexible in that we can modify the design of each agent, add additional 
agent behaviour and increase/decrease the number of agents in the marketplace. The negotiation 
mechanisms can also be configured to include other types of auctions or other negotiation techniques.   
6.4 Future work 
There are a number of open issues of this work and a number of extensions which can be applied 
to the existing framework. It can be divided into three categories: 1) applying other auction strategies, 
2) improving the single agent mechanism and 3) extension of auction environments. 
6.4.1 Applying other auction strategies 
We described that the auction mechanism can improve the efficiency of water sharing and gain 
additional profit to the community in total. We applied four types of auctions to deal with water 
distribution, but each auction technique has limitations that can be improved. Our results showed that, 
excess water is not reduced if there are no matching offer during the auction period. It would be useful 
to explore other auction mechanisms that can be used in the second round of auction to improve the 
water distribution such as continuous double auction (CDA) as this type of auction is also based on supply 
and demand.  
6.4.2 Improving the single agent mechanism 
The single agent can work with the several factors (crop growth stage, soil type, productivity) in 
the calculation of the utility function. It can prioritise crop water need during water scarcity. However, 
the utility function can be improved by adding additional factors that might affect the crop water needs.   
6.4.3 Extending the irrigation management framework 
This research proposed an irrigation management system that can be applied in Canterbury region 
in New Zealand as it used localized data such as weather data, soil type and irrigation system. The 
framework can be extended to other locations by changing the information related to crops, the weather 
and potentially adding new information such as water usage policy.  For example, in Thailand the water 
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problem is dissimilar to New Zealand. It has a long drought season, two seasons only, farming behaviours 
are different, and the water usage policy is different.
 123 
Appendix A 
A.1 Copy of the paper published in conference proceeding 
 
Agent Based Irrigation Management for Mixed-Cropping Farms 
Kitti Chiewchan, Patricia Anthony and Sandhya Samarasinghe 
Lincoln University, Christchurch 7608, New Zealand 
Kitti.Chiewchan@lincolnuni.ac.nz  
Patricia.Anthony@lincoln.ac.nz Sandhya.Samarasinghe@lincoln.ac.nz 
Abstract.  This paper describes the development of an intelligent irrigation management system that can be used 
by farmers to manage water allocation in the farms. Each farm is represented as a single agent that can work out 
the actual water required for each crop in the farm based on the crop’s drought sensitivity, growth stage, the crop 
coefficient value and the soil type. During water scarcity, it can be used to prioritise irrigation allocation to different 
crops on a farm and generates an irrigation plan based on the predetermined water reduction.  Our initial experiment 
showed that using the irrigation management system, the farm can achieve a consistent water reduction which is 
more than the required reduction. The results showed that the agent consistently recorded an  average water 
reduction higher than the actual reduction required by the water authority. This significant reduction means that 
more water can be conserved in the farm and reallocated for other purposes. 
Keywords: agent-based model, water allocation, utility function, water reduction. 
1 Introduction 
Water use and water demand have increased steadily in New Zealand over the last 20 years resulting in insufficient 
water availability. The water usage data [13] shows that Canterbury water allocation makes up 58%    of the New 
Zealand’s total water allocation where it contributes 70% of the New Zealand irrigated land. It is expected that water 
demand will become a problem in the future because the irrigated areas in Canterbury have been increasing for the 
last 13 years (from 300,000 ha in 2002 to 500,000 ha in 2015) [7].  This demand directly affects the water allocation 
scheme in Canterbury . Currently, the water usage policy is based on “first in, first served”, which means request for 
water consents are processed and determined in the order they are received.  This policy worked in the past because 
water capacity and farming areas are in equilibrium .  Unfortunately, “first in, first served” system is not the most 
efficient way to manage water. This is due to the fact that even though water demand has increased over the years, 
water capacity remains unchanged [13]. As the irrigation is based on estimate, there is a possibility that crops received 
more water than necessary leading to wastage. Water needs become more serious during drought season and so it is 
very important to conserve water and prioritise crop water need such that high yield crops get the highest priority so 
as not to affect productivity. If farmers can decide on the irrigation plan that is dependent on the importance of the 
crops, they can reduce water need in the farm and reduce the loss in productivity during water restriction [2]. 
To assist in the irrigation planning, farmers often used computing tools and two of the most common ones are 
OVERSEER and IrriCalc. IrriCalc is an irrigation management tool for irrigation water requirement. It can determinate 
the irrigation water need due to seasonal planning [6]. OVERSEER is owned and supported by the Ministry for 
Primary Industries. OVERSEER’s model uses daily soil water content data to calculate the daily water drainage. 
IrriCalc and OVERSEER require input such as selected month, farm location, and type of irrigation system for daily 
water need calculation. However, IrriCalc and OVERSEER use different models to calculate climate data. 
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OVERSEER assumes full ‘canopy’ cover (value of 1) whereas IrriCalc uses a seasonally adjustable value, with an 
average value of 0.8 [16]. There are other computing tools such as APSIM (Agricultural Production Systems 
Simulator) and AquaTRAC.  APSIM is a modeling framework that contains a suite of modules to enable simulation 
of agricultural systems. It provides a set of modules (physical process in farm, farm management rule, simulation 
engine) to support higher-order goal of farming simulation. It provides accurate predictions of crop production based 
on climate, genotype, soil and management factors. On the other hand, AquaTRAC is a software program developed 
by Foundation for Arable Research (FAR) which assists cropping farmers with their irrigation scheduling. It calculates 
when and how much irrigation to apply to optimise yield for each crop by including data on crop type, soil type, 
weather and irrigation levels [10][16].  However, these tools are limited to calculating water requirement for a single 
crop in a farm and is unable to address water requirement for farm with multiple crops. Hence, there is a need for a 
better irrigation management that can accurately estimate and manage irrigation water on the farm either for single 
crop farms or multi-crop farms. This paper proposes an agent-based irrigation management system that can be used 
to allocate water efficiently in the farm based on the farm’s characteristics. The remainder of the paper is organised 
as follows. Section 2 describes the irrigation management and its application in New Zealand, the crop water needs 
calculation and related works on agent-based irrigation management. The proposed agent-based model for intelligent 
irrigation management system is discussed in Section 3. We present the experiment and result in Section 4 and finally 
Section 5 concludes and discusses future works. 
2 Related Works 
2.1 Irrigation scheme and the process 
There are three stages in the cycle of crop growth; 1) soil preparation 2) irrigation process and 3) after irrigation 
process. During the soil preparation, farmers need to decide the location of the irrigation, the water capacity and the 
irrigation schedule to prepare for planting [15]. During the irrigation process, farmers  need to check and work out 
their irrigation plan for the whole agriculture areas by making references to the weather, season and water policy.  The 
after irrigation process  cycle focuses on improving soil quality after the irrigation season and improving irrigation for 
the next seasons. The Evapotranspiration Rate (ET) is an important variable in irrigation which relates to land location, 
soil type, and planting season in the farm. ET is the summation of evaporation and plants transpiration from soil to 
atmosphere. To ensure that each crop gains the highest yield, maximum water need must be applied. This irrigation 
water need can be estimated using ET and another variable called the crop coefficient (Kc). The value of Kc is 
determined based on the crop growth stages which are initial state, crop development stage, mid-season stage and late 
season stage. The water need for each crop varies from one crop stage to another.  
2.2 Calculating Crop Water Need 
The irrigation water need is defined as the depth of water needed to meet the loss through evapotranspiration (ET). 
Crop water need can be calculated by using the following formula [9]:  
 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 =  𝐸𝑇0  ×  𝐾𝐶  (1) 
Where: 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝  =  Crop water need 
 𝐸𝑇0  = Influence of climate on crop water need 
𝐾𝐶   = Influence of crop type on crop water need 
 
Some of the tools commonly used in irrigation management (such as OVERSEER, IrriCalc, APSIM, AquaTRAC) 
follow this formula to estimate crop water need in the planting season. However, these tools do not consider the 
drought sensitivity of different crop and drought sensitivity based on crop growth stages. Drought sensitivity is a crop 
characteristic under drought stress where they need more water for every growth stage to ensure maximum 
productivity such as paddy rice and potato. If various crops are grown on an irrigation scheme, it is advisable to ensure 
that the most drought sensitive crops get the highest priority. 
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2.3 An agent-based approach to irrigation  
Agent-based Programming (AP) is a software paradigm that uses concepts from Artificial Intelligence (AI). Agent’s 
behavior depends on what it is tasked to do and gathers information about the environment to make a decision. AP 
has been used to solve resource allocation problems [17]. A software agent is essentially a special software component 
that can operate without the direct intervention of a human. These agents when grouped together, form a multi-agent 
system that can be used to model and solve complex systems as it has the ability to introduce conflicting goals and act 
upon it. An agent senses and reacts to the changes in the environment. An agent is able to exhibit goal-directed 
behavior by taking initiative while ensuring that its goal is achieved. The agent can learn and adapt itself to fit its 
environment and to the desires of its users [5] 
Agent-based programming has been used in water resource allocation.  For example, [8] used agent-based modeling 
to simulate the interaction between farmers who are stakeholders in transboundary Nile River. This simulation 
generated farmer agent and water sharing scheme from water usage behavior. This model was developed to optimize 
allocated water for each user with different water requirement to find a fair water allocation for stockholders at Nile 
river basin.  
An agent-based model was applied to investigate the history of irrigated agriculture in Spain. The purpose of this 
study was to study the influence of farmers’ characteristics on land-use change and associated groundwater over-use 
[12]. They showed that agent-based model can be utilized to enhance this understanding even when data is scarce and 
uncertain. An agent-based model was used to simulate irrigated system in Senegal River Valley  to find the limitation 
of water used based on behavioral factors (resource capacity, a set of individual water used rule, and a set of collective 
rules) [3]. The focus of this work was to verify that MAS is a suitable architecture that can be used to theoretically 
study irrigated systems’ viability.  Using MAS, they designed and developed virtual irrigated systems as alternative 
to real labs. 
A simulation based on multi-agent system was developed to study and analyse the collective action when a certain 
water policy is changed [4]. This model was able to capture collective action problems in water markets in small-large 
scale infrastructure provision. The system was also used to simulate the behavior of different water users to represent 
social and institutional relations among users. This work demonstrated how MAS can be used to better understand the 
complexity of water uses and water users within sub-basins.  
[1] proposed an agent-based model that simulated the behaviors of different water users/stakeholders of a system as 
well as their reactions to different management scenarios. They simulated the behavior and interactions of the 
conflicting parties and modeled it as a game. This model was used to explain the interactions between parties and to 
enable decision making among the stakeholders. 
Giuliani et al. [11] developed a multi-agent system   to design mechanism for water management. The agent-based 
model represents the interactions between the decision makers to demonstrate a hypothetical water allocation problem, 
involving several active human agents and passive ecological agents. They used different regulatory mechanisms in 
three different scenarios of water availability to investigate efficiency-acceptability tradeoff. The results obtained 
showed that this approach was able to support the design of distributed solution.  
Zhao et al. [18] compared the water user behavior under the administered system and market-based system by 
developing an agent-based modeling framework for water allocation analysis.  Their analysis showed that the 
behaviors of water users were dependent on factors such as transactions, administrative cost and costs.  
Overall, irrigation management is a complex problem because it is hard to determine the water need in the farm as 
there are many dynamic factors that need to be considered. For example, crops growth are in different stages, 
temperature changes on a daily basis, the soil moisture varies, and sometimes there is a prolong drought season. 
Moreover, different farms have different water requirements because of the varying crop type, soil type, farm location, 
and farm size. Agent-based programming has advantage over other software approaches because it can work with 
uncertain factors and supports non-linear data. Moreover, it is flexible and autonomous under complex situations.  
3 Agent-based model for irrigation management 
3.1 Conceptual design 
This study focuses on using agent-based approach to optimise water allocation in mixed-cropping farms. The crop 
water need is calculated based on many factors such as crop water requirement, moisture on the ground, and farm 
types. It is assumed that an agent represents a single farm where each farm may have a single type of crop or mixed 
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types of crop. The agent is able to estimate the crop water need on a daily basis based on the current state of the farm’s 
characteristic (i.e. crop types, crop stage, soil type, etc.). The agent will also be able to work out the irrigation plan for 
the farm for a given planting season. During water scarcity (such as drought season), the agent will work out an 
irrigation plan that will prioritise crop water needs based on the prevailing condition.  
The agent will be able to generate the irrigation plan on a daily basis, weekly or for the whole season. The crop 
information database contains an up-to-date information about the state of the farm including information about each 
crop, its growth stage, its location, size of the plot and soil type. During water scarcity, user may enter the percentage 
of water reduction required by the authority. The agent will then calculate the water need for each crop in the farm, 
calculate the expected utility for each crop, decide which crops have higher water need by prioritizing them and 
determine how much water should be reduced for each crop in the farm. This prioritization is determined based on 
crop’s expected utility which takes into account the potential yield of the crop, the drought sensitivity and growth 
stage and the soil type. For example, if the farm contains high yield crops, more importance will be placed on the 
crop’s yield to ensure that the revenue of the farm is not compromised. On the other hand, if there is no high yield 
crop on the farm, the other two factors can be considered. 
Crops type can be divided into 2 categories: grazing pasture and other crops. High yield crops are crops that generate 
higher revenue for the farm. Examples of high yield crop include tomato, sugar cane and sugar beet. Most crops have 
four growing stages (germination, development, mid-season, late-season). Pasture has three stages (grazing, 
development and late-season). There are 3 types of drought sensitivity (low, medium, and high). Crop with high 
sensitivity to drought requires higher irrigation priority. Crops can be planted in plots with varying soil type (light, 
medium, heavy). Heavy soil can absorb more water and so it has low irrigation priority. On the other hand, light soil 
has bigger pores and absorbs less water. Therefore, light soil has higher priority over medium and heavy soil because 
of its inability to retain moisture in the soil moisture potential yield [14]. It is assumed that each type of crops is 
planted in plot of a certain size. This means that the water need for a crop is calculated to cover the plot that has been 
planted with that particular crop. 
 
begin 
   get water reduction percentage 
   retrieve crop information from crop database 
   calculate the water requirement for each crop 
   calculate total water requirement on farm 
   calculate expected utility for each crop  
   prioritise crops based on expected utility 
   calculate water reduction for each crop 
   generate water reduction plan for a farm 
end 
Fig. 1. The pseudocode of the irrigation management agent 
The pseudo code for the water reduction calculation is shown in Fig.1. First, the user keys in the percentage of 
water reduction required to the system. The agent retrieves the crop information from the database, Kc value for each 
crop stage, and reference 𝐸𝑇0 data. Equation 1 is used to calculate the actual crop water requirement. The 𝐸𝑇0 value 
is retrieved from the New Zealand weather data and the Kc value is based on the FAO data reference. Agent will work 
out the individual crop water need and the total water requirement for the whole farm (this is the summation of 
individual crop water requirement). Next, the agent calculates the water reduction requirement for the farm based on 
the percentage of required reduction entered by the user. Then, the agent calculates the expected utility for each crop 
based on its properties. Once the crops are prioritized, the agent will then determine the percentage of water reduction 
that should be applied to each crop. Finally, agent generates irrigation reduction plan as the output to the farmer. 
3.2 Prioritising irrigation water need to multiple crops. 
To calculate water requirement, agent uses 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 and plot size on each crop (𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡) as follows: 
 𝐶𝑤𝑟𝑞 = 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 × 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡 (2) 
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To prioritise irrigation water need to multiple crops, the agent used three determinants namely the drought 
sensitivity and the growth stage, the potential yield for crops and the soil type [2]. Each determinant is associated with 
a utility function that indicates the importance of that crop (the higher the value, the higher the irrigation priority).  
These utility functions (based on crop’s potential yield, drought sensitivity and growth stage and soil type) are defined 
as follows: 
𝑓𝑃𝑌 = (𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡 × 𝐶𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑) × 𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (3) 
𝑓𝐷𝑆 = 𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 × 𝐷𝑣𝑎𝑙  (4) 
𝑓𝑆𝑇 = 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 × 𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡 (5) 
Where: 
𝑓𝑃𝑌  = crop’s potential yield function 
𝑓𝐷𝑆  = crop’s drought sensitivity function 
𝑓𝑆𝑇  = soil type function 
𝐶𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑  = yield amount of crop area 
𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  = price per kilogram 
𝐶𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  = crop stage 
𝐶𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑡  = plot size of crop 
𝐷𝑣𝑎𝑙  = drought sensitivity value 
𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒  = soil type 
 
To determine the expected utility (EU) of each crop, the agent combines the three utility functions by allocating 
weights to denote their relative importance. Thus, the expected utility of each crop is calculated as follows: 
 𝐸𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑓𝑗𝑗𝜖𝑐                   ;  0 ≤ 𝑤𝑗 ≤ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑗𝜖𝑐 = 1 (6) 
where C is the set of determinant when agent works out the crop priority value, 𝑓 is the utility function for each 
determinant and 𝑗 is the individual parameter. At any time, the three utility functions can be considered by the agent 
for irrigation priority depending on what it sees as being important at that point in time. 
For example, in an all pastures farm, the crop’s drought sensitivity and growth stage determinant are the most 
important because the potential yield of the crop is the same (pasture only). On the other hand, if the farm is a mixed 
crops farm that has high yields crops, then the crop’s potential yield is more important because is affect the 
productivity and farming income. Thus, a higher weight will be applied to the crop’s potential yield function. 
4 Experimental Evaluation 
4.1 Experimental setup 
To test the performance of our intelligent irrigation management system, we conducted three experiments using 
three farm setups, grazing pasture only farm, other crops only farm and mixed crops farm (which consists of pasture 
and other crops). These setups are common in New Zealand’s farms. For each experiment, we randomly generate 100 
farms with varying crop properties. For the pasture only farm, we set the crop type to pasture and randomise the 
growth stage to three different stages. In the other crops farm, we randomise the crop type and the growth stage to 
four different stages. The setup for the mixed crop farm is also similar to the other crop farm. However, we included 
pasture as the additional crop. The farm size is fixed to 200 hectare and the water capacity to 15,000 m3. To validate 
the accuracy of our crop water need, we manually calculated the crop water need the actual water need is calculated 
based on FAO’s formula for calculating crop water requirement [9]. and compared this value with the value generated 
by our irrigation management system.  
We run this experiment using four water reduction schemes at 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% and calculated the average 
difference between the actual reduction and the proposed reduction. This is to align with the real world setting where 
the water authority defines the water reduction percentage during water scarcity. We did not test it with reduction 
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scheme higher than 20% as the water reduction scheme is usually capped at 20%. In the pasture only farm, we set the 
weight for the three determinants as (𝑓𝑃𝑌=0.2, 𝑓𝑆𝑇 = 0.5, 𝑓𝐷𝑆 = 0.3) to indicate the importance of growth stage and 
drought sensitivity. In the other crops farm, we set the weight as (𝑓𝑃𝑌=0.5, 𝑓𝑆𝑇 = 0.3, 𝑓𝐷𝑆 = 0.2) and in the mixed 
crops farms the weight were set to (𝑓𝑃𝑌=0.5, 𝑓𝑆𝑇 = 0.3, 𝑓𝐷𝑆 = 0.2). 
5 Results and Analysis 
The proposed water reduction by the system is shown in Table1 and Fig.2. In grazing pasture only farm, the average 
water reduction is much higher than the actual reduction for all cases. Our proposed irrigation management system 
recorded a reduction percentage of 9.36%, 11.79%, 16.70% and 20.81% for 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% reduction 
scheme. It can be seen that the agent was able to propose a higher water reduction than the actual reduction. In the 
other crops farm, the average water reduction is similar with all pasture farm for all cases (10.01%, 12.39%, 16.70% 
and 21.96% respectively). The result for the mixed crops farm, also recorded a higher reduction percentage compared 
to the actual reduction. It recorded a reduction percentage of 9.36%, 20.46%, 20.46% and 21.96% for 5%, 10%, 15% 
and 20% reduction scheme. The results for the three types of farm are consistent across all the reduction schemes 
where all three recorded a higher than the actual reduction percentage. Based on this result, we can conclude that our 
proposed agent-based irrigation management system was able to consistently propose a significantly higher water 
reduction than the actual reduction required. 
Table 1. The average proposed water reduction for difference reduction schemes. 
 Water reduction (m3) 
 5% of reduction 10% of reduction 15% of reduction 20% of reduction 
 m3 % m3 % m3 % m3 % 
Actual water  
requirement 
15,000 100 15,000 100 15,000 100 15,000 100 
Actual reduction 750 5 1,500 10 2250 15 3000 20 
Proposed reduction 
(pasture) 
1,404.52  9.36  
1,768.92
. 
 11.79  2,504.5  16.70  3,121.46  20.81  
Proposed reduction 
(multiple crops) 
1,500.81  10.01  1,859.21  12.39  2,332.5  16.70  3,294.92  21.96  
Proposed reduction 
(crops and pasture) 
1,404.52  9.36  3,068.92  20.46  3,068.92  20.46  3,294.92  21.96  
 
 
Fig. 2. The average water reduction based on water reduction scheme 
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6 Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper, we describe an intelligent irrigation management system that makes water allocation decision based 
on the crop potential yield, the crop drought sensitivity and growth stage and the soil type. This tool is especially 
useful during water scarcity when farmers are required to make water reduction in the farm.  Based on experimental 
result, it can be seen that the proposed model was able to save water even when water reduction is in place. It 
consistently proposed a water reduction plan that is higher than the actual reduction. For future work, we plan to 
extend this work by creating a community of agents that can work together to optimize water allocation in a community 
irrigation scheme. If each agent can accurately work out its crop water requirement in the farm, then it is quite possible 
that there is excess water that can be used for other purposes such as trading it with the other farmers in the community 
who might not have sufficient water. This will help the authority to maximize the allocation of water across the region. 
This water trading mechanism will also need to be further investigated. 
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Abstract.  This paper describes a multi-agent irrigation management system that can be used to distribute water 
efficiently among farmers in a community irrigation scheme during water scarcity. Each farm is represented as an 
agent that can calculate how much water is needed in the farm and hence estimate the marginal profit for the farm 
based on how much water is available. During water scarcity such as drought, some farmers would face water 
shortages and some would have excess water for irrigation. To ensure efficient water distribution, those farmers 
with excess water should share their water with other farmers needing water. In this study, we used auction 
mechanism to distribute water efficiently among the farmers with the objective of maximizing the farmer’s expected 
utility (profit margin).  Our preliminary experiments showed that water distribution using auction mechanism 
yielded higher profit margin for all farmers in a community irrigation scheme when compared to direct negotiation 
strategy with a fixed price. 
Keywords: multi-agent negotiation, water allocation, auction mechanism, water scarcity. 
1 Introduction 
Water demand for irrigation in Canterbury has been increasing in the last 20 years. The New Zealand statistic data 
shows that irrigated areas in Canterbury have increased by 200,000 ha from 2002 to 2015(Dairy NZ, 2015). It is 
expected that water demand will affect the water allocation scheme in this region in the future. Currently, access to 
water is controlled by the government. However, farmers can apply for water consent to irrigate their areas. Water 
consent requests are processed and determined in the order they are received (on a first come first serve basis). This 
policy has worked in the past because the water demand and the total irrigated area were in equilibrium. However, the 
processing method based on first come first serve is no longer efficient as the demand for water has increased but the 
water capacity in Canterbury remains unchanged(Environment, 2004). Moreover, where water availability is not 
sufficient, this approach cannot ensure water allocation to most productive use. Therefore, community irrigation 
scheme are in practice, where farmers get water with high reliability and flexibility. Under this scheme, water is 
distributed to shareholders through piped system and water consent is obtained by the community irrigation scheme. 
Shareholders have to pay for their shares based on the size of the farm and water charges on annual basis. However, 
request for required irrigation must be done one day in advance. This scheme provides water to the shareholders based 
on their demand provided that there is enough water to meet the demand. If available water is not sufficient to meet 
100% of the demand, then the distribution is reduced proportionally.  
Since farmers need to estimate their water usage for farming and pay for it, they need to consider many aspects in 
the farm such as the size of the farm, the crops to be planted as well as the soil condition. If farmers overestimate, they 
risk paying more for the water and they will have unused excess water. If they underestimate, then they may run into 
water shortages which will result in poor crop yields which in turn affect their profit.  This becomes more serious 
during drought season when water is scarcer. Ideally, if farmers can decide on the irrigation plan that is dependent on 
the importance of the crops, they can keep their productivity and profit margin during water restriction(Anthony & 
Birendra, 2018). In a community irrigation scheme, during water scarcity, there are farmers who have excess water 
and farmers who have water shortages and it would be beneficial if farmers with excess water can extend this water 
to their counterparts who are facing water shortages. Unfortunately, these farmers do not have an efficient mechanism 
for selling or buying water from others when the situation arises.  
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In our previous work, we have developed an agent-based water management system that can be used by farmers to 
calculate the water requirement in the farm based on the types of crop, the soil condition and the size of the farm. 
However, this application can only be used for a single farm (Anthony & Birendra, 2018). In this paper, we described 
the extension of this work to a multi-agent system to improve water allocation and to investigate efficient water 
distribution mechanisms among the farmers in a community irrigation scheme. Each farm is represented as an 
intelligent agent that can work out the actual water needed for that farm at any given time. The agent can also work 
out the water shortage/excess for that farm as well as the marginal profit of that farm at any particular time (in this 
case, during drought season when water distribution is reduced). Each agent makes a decision on behalf of the farmer 
whether to buy or sell water and at what cost. These agents negotiate with each other to buy and sell water with the 
aim of maximizing their profit margins. In this preliminary experiment, we compared two negotiation strategies (the 
direct negotiation with fixed price and first price sealed-bid auction) and observed the additional profit obtained by 
the sellers and the total loss reduction for all the farmers in the community. This work advances the state of the art as 
it proposes a multi-agent irrigation management system that can allocate water efficiently in a farming community. 
This system consists of multiple agents that can make decision on behalf of the farmers whether to buy or sell water 
and negotiate with each other using negotiation strategies with the objective of maximizing their own profit margin. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the overview of irrigation system and water 
requirement estimation, auction process and agent irrigation management. The proposed multi-agent for irrigation 
management is discussed in Section 3. The initial experiment and results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 
5 concludes and discusses future works. 
2 Related Works 
2.1 Irrigation water need and tools 
There are three stages in the cycle of crop growth; 1) soil preparation 2) irrigation process and 3) after irrigation 
process. Farmers needs to work out an irrigation plan based on crop evapotranspiration (ET) and crop coefficient (Kc) 
(The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2004). ET is the summation of plant transpiration and 
evaporation from soil. The Kc value is determined based on the crop’s growth stage. Currently, there are computing 
tools that use ET and Kc factors to estimate irrigation water need and crop planning. The most popular ones are Irricalc 
and OVERSEER. The irrigation water need formula is defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)(Testa 
et al., 2011). Both OVERSEER and IrriCalc follow the crop water need formula (1) to estimate the crop water need. 
However, both tools can only be used to calculate for a single crop farm and they do not provide an option for multiple 
crops water calculation(Testa et al., 2011)(Wheeler & Bright, 2015). The crop water need calculation is as follows: 
 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝 =  𝐸𝑇0  ×  𝐾𝐶  (1) 
In this equation, 𝐸𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝  is the crop water need, 𝐸𝑇0 is the influence of climate on crop water need and 𝐾𝐶  
is the influence of crop type on crop water need. Based on the crop water need, farmers can then estimate the water 
requirement and the cost of water for their yearly farming schedule. Farmer can also estimate the total profit for their 
farm. During water restriction scheme, they make decision on which crops should have higher irrigation priority 
(usually based on which crops yield higher profit).  
 
2.2 Margin value and crop value 
The profit margin for crop productivity can be calculated using the following formula(Klos & Nooteboom, 2001). 
 𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (2) 
𝑉𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 is total profit in the farm which is calculated by subtracting the farming cost (Total Cost) from the crop 
revenue (Total Revenue). The crop revenue varies by plot size, value of crop (price per kilogram) and harvesting 
season. The farming cost includes the water consent fee, purchases of fertilizers (dollar/hectare), labour charges, etc. 
The goal is to obtain as much profit as possible.  
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2.3 Multi-agent approach and auction system 
Multi-agent agent system has been applied to solve complex problems such as  resource allocation 
problems(Jennings, 2002). Agent can be adapted to many types of modelling with varying agent behaviors (Le Bars 
et al., 2004). When the environment changes, agent can learn and adapt itself to the desires of its users(Bellifemine et 
al., 2007) . Agent based model has also been implemented in water resource allocation. For example, agent based 
model was used for capturing the collective problems in small and large scale water infrastructure provision. This is 
done by simulating the different behaviors of water users to learn and understand the complexity of water use at Maule 
river basin(Berger et al., 2006). Giuliani et al.(Giuliani et al., 2015) proposed a multi-agent system to demonstrate a 
hypothetical water allocation problem. This model involved several active agents and passive agents under the same 
environment to investigate efficiency-acceptability tradeoff. The results were used to support the design of a 
distributed solution. In terms of water policy analysis, multi-agent can be used to create simulation model for improved 
policies. For example, uncertainty analysis was applied in agent-based model for optimising complexity of residential 
water use in Beijing, China. The multi-agent can evaluate the consumer responses on water and provide insights to 
seller agency to develop water usage policy(Chu et al., 2009). (W. Huang, Zhang, & Wang, 2011) developed a water 
resource allocation in China using multi-agent and complex adaptive system. In this work, multi-agent was used to 
verify rules of internal stage and behavior of the agent based on government policy. The results showed that the typical 
characteristics from agent changed based on the situation and can be used to improved water management policies. 
(Ding et al., 2016) used agent-based modeling to understand the interaction between stakeholder’s in transboundary 
Nile River. This work generated farmers and water sharing scheme with the intention to optimize allocated water for 
each user and finding optimal water allocation method for stockholder’s at basin based on crop types  and user 
behaviours (Ding et al., 2016). Multi-agent modelling was implemented to optimize the trade-policies of inter basin 
water restriction in Texas, USA. The multi-agent model and complex adaptive system was developed to simulate 
consumer agents and were encoded to represent the interaction between consumers and policy maker agents to 
evaluate the performance of demand-side strategies (Krishna, 2010).  
An auction is a process of buying and selling goods or services. The most popular auction protocol is the English 
auction which is an ascending-price auction. The auctioneer begins with lowest acceptable price and proceeds to 
finding the highest bidder. The auction is considered complete when no one increases their bid price and the item is 
sold to the bidder with the highest price (Krishna, 2010)(Mcafee et al., 2018). Another popular auction protocol is the 
first-price sealed bid auction where all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids within a specified period of time 
and they have no knowledge of what the others bid. The winner is the one with the highest bid and he pays the price 
he submitted.  There are many applications that apply auction mechanisms such as EBay and TradeMe. Both use 
intelligent agents to provide facility for users to make automated bids in auctions.  To use the bidding agent, users 
only need to setup the maximum and minimum bid price for the item they are interested in(Bonabeau, 2002). 
Book.com uses continuous double auction that applies Markov model for agent behaviour to create bidding strategies. 
This auction supports trading process for users who can freely join and leave the trading market (Park, Durfee, & 
Birmingham, 2000). Sealed bid auction with econometric analysis was used in mussels’ market in Netherlands. The 
purpose of this analysis was to identify factors that determine the mussels’ price and to quantify the performance  of 
individual purchase managers(Kleijnen & Van Schaik, 2011). It can be seen that the auction process is useful for 
trading goods and is also applicable to water allocation within a community irrigation scheme.  
3 Multi-agent model for irrigation management 
3.1 Conceptual design 
This study focuses on using multi-agent approach to find an efficient mechanism for water allocation between 
farmers in a community irrigation scheme during water scarcity. As mentioned, each agent represents a farm that can 
calculate the total water requirement of the farm, prioritise crops to be irrigated, calculate water reduction for each 
crop in the farm, make decision whether to sell or buy water and negotiate with other agents. The multi-agent 
environment and the pseudo code for multi-agent water management system is shown in Fig.1. The system can be 
explained to two parts; 1) Total crop water need on single farm and 2) the negotiation process using first-price sealed 
bid auction. The crop water need is calculated using Equation (1) on each crop. The crop water need for a single farm 
is calculated using the single agent water management algorithm(Chiewchan, Anthony, & Samarasinghe, 2019). The 
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agent is able to estimate the crop water need on a daily basis based on the farming information such as crop types, 
crop stage, and soil type (more details can be found in [3]). 
 
Fig. 1. Pseudo code for multi-agent irrigation management system 
Agent creates a crops prioritized list which follows the decision rules based on productivity value, drought 
sensitivity and soil type respectively. The result of the calculation will show the total crop water need in the farm and 
whether the agent will be participating in the water marketplace as a bidder or a seller. The decision whether an agent 
should be a seller or a bidder is based on the farming profit calculation shown below:  
 𝑃 = ∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖 − ∑ 𝐹𝐶𝑗   (3) 
Here,  𝑃 is the total marginal profit in the farm, 𝐶𝑉 is the total crop value, 𝐹𝐶 is the total farming cost, 𝑖 is the 
crops planted in the farm and 𝑗 is the farming cost factors for each crop. 
Based on the crop water requirement, the agent can decide to be a seller if it has excess water, or it can be a buyer 
(bidder) agent if it has water shortage. The seller agent will work out the reserve price (minimum price it is willing to 
sell the water) for its water based on price per cubic meter. On the other hand, a buyer agent sets a reserve price 
(maximum price it is willing to buy water) which is dependent on the expected profit in the farm. The water pricing 
equations are shown in (4, 5 and 6). The water price for agents varies by farming profit. We can assume that the profit 
will decrease during water scarcity but the total farm cost is the same. In this situation, the farming profit value will 
decrease if farmer does not have enough water for the farm as shown in Equation (4). On the other hand, if the farmer 
has more water than required, he can gain more profit by selling water to others as shown in Equation (5). The expected 
profit function is shown in Equation (6) where 𝑥 is the profit changed value (in dollars), 𝑓(𝑦) is the total farm cost 
function and 𝑓(𝑧) is the utility function for water pricing. 𝑓(𝑧) is then used as a maximum price for the buyer agent 
and a minimum price for the seller agent. 
𝑃 − 𝑥 =  𝑓(𝑥)𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑓(𝑦)𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡  (4) 
𝑃 + 𝑥 =  𝑓(𝑥)𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑓(𝑦)𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡    (7) 
𝑓(𝑧) = {
∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖 − ∑ 𝐹𝐶𝑗 − 𝑥     ; 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒
∑ 𝐶𝑉𝑖 − ∑ 𝐹𝐶𝑗 + 𝑥     ; 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒
  (6) 
3.2 Multi-agent irrigation management process 
In this scenario, we used two negotiation mechanisms (direct negotiation with fixed price and first-price sealed bid 
auction). The direct negotiation with fixed price mechanism is where a seller wishes to sell his excess water with a 
fixed price. The seller will broadcast this sale to the all the agents in the marketplace. Any buyer agents who are 
willing to buy water at this price will respond with an offer to buy from the seller agent. If there are multiple buyers 
making the offers, the seller will sell the water at the price he set to the first buyer who offered to buy the water (see 
Fig.2 (a)). The second negotiation mechanism is using first-price sealed-bid auction. The seller broadcasts to all the 
agents in the marketplace with the auction deadline and each buyer agent will then make an offer to the seller agent.  
When time is up, the seller will select the highest bidder as the winner (see - (Fig.2 (b)) as long as the bid is equal to 
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or higher than the seller’s reserve price. In this case, the bidders have no knowledge of the reserve price set by the 
seller. They are also not privy to the bids of the other bidder agents.  
 
  
(a) Direct negotiation with fixed price  
mechanism 
(b) First-price sealed-bid auction  
Mechanism 
Fig. 2. Negotiation mechanisms 
3.3 Experimental setup 
The purpose of this experiment is to determine which negotiation mechanism is more efficient in water allocation 
within a community irrigation scheme. To test the performance of multi-agent irrigation management system, we 
conducted the two experiment using the two seller agents and twenty bidder agents using the two negotiation 
mechanisms.  For each experiment, we randomly generated 20 farms with varying crop properties which are common 
in New Zealand’s farm. Crop properties are randomized based on the growth stage and crop types. The farm size is 
fixed to 200 hectares and the water capacity to 15,000 m3. The actual water need is calculated based on FAO’s formula 
for calculating crop water requirement(Doorenbos & Pruitt, 1977). To simulate water scarcity situation, we run this 
experiment using three reduction schemes at 5%, 10% and 15% (these reduction schemes are set by the community 
irrigation scheme based on the water availability) and compared the total loss of all the farmers in the community. We 
also observe the additional profit earned by those sellers with excess water. 
4 Results and Analysis 
Table 1 shows the total loss for the all the farmers (sellers and bidders) in the irrigation scheme. If water is not 
traded among the agents, the total loss are 10.23% (5% reduction), 11.54% (10% reduction) and 13.11% (15% 
reduction). Using direct negotiation with fixed price mechanism to trade water, the total loss is reduced to 9.77%, 
11.23% and 12.97% respectively. It can also be seen that, all the remaining water are distributed to the farms (shown 
as 0.00 in the table). This also shows that it is better to trade the excess water as the losses can be reduced. This would 
mean that the sellers gained additional profit by selling their water to the other farmers who need it which in turn allow 
the buyers to reduce their losses. Using first-price sealed bid auction mechanism, the loss is reduced further to 9.12%, 
10.80 and 12.35% for the three reduction schemes. All excess water were also successfully traded. This indicates that 
water allocation using first-price sealed bid auction resulted in a lower loss compared to direct negotiation with fixed 
price mechanism. This also means that allocating water using auction mechanism is economically better than using 
fixed price mechanism. 
Table 1. The average proposed water management for difference reduction schemes. 
 Water reduction (m3) 
 5% of reduction 10% of reduction 15% of reduction 
 Value % Value % Value % 
Total water left (m3) 28,080 9.36 37,200.00 12.40 39,210.00 13.07 
Total loss ($) 710,371 10.23 801,337.60 11.54 910,358.40 13.11 
Fixed price mechanism 
Total water left (m3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total loss ($) 678,428.80 9.77 779,811.20 11.23 900,636.80 12.97 
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Auction mechanism 
Total water left (m3) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total loss ($) 633,292.80 9.12 749,952.00 10.80 857,584.00 12.35 
Fig.3 shows the percentage of marginal profit based on trading mechanism. It can be seen from Fig.3 that 
farmers/agents with excess water cannot gain additional profit if water is not traded (shown as 0 in Fig.3). However, 
it can be seen that using direct negotiation, sellers gain additional profit. (1.97% with 5% reduction, 2.21% with 10% 
reduction and 3.57% with 15% reduction).  This is as expected as trading excess water would lead to additional profit 
for the sellers. It can also be observed that using first-price sealed bid auction mechanism, the additional marginal 
profit is higher that the additional marginal profit gained from direct negotiation with fixed price. The additional 
marginal profit increases to 2.28%, 2.85% and 3.89% respectively.  Both trading mechanisms yielded additional 
marginal profit, but first-price sealed bid auction would be the preferred mechanism as it generated higher additional 
profit margin. 
  
Fig. 3. The percentage of agent’s marginal profit  
5 Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper, we describe a multi-agent irrigation management system that can be used to distribute water efficiently 
between farms in a community irrigation scheme.  The advantage of this MAS system is in its ability to autonomously 
decide on behalf of the farmer whether to engage in a negotiation or not depending on the current water situation in 
the farm. This MAS is especially useful for farmer who needs to optimize marginal profit in the farm during water 
scarcity. Based on the preliminary experimental result, it can be seen that the total loss for each farm can be reduced 
using first-price sealed bid auction. This loss is much lower when compared to trading water using direct negotiation 
with fixed price. Moreover, seller agents with excess water were able to obtained additional profit when they traded 
their excess water. In this experiment, it can also be observed that using auction mechanism is better than direct 
negotiation as it resulted in higher (additional) marginal profit.  For future work, we plan to extend this work by 
implementing combinatorial auction to trade water. In its current design, it is assumed that the farmers sell their excess 
water as a single unit. In reality, farmers might be more interested in buying parts of the water (purchase certain 
volume for a certain price) depending on their needs. This means, that if a farmer has a 1000m3 in volume, he can 
choose to sell the water in units with different prices (200m3 at $x, 500m3 at $y and 300m3 at $z).  It is quite possible 
that farmers will be able to recover their losses further by using this mechanism and may result in a more efficient 
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